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Abstract
Empirical research in the Arab countries, based on the surveying of opinion, has been very
rare. This is because the regimes in power have generally been reluctant to allow opinion to be
tested. This study, however, is based on such survey research, carried out in the spring and
summer of 1994 among 500 Libyan male and female students at Garyunis University in
Benghazi. The survey of political culture in Libya covered a variety of dimensions, namely
identity, tribe and tribalism, political participation, the role of women within society, Arab
unity, Arab nationalism, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The methodology is based on stratified
samples with simple random sampling, employing a questionnaire. The data is statistically
analysed with the help of the SPSS computer package, and by using a number of statistical
procedures, such as frequencies, cross-tabulations and cluster analyses.
The ultimate aims of this study are: First, to explore the attitudes of the students towards
elements of the state ideology of the revolutionary regime; second, to investigate the extent to
which political culture is still influenced by traditional, pre-regime values and ideas, reflecting
the social life of Libyans before the ideological, economic and social changes since the 1960s;
third, to examine the role of the regime's ideology, structures, and particularly the school
system in inculcating national identity and belief in Arab unity and Arab nationalism; and
finally, to examine the values of a generation which has gone through the school system and
the ideological preparation camps, and see whether their values are congruent with the values
taught to them in those institutions. Particular attention is paid here to views on women's
rights and gender roles.
The findings of the study show that the revolutionary regime in Libya has had considerable
success in creating certain values among the younger generation. The regime was most
successful in inculcating its values on Arab nationalism, Arab unity and the Palestinian
lii
problem, and on gender roles and equality between the sexes. Both males and females
displayed progressive attitudes towards gender equality, but the women had the more
progressive viewpoints. However, the regime has failed to create participant individuals and to
develop alternatives to kinship ties. Tribes, and the family, remain an important, localist,
source of identity and economic welfare. Moreover, Arabism and Islam are found to be the
main source of identification. This reflects the fact that the regime's ideology intertwines
Arabism and Islam.
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1. Introduction
1.1	 Political Culture: An Introduction
The concept of 'political culture' in political science has effectively emerged during the last
four decades. In 1956, Gabriel Almond introduced the concept of political culture in his early
attempt to offer a classification for comparing political systems. As he stated, "every political
system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. I have found it
useful to refer to this as the political culture".' At some stages the term has been subject to
criticism, but now attention has returned, especially in the aftermath of the collapse of
communism in Central and Eastern Europe.
The notion of political culture, however, is not a particularly new one. As Almond wrote in
1980: "political culture has been around as long as men have spoken and written about
politics."2 Almond contends that the notion of political cultural change is one of the most
powerful themes of classical literature. 3 For instance, the Greeks had a cyclical theory of
political change, and explained the rise and role of political constitutions in socio-
psychological terms. Historically, Plato, Aristotle, Abu Nasr al-Farabi, Ibn Khaldun, Abu
Bala Ibn al-Asamm, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and de Tocqueville emphasised
themes of political culture and political socialisation.4
Political culture is concerned with issues regarding people's knowledge and beliefs about
politics, and with the attitudes that they acquire towards matters such as political ideology,
orientation towards authority and political activity.
Political culture as an approach constitutes an essential means of understanding change within
society. However, in the Middle East region, especially in the Arab countries, there have been
relatively few studies that have dealt with political culture and political socialisation or
focused on the people's beliefs, attitudes and values towards the government or political
leaders.5 Undertaking such research in the Arab countries, especially when using an empirical
method such as survey research, has been very rare. This is because the regimes in power
have generally been reluctant to allow opinion to be tested.
As Suleiman indicated, many Arabs are not accustomed to answering questions put to them in
questionnaire form. 6
 Moreover, several types of social, cultural and political constraints are
present which contribute to the difficulties of research. First, there is mistrust of outside
researchers. Second, there is the absence of academic freedom in some Arab states.
Furthermore, "in the few Arab countries where such research is allowed, securing a permit to
conduct the research is often a long, uncertain and complicated process requiring the approval
of several ministries."' Third, there is also the problem of 'sensitive' issues where authorities
often refuse to allow research claiming that it constitutes a threat to the security of the state.'
Fourth, the researcher has to deal with the absence of freedom of speech and freedom of
expression, which may lead to respondents being afraid to express themselves in the
questionnaire.
Despite these problems and difficulties, some studies have been carried out in various Arab
countries.9 With reference to Libya, studies have looked at political development, political
mobilisation and political socialisation. 16 As a whole, these studies have identified some of the
problems which the Libyan regime has faced in socialising its citizens, especially the young
generation (school children), and have then identified some of the means that the regime has
embarked upon to achieve its ends, for example through the use of school textbooks.
1.1.1	 Political culture in Libya
Historically, the religion of Islam, the tribe as one of the traditional social institutions, and
education have played a crucial role in shaping the political culture in Libya. In addition, the
ideological factor in nation-building in Libya became a significant one since the revolution in
September 1969.
Libya as a developing country and an Arab Middle Eastern state has faced a number of
political challenges, especially following the revolutionary transformation. The first challenge,
as perceived by the post-1969 regime, was to unite the country as one nation. The second was
the dual task of undertaking both socio-economic and political changes in an attempt to build
a new society. The third was to create a 'new citizen' and a 'new political culture' and to
change some of the values, attitudes and patterns of behaviour which Libyans inherited from
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the previous eras of Ottoman, Italian and monarchical rule." Such efforts at attempting to
create a new political culture obliged the new regime to embark upon a mammoth programme
of political socialisation and resocialisation. Yet no empirical study has investigated the extent
to which the regime has succeeded in its political socialisation and resocialisation of Libyan
students.
1.2	 Statement of the Problem
The key issue of this thesis is to understand the influence of state ideology on the young
generation in Libya. The revolutionary regime has made a tremendous effort to create a
Libyan lamahirian citizen', by employing the main agents of political socialisation, namely
media and education. It has targeted the young generation, in particular students.
The attitudes of young Libyan citizens towards the revolutionary regime's ideology will be
explored through studying the political attitudes of Libyan university students, that is the
revolutionary generation. The primary data to be used comes from a survey of university
students, both male and female, through a questionnaire which was administered by the
researcher in Libya during the spring and summer of 1994. The research is an attempt to
investigate the relationship between Libyan citizens and the political system and at the same
time to find out how far the regime has succeeded in creating politically active, participatory,
nationally conscious and motivated citizens with a commitment to Arab nationalism and Arab
unity, and to equality for women.
This study will build upon the aforementioned works; 12 its originality stems from using
university students as the test case. The educational sector has always played a crucial role in
political socialisation in Libya; during the 1950's and 1960's, for example, Pan-Arab
nationalism was orchestrated through the school system, which affected political life in Libya
strongly and effectively.13
1.3	 Definitions of Terms
Some of the main terms used in this study will now be defined.
Political Culture: Political culture is used in this study to refer to "people's political
orientation, beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments towards the political system and its
various parts, and the role of the self in that system." 14 This term will be used as a concept in
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exploring the political attitudes of Libyan university students towards some elements of the
ideology of the revolutionary regime in Libya. In the empirical investigation and the analyses
derived from that investigation, political culture is addressed through a consideration of the
set of detailed attitudes expressed by the students.
Political Participation: Political participation is used in this study to refer to "the act of
taking part in the formulation, passage or implementation of public policies. This broad
definition applies to the activities of any person, whether an elected politician, a government
official or an ordinary citizen, who is active in any way in the production of policy within any
type of political system". 15 It is not part of the definition that political participants must be
successful or effective in affecting public policy, although their actions might be expected to
have more than a purely symbolic function.
Political Socialisation: Political socialisation is used in this thesis to help in explaining the
political socialisation process in Libya. The concept according to Greenstein can be defined in
either broad or narrow terms. In narrow terms, political socialisation is the "deliberate
inculcation of political information, values and practices by institutional agents who have
been formally charged with this responsibility. A broader conception would encompass all
political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned at every stage of the life
cycle, including not only explicit political learning but also nominally non-political learning
that effects political behaviour, such as the learning of politically relevant social attitudes and
the acquisition of politically relevant personality characteristics". I6 This study will use the
term in the narrower sense.
Identity: Identity is defined here as a sense of shared characteristics held by a group of
individuals. One identity is not exclusive of others, since people can have a sense of belonging
to a religious grouping, a culture, a state and a region, all at the same time. Moreover, the
weight which individuals give to particular elements of their identity can change over time.
The task is to assess what weight individuals give to the different elements of their identity,
and how those elements relate to one another.
Tribe: Tribe is defined here as a system of social organisation which includes several local
groups — villages, bands, districts, or lineages — and normally includes a common territory,
a common language, and a common culture. The elements constituting a tribe may or may not
be co-ordinated by formal or centralised political power. Ideally, the term 'tribe' implies a
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large element of solidarity based on strongly shared primary sentiments. Such solidarity
becomes contractual as the tribal organisation becomes more formally organised."
Islamist, Arabist and Localist: These terms are used in this study with relation to identity.
'Islamists' are those who cite Islam as the main source of their identification, and those who
are Islam-oriented. `Arabise refers to those for whom Arabism is the main source of
identification and those who are Arab-oriented. `Localist' refers to those for whom family,
tribe and region are the main source of their identification. It is worth noting that the use of
these terms here differs to some degree from the way in which they have been employed by
other researchers.
1.4	 The Objectives of the Study
This study will compare the actual values, identities and amount of political participation by
the students with what these would be if the regime's processes of political socialisation had
achieved their objectives. The study will also explore the extent to which these values,
identities and political participation reflect pre-regime value systems in Libya, with particular
reference to issues related to the 'tribe' and 'Arab nationalism'. In an exploratory survey-
based study of this type, it is generally not considered appropriate to formulate hypotheses in
the strict sense of specific testable statements." In dealing with complex covariation in the
real world, different models can fit the observed data. Our choice among them is determined
by our historical and other qualitative-based knowledge of the world. The ultimate aims of
this study are:
a) To explore the attitudes of the students towards some elements of the state ideology of
the revolutionary regime.
b) To investigate the extent to which political culture is still influenced by traditional
values and ideas, reflecting the social life of Libyans before the ideological, economic
and social changes which have occurred since the 1960s.
c) To examine the role of the regime's ideology, structures, and particularly the school
system in inculcating national identity, belief in Arab unity and Arab nationalism.
d) To examine the values of a generation which has gone through the school system and
the ideological preparation camps and see whether their values are congruent with the
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values taught to them in those institutions. Particular attention will be paid here to
views on women's rights and gender roles.
1.5	 Method and Procedures
As Bryman has suggested, social scientists are likely to create greater confidence in their
findings when they employ more than one method of investigation, and hence more than one
type of data. 19 This study combines both quantitative and qualitative research methods, into
what Bryman refers to as 'triangulation of measurement' ."
In exploring the attitudes of Libyan university students towards some elements of the ideology
of the revolutionary regime in Libya, the empirical method chosen was survey research.
The main part of the survey is based on a questionnaire, which was distributed to 500
university students of both sexes. Personal interviews with 15 students was conducted at the
end of the data-collecting process. The reason for using interviews as another tool was to
explore in more depth some of the information and answers provided by the respondents to the
questionnaire.
The questionnaire comprised 62 open- and closed-ended multiple choice questions, divided
into seven main categories (see Appendix A). The questions were originally written in English
and then translated into Arabic. The type of sampling used in the survey was a stratified
sample with simple random sampling within categories. The methods used for selecting
samples and other field procedures are described in more detail in Chapter 4.
Three kinds of data sources were used: firstly, the empirical sources, that is questionnaire
survey research; secondly, official Libyan publications and statistics; and thirdly, secondary
material, mainly theoretical material concerning political culture, political socialisation, and
identity.
1.6	 The Limits of this Study
The limits of this study can be summarised as follows:
a) This study is primarily concerned with the effects of socialisation via the education
system and the regime's attempts to change and create a 'new' political culture in
Libyan society. It would not be appropriate (although it can provide a basis) to use the
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outcomes of this study to generalise about other specific groups or strata within society
such as women, workers or farmers, as the regime has endowed each with its own
special role.
b) The study did not investigate the attitudes of non-Libyan students at the university.
1.7	 The Significance of this Study
This study seeks to fill a gap in research about political culture in the Middle East in general
and the Arab countries in particular. With reference to Libya, studies have looked at political
development, political mobilisation and political socialisation, but none of them have explored
the notion of political culture.
Moreover, there have been very few empirical studies in the political field in Libya in general.
The contribution of this thesis is an assessment of the influence of state ideology on the young
Libyan generation; its originality will stem from using university students in examining
political culture. Given the lack of political attitudes studies in Libyan society, the greatest
attention has necessarily been devoted to the survey findings.
1.8	 Structure and Organisation of this Study
This study is divided into ten chapters. The first is an introductory chapter which states the
problem, the aims of the study, methodology, and limits of the study. Chapter 2 examines the
current literature on political culture theory. The focus is on research contributions from
scholars who have dealt with political culture as a concept in the last three decades. Particular
attention will be given to political culture in the Arab countries.
Chapter 3 focuses on the historical background of Libya, providing some understanding of
factors that shaped the political culture of contemporary Libyan society. This chapter gives
particular attention to the role played by education and religion and the state ideology of the
revolutionary regime since 1969. The chapter also examines the revolutionary regime's use of
political socialisation as an instrument to create "revolutionary citizens".
Chapter 4 deals with the survey process and the sample. This chapter describes the process of
the survey which was carried out in spring and summer 1994 at Garyunis University. The
chapter covers the aims and objectives of the research, data collection, selection of samples
and the questionnaire design, data treatment and the statistical procedures, and the
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characteristics of the sample through background factors such as the place of family
residence, or parental education level.
Chapter 5 analyses and explores the attitudes of the university students towards the identity
question through a number of dimensions of potential identifications, such as Arabism and
Islamism on the one hand, and the traditional, localist sources of identity (region, tribe,
family, city) and the state on the other hand.
Chapter 6 deals with tribe and tribalism in Libya through exploring the attitudes of the
university students towards tribalism. The chapter also examines attachment and loyalty
towards the tribe among the respondents.
Chapter 7 examines the amount of political participation of Libyan university students.
Political participation in Libya is examined by studying the institutions for participation
which the regime has created. The chapter seeks to explore the attitudes of students to their
role in the political participation process in Libya, also covering the experience of
participation which respondents have had within their families, at school and university.
Chapter 8 examines attitudes to the role of women in society. The chapter focuses on
changing attitudes towards women in Libyan society through describing the traditional values
and views relating to women on the one hand, and the ideology and policies of the
revolutionary regime towards women on the other hand. Examining the image of women in the
school curricula is a further focus of this chapter.
Chapter 9 explores the attitudes of Libyan students towards some Arab issues, namely Arab
unity and the Palestinian issue. The chapter seeks to ascertain whether the regime has
succeeded in instilling its values and some elements of its ideology related to Arab nationalism
and Arab unity in the students as an important stratum within Libyan society.
Chapter 10 summarises the main themes of the study, discussions and analysis of the
problems, and makes some suggestions for future research.
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2. Political Culture: Theoretical
Considerations
2.1	 Introduction
In 1979, Elkins and Simeon stated that "political culture is one of the most popular and
seductive concepts in political science; it is also one of the most controversial and confused."1
This reflects the fact that the concept has been employed and debated by many scholars;
through their theoretical debates they have created a considerable amount of literature on the
subject. The concept has, therefore, survived a significant amount of criticism. "What is
distinctive about the concept of political culture, is the enduring nature of its appeal in the
face of large body of criticism."2 The increasing attention given by scholars to the term in the
last few years indicates that the concept has had a "renaissance", as Ronald Inglehart has
described it. 3 Furthermore, as Almond has mentioned
the movements that have most actively polemicized against political culture as an
explanatory variable (Marxism of various kinds, and rational choice theory) now seem
to have run out of steam, appear to be inclined to negotiate settlements, rather than
requiring unconditional surrender.4
The main focus of the literature on political culture is on three regions: industrial societies,
communist societies and East Asian societies. This chapter contains a theoretical review of the
literature of political culture in general, but particular attention will be given to political
culture in the Arab countries. The first section is devoted to an analysis of the historical
development of the concept through a historical review. This part also focuses on definitions
of political culture. The second deals with the criticism of the term and its rehabilitation. The
third section focuses on the relationship between political culture and political socialisation.
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The fourth covers the analysis of political culture in Arab countries. Finally, studies of
political socialisation in Arab countries will be reviewed.
2.2	 A Historical Review of Study of Political Culture
Historically, the idea of political culture has been around ever since people have written about
politics. Scholarly interest in the notion of political culture goes back at least as far as Plato,
when he argued in The Republic that:
Governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and there must be as many of the
one as there are of the other. For we can not suppose that states are made of 'oak and
rock' and not out of the human natures which are in them.'
Plato stressed the importance of political culture and discussed what can be termed political
socialisation, i.e. political orientations coming about through education and childhood
socialisation. 6 The question of education was picked up by Aristotle in his book Politics. He
showed the importance of political culture through his description of the optimum
government, which he believed came from a mixed polity. Almond states that
Aristotle's conception of mixed government with a predominant middle class is related
to what some of the modem scholars in recent years have characterized as the civic
culture in which there is a substantial consensus on the legitimacy of political
institutions and the direction and content of public policy, a widespread tolerance of a
plurality of interests and belief in their reconcilability, and a widely distributed sense of
political competence and mutual trust in the citizenry.'
Ideas of political culture were not just debated in the West, but were also found in the Islamic
world. Abu-Nasr al-Farabi, 8 an Arab thinker, in his book 'Ara 'a Ahl al-Madina al-Fadila
[the Opinions of the People of the virtuous city], stresses the role of education and the creation
of good citizenship through the education process.
Machiavelli also emphasised themes of political culture and political socialisation. He
developed notions as to how political leaders should act to promote support and loyalty.
Machiavelli "instructed the prince on how to act to command the respect and loyalty —
although not necessarily the love — of his subjects."9
Rousseau also reflected on the importance of political culture and socialisation processes. He
was influenced by Montesquieu, who studied French culture and society through sociological,
anthropological and psychological approaches in a bid to explain the national history and
political institutions of his time. Rousseau discussed political culture through such terms as
morality, custom and opinion.
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Another thinker who paid attention to political culture as a core idea was de Tocqueville. In
his book Democracy in America, de Tocqueville states that
In order that society should exist and, a fortiori, that a society should prosper, it is
necessary that the mind of all the citizens should be rallied and held together by certain
predominant ideas; and this cannot be the case unless each of them sometimes draws
his opinions from the common source and consents to accept certain matters of belief
already formed.°
As the notion of political culture has always been around, the sudden appearance of the term
itself at the end of 1950s and early 1960s needs an explanation. A number of factors account
for it. First, Almond suggests that the "failure of enlightenment and liberal expectations as
they related to political development and political culture set the explanatory problem to
which political culture research was a response." n Second, the development of social theory
in general in the 19th and 20th centuries was crucial in prompting political culture studies.
Third, the development of survey research methodology and technology in the period
following the Second World War has increased the practical potential for undertaking studies
of political culture.
In 1956, Gabriel Almond first introduced the concept of "political culture" as part of his
formula for the classification and comparison of political systems. In the early 1960s he,
together with Sidney Verba, carried out an empirical study and survey of attitudes in five
countries, which was published in their study, The Civic Culture (1963). They defined the
concept of political culture as covering the political attitudes and orientations of individuals in
relation to the political system: "Attitudes towards the political system and its various parts,
and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system."12 "Orientation" refers to the
internalised aspects of objects and relationships. It includes: (i) cognitive orientation, (ii)
affective orientation, and (iii) evaluative orientation. 13 These orientations refer to the
knowledge of individuals and their beliefs about the political system, their feeling about the
political system, and their judgements of it."4 In other words, political culture "becomes the
frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward the
political system in general, its input and output aspects, and the self as political actor." 15 The
orientations which Almond and Verba describe become the basis for the three types of
political culture, which are: parochial, where individuals have low expectations and
awareness of government and are generally not involved; subject, where the individuals are
aware of the output of the political system but do not participate in the process of policy
decisions; and participant, where individuals are active and involved in the political system as
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a whole in both the input and output of the system. I6 This analysis shows that Almond and
Verba consider political culture and its role as part of the political process.
Some other scholars have reiterated Almond's formulation of political culture. Lucian W. Pye
was one of them. For Pye, political culture provides "an ordered subjective realm of politics,"
which is found on two levels. "For the individual the political culture provides controlling
guidelines for effective political behaviour, and for the collectivity it gives a systematic
structure of values and rational considerations which ensures coherence in the performance of
institutions and organisations." I7 Political culture then is the product both of collective
histories and individual life histories of the political system. It evolves also from conscious
learning about politics. As Chilcote states, "it gives a behavioural form of analysis to such
terms as ideology, national spirit, and values of people."18
For Verba political culture as a concept consists of the "system of empirical beliefs,
expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes
place."I9 Verba suggests a number of dimensions of political culture, including beliefs and
ways of identifying with politics, in particular with the nation-state; with one's fellow citizens;
with governmental output and operation; and with the process of making-decisions the
political output. 2° Similarly, Kavanagh defined political culture as "the values, beliefs, and
emotions that give meaning to political behaviour. These are the values which create
predispositions for people to behave in a particular way or which provide justifications for
behaviour."21
Despite some differences, all the above definitions share the idea that all the values found in
the political system are part of political culture.22 Political culture is regarded as a subculture,
or as a part of the general culture of society. Political culture is seen as something which can
change slowly and gradually, reflecting general changes in the socio-economics and politics of
any society.
2.3	 A Criticism of Political Culture
Since the publication of Almond and Verba's work in the 1960s, the concept and theory of
political culture has been attacked by scholars from a variety of perspectives. One line of
criticism was directed at the definition of political culture. Lijphart and Pateman were
prominent advocates of such criticism. Lijphart criticised Almond and Verba for their broad
definition of the term political culture, going beyond orientations towards political objects to
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include general social and interpersonal re1ations. 23 He argued that such definition introduced
vagueness to the term. This vagueness could be avoided by limiting political culture as a
concept to the explicitly political. In Lijphart's discussion of Almond and Verba's work the
Civic Culture, he adhered to the narrow definition of political culture and concentrated on the
"links between political culture as independent variable and political structure as the
dependent variable, leaving aside the antecedent influence of the social structures and
processes."24
Carole Pateman criticised Almond and Verba's conception of political culture on the grounds
that they made political orientations and attitudes a necessary part of the political system, in
so far as attitudes are linked closely to certain institutions.25 As Street has stated, "if this is
true, then it is impossible for Almond and Verba to retain the view that political culture
constitutes an independent variable.26
Jerzy Wiatr's critique is an example of the Marxist line of criticism. He argued that Ahnond
and Verba in their analysis missed the "relationship between socio-economic reality and
political institutions, on the one hand, and the impact this relationship has on political culture,
on the other hand."27 A similar analysis was given by Paternan when she stated that Almond
and Verba's "argument completely neglects the association between class and participation
and implies that social status is irrelevant to which side of the balance a citizen occupies, or to
the citizen's view of the rationality of action or inaction."28
2.4	 The Relationship between Political Culture and Political
Socialisation
When studying political culture, researchers should familiarise themselves with the related
concept of political socialisation. The term "socialisation", according to Almond et al, refers
to "the way children are introduced to the values and attitudes of their society." 29 Almond et
al add that political socialisation is "the part of this process that shapes political attitudes."3°
Political socialisation, then, is the process by which political cultures are maintained or
changed. Through the performance of this function, individuals are inducted into the political
culture, and their orientations toward political objects are formed. 31 Political socialisation is
also the source of changes in the patterns of political culture. Political socialisation is a
"process whereby political attitudes and values are inculcated as children become adults and
as adults are recruited into roles."32
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Thus political socialisation is a tool for disseminating political culture and all the propensities,
attitudes, beliefs and values which make up that phenomenon. In essence, the latter are a
consequence of political socialisation. One of the typical definitions of political socialisation is
that of Easton and Dennis, which refers to "those developmental processes through which
persons acquire political orientations."33 Another common definition, by Greenstein, stresses
political socialisation as a
deliberate inculcation of political information, values and practices by institutional
agents who have been formally charged with this responsibility. A broader conception
would encompass all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned
at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicit political learning but also
nominally non—political learning that affects political behaviour.34
The literature of political socialisation concentrates on the agents of socialisation. These
agents can be formal or informal. One of the main formal agents of political socialisation is
school, perhaps second in importance only to the family. The difference between formal
education and the family is that education is more readily controlled by the state. It is also a
"direct rather than an indirect agent of political socialisation and as such transmits its political
messages in an explicit rather than an implicit fashion." 35 School as an education system is
involved in the formation of culture and political culture through school curricula textbooks,
and by teachers who contribute to an awareness of politics among the students. The mass
media is another crucial agent of socialisation in modern societies, transmitting political
information.
According to Dawson and Perwitt, the agents of socialisation can be classified into three
categories: first, agents that have authority over the learner such as teachers and parents;
second, agents that are equal to the learner such as age peers in school, friendship cliques, and
work associates; third, agents that are political, such as contact with political authorities and
voting.36
Political socialisation is the way through which a generation passes on political ideas, values,
beliefs and pattern of behaviour to another generation. This process, as described by Almond
et al, is "cultural transmission".37 Political socialisation transforms the political culture of the
nation. It leads the citizens, or some of them, to experience politics. Political socialisation may
create a political culture where none existed before during the formation of a new nation.38
Political socialisation thus can transfer, create or change the political culture in any society.
An example would be the post-colonial emergence of nations in the developing world. In these
countries
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The campaign to create a new 'political man' and a 'political religion' takes many
different forms, from the Maoist extreme of cultural revolution to subtle nuances
embedded in school textbooks, the media, or more blatantly, in official propaganda. In
fact, the process of transforming an existing political culture or building political
culture entirely new is central to efforts by numerous third world countries to embark
on nation buikling.39
There are two major points related to political socialisation as a concept. The first, as Almond
et al stated, is that "political socialisation can take the form of either direct or indirect
transmission and learning."' The former involves direct communication of information for
example by using the education process at schools. Such socialisation has been used by
communist parties to inculcate the idea of "the Soviet man", or the "Cuban socialist man".41
The Libyan experience is one of direct socialisation, where the mechanism of political
socialisation aims to inculcate citizens with the values and ideology of the revolutionary
man	
"Ja	 jamahirian snciery".42regime to create the "rnahirian	 " and the	 Indirect political
socialisation occurs "when political views are inadvertently molded by our experiences."43
The second point related to political socialisation is that "political socialisation continues
throughout an individual's 1ife. 44 The attitudes adopted during childhood by family influences
can create a favourable image for example of a certain political party, but the formal
education process or the influence of friends may change this image. Moreover, some societies
have experienced events such as war or economic depression, which may have left their mark
on the whole nation, having a particularly great impact on the younger generation. As Almond
et al state, "when experiences shape and change the attitudes of older members of the society
this can be political resocialisation."45 Germany is an important example for such political
resocialisation having occurred.
2.5	 The Analysis of Political Culture in the Arab Countries
This section is about the analysis of political culture in the Arab countries. There are only a
few studies which have dealt with political culture in the Arab countries directly. A selection
of these studies will be analysed and examined. The researcher classified these studies into
two categories: first, descriptive and historical approaches to Arab political culture; second,
studies of the political values, attitudes, orientations and behaviour of particular groups, for
example students or peasants, based on empirical research.
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2.5.1	 Descriptive and historical approaches to Arab political culture
Arab political culture has been analysed descriptively from a number of different
perspectives. One of these perspectives has led scholars to focus on the significance of
political culture for the prospects for democracy in the region. This line of analysis was taken
by Elie Kedourie (1993) in Democracy and Arab Political Culture and Mohamed Z. El-
Mogherbi (1989) in Political Culture and the Issue of Democracy. Kedourie used a historical
approach to examine the political traditions of Islam, the introduction of Western ideas into
the Middle East during the 19th century, and the ways in which those ideas took root or failed
to do so.46 He has described what he calls varieties of democratic experiences in the Arab
countries. He found that one of the main reasons for the failure of Western constitutionalist
traditions in the Middle East was that
a newer Western political tradition, that of enlightened absolutism, had become familiar
to the modemising Middle Eastern rulers of the nineteenth century. This other Western
tradition, with its penchant for centralised control, chimed in much more easily with,
indeed powerfully reinforced, the native autocratic tradition.47
Kedourie mentioned that in each of the countries which he examined, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and
Lebanon, there were particular reasons why the constitutional experiment failed. The
explanations which Kedourie gave for the failure of the constitutional experiment in the Arab
countries involve measuring political culture through a historical approach rather than by
measuring people's attitudes. The reason why a Western-style parliamentary democracy failed
in Egypt between 1923 and 1952, he says, was that Zaghlulist populism was in competition
with the rival royal court.43 hi the case of Iraq, between 1921 and 1938, the reason for failure
was that the state was extremely heterogeneous and was devoid of any loyalty binding the
population.49 Also the pan-Arab ambitions of the regime excluded the Shiite and Kurdish
majority, who were considered alien and dangerous. The Syrian experience of constitutional
and representative government lasted for a shorter period than that in Egypt and Iraq. It
continued from 1943 to 1949, but was then overwhelmed by successive military interventions,
which the political elite who had taken over from the French mandatory government was
powerless to stop. 5° In Lebanon, the constitution sought to maintain a balance between
various groups, the army was never a threat to constitutional government and the
parliamentary experience in contrast to other Arab countries like Syria. The parliamentary
experience in Lebanon was affected by the country's political and military weakness. This led
to a civil war between various militias which exploded in 1975 and also led to the armed
intervention by two neighbouring states, Syria and Israel, in Lebanese territory.5'
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El-Mogherbi, in his study The Arab Political Culture and the Issue of Democracy, also
focused on the relationship between democracy and Arab political culture. 52 He made use of
the three types of political culture which Almond and Verba put forward in The Civic Culture
(1963), namely parochial political culture, subject political culture, and participant political
culture.53 He concluded that Arab political culture is a subject political culture, in which
individuals are aware of the output of the political system, but unaware of their role and their
influence on the system. They do not participate in the processes that result in policy
decisions.
El-Mogherbi emphasised that the values, orientations and patterns of behaviour which Arab
individuals acquire in the early years of their lives and throughout their lives, through the
agents of socialisation, create a strong relationship based on submission and authority. Arab
social life is built within a framework of chains of authority and submission relations,
between fathers and their children, brothers and sisters, old and young. This continues in the
relationship between those governing and those being govemed. 54 It becomes natural to the
individuals to accept any authoritarian system. El-Mogherbi emphasised that this dominant
type of political culture within the Arab society is a consequence of the socialisation process
through different agents of socialisation: formal (i.e. education system and mass media) and
informal (such as the family). He argued that not all values and patterns of behaviour which
an individual learns have a link with political matters, but all may help in building their
personality and affect their orientations in a way which later affects their political behaviour.
The submission, fear and the pattern of non-democratic behaviour characterised by the lack of
free discussion and unwillingness to accept different opinions are a consequence of the
process of social and political socialisation through the educational institutions and the family
in particular." El-Mogherbi concludes that the first step to build a real democracy in Arab
societies is by changing the type of the dominant political culture based on authoritarian
values and submission of the individual. For El-Mogherbi, democracy is "the right of the
citizen to participate in decision-making in public affairs". 56 The task is to inculcate
individuals with values which help to build a free and independent personality and create a
participant political culture. This culture, which will give Arab citizens confidence in
themselves, will underpin participation in the decision-making process. The change of political
Arab culture needs a revolution within the educational systems, at home and in the mass
media. This revolution should rebuild the Arab individual in order to change the structure of
the Arab political culture towards democratic values."
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Another approach to Arab political culture from a general perspective emphasises the role of
religion with it. Religion is seen as an important source of basic value orientation, with a
powerful impact on political culture. Gehad Auda, in his study The Islamic Movement and
Resource Mobilization in Egypt: A Political Culture Perspective, emphasised the increasing
role of the Islamic movement in Egypt especially during the 1980s:
The Islamic movement in Egypt has attempted to translate its political economic
conceptions into action. The process was catalyzed by the increasing involvement of the
state after 1952 in mobilising religion for political and social purposes.
Democratisation processes were structurally conducive for the Islamic movement to
wage a political economic war of manoeuvre against the govenunent.58
According to Auda, on the one hand the Islamic movement in Egypt "facilitates the transition
to democracy by liberating the sentiments and interests of the Muslim individual from
domination by the modem state". On the other hand, it "captures the liberated Muslim
individual into a new hegemonic set of values and principles". He points out that the "twin
processes at once create an opening for democracy but prevent democracy from being realised
and consolidated."" Auda finally stressed that the Islamic movement in its ideology and
worldview accepts democracy only as a means for its advancement as a social movement".°
Another line looks at the relationship between Arab political culture and political development
in general. Tawfic E. Farah in his study Political Culture and Development in a Rentier
State: The Case of Kuwait. 61 used the concept of political culture to explain Kuwait's socio-
economic and political development. He stated that "political culture in Kuwait is a function
of its one-resource economy."
Farah attributed the successful achievements of the Kuwaiti political system to the political
skills and management of the leadership of this country. 62 He concluded that Kuwait's
"political culture creates a bond between Kuwaiti citizens and their ruler, with the
bureaucracy promoting and strengthening allegiance to the state and its development
policies."° He added also that families in Kuwait still dominate the social and political life."
The final line of analysis of political Arab culture deals with "elite political culture". John P.
Entelis, in his study on Elite Political Culture and Socialisation in Algeria: Tensions and
Discontinuities, analysed the political culture in Algeria within a framework which
differentiates elite political culture from mass political culture. The masses identify
unswervingly with Islam and its religious symbols, while Algerians who deal with power and
have responsibilities for the decisions of government develop a very different outlook.°
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2.5.2	 Empirical studies of political culture
This section covers studies of political culture in Arab countries based on empirical research.
These studies examine the values, attitudes, orientations and behaviour of particular groups,
that is, students or peasants. Kamal El-Menoufi.'s The Political Culture of Egyptian Peasants
is an important study focusing on the changing attitudes of a particular group within the
Egyptian society, that is, the peasants. The study was based on survey research. The purpose
of his research was to "study the main variables determining the core and dimensions of the
orientation of Egyptian peasants towards government authority."66 El-Menoufi tried to clarify
the extent to which the peasants' cultural attributes concerning government which existed
before the 1952 revolution survived after the revolution.
El-Menoufi mentioned a number of factors affecting the attitudinal system of the Egyptian
peasants towards government. The first of these was the physical environment, referring
mainly to the Nile and the pattern of settlement in rural areas. Egypt is "an agricultural
hydraulic society par excellence in the sense that agriculture is the main source of living and
that irrigation relies almost totally on the River Nile. This necessitated, since time
immemorial, large-scale irrigation projects, like canals, dikes, dams, barrages. It was difficult
to achieve these projects without the interference of a central govemment."67 On this point, El-
Menoufi added that the Nile was responsible for the emergence of a central authority, while
the landscape and the pattern of settlement provided for its tight control over the subject." It
can be said that the nature of the hydraulic society might be responsible for a political culture
of submission and passivity within Egyptian society especially in the political culture of the
peasants. The second factor was landholding. The rural socio-economic structure changed to a
considerable degree during the late 1950s and early 1960s as a consequence of the reform
laws of the revolutionary regime in Egypt. For instance, the percentage of small-landholdings
increased from 35 percent in 1952 to 57 percent in 1965. But in general landownership
remained unbalanced. El-Menoufi concluded that poverty in the Egyptian context was often
conducive to passivity, alienation and subordination.69
The third factor was the mode of governance. El-Menoufi described the authority as highly
central and personal, and strictly hierarchical. Relationship between people and government
was a one-way process, with very limited popular participation, and decision-making was in
the hands of the ruler. The situation remained the same in Nasser's and Sadat's Egypt. The
president was the highest authority; after him came ministers, governors and mayors.7°
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The final factor was the socialisation process. El-Menoufi emphasised that in the case of
Egypt, the socio-political context imposed an authoritarian mode of socialisation. The
socialisation process in Egyptian rural areas has always been authoritarian and as a result has
contributed to the peasants' subordination to govemment.71
El-Menoufi empirically examined some aspects of the peasants' orientations. These aspects
were: the cult of authority, the personification of authority, the mistrust of authority, and
excessive dependence on government. Finally, El-Menoufi concluded two main things: first,
the societal milieu which the peasants experienced throughout history caused them to adopt
certain beliefs, attitudes and feelings concerning government; second, the political system of
the 1952 revolution failed to transform these cultural attributes. 72 El-Menoufi's work is
significant for the study of political culture in Libya, especially as both it and the present
study deal with the attitudes of particular groups within the society (peasants in El-Menoufi's
study, and students in the present study). It is also important to note that the Egyptian
revolution sought to change mass attitudes, as the Libyan revolution did.
Another area of empirical research has explored the role of religion as a factor determining the
social and political positions of Muslims. Iyad Barghouti, in his study on Religion and
Politics among the Students of Najah National University, in Nablus discussed the
relationship between the degree of religious observance and the socio-political positions of a
random sample of 383 students. 73 Barghouti's study showed that the male respondents were
less religious than the female respondents. As he explained, the reason for this was that "the
concept of morality in Islamic culture requires more of women than of men" 74 Another finding
was that students in the College of Science seemed to be more religious than students of other
colleges. There was a clear relationship between the social background and the religious
observance of the respondents. Those who came from merchant families were less religious
than those who came from a worker background. Those whose mothers were not employed
outside of the home were more religious than the children of non-working mothers.
Barghouti also examined the relationship between religious observance and his sample's
political positions. His findings showed that students who were arrested by the Israelis (80
percent of the respondents) were less religiously observant than those who had not been
arrested. He noticed that 21.7 percent of respondents who were arrested never observed
religious occasions. He was also surprised that 23.2 percent of the respondents who had been
arrested always observe religious occasions. When he talked to many of the last group, he
found that some of them became religious in prison or after leaving it."
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One of the studies which have dealt with political attitudes as part of the political culture is
Raymond A. Hinnebusch's study of Children of the Elite: Political Attitudes of the
Westernised Bourgeoisie in Contemporary Egypt. It is significant to the present study
because it was based on a survey of the political attitudes of a particular group. Its aim was to
explore the political ideology of the Westernised wing of the Egyptian bourgeoisie through a
study of the attitudes of its children. % The "Westernised bourgeoisie" are the professional,
business and government elements of the upper and upper-middle income strata who have
received a Western education." Hinnebusch's survey covered the attitudes of 145 students at
the American University in Cairo in 1977 and 1978. His survey examined personal values,
political identity, foreign policy attitudes, political leadership, and political system preference
and socio-economic attitudes. Hinnebusch concluded from his findings that the "Westernised
bourgeoisie in developing countries is unlikely to be a political monolith and it is certainly not
in Egypt."'" His survey suggests that, despite lingering differences,
a considerable consensus on many vital matters has brought the various segments of the
Egyptian bourgeoisie together. 1) Internally, the bourgeoisie prefers a secular liberal
democratic capitalist course. It dislikes authoritarianism, but will acquiesce in such an
order if the regime defends or advances the bourgeoisie's preferred capitalist socio-
economic policies. 2) Externally, the bourgeoisie advocates a Western political
alignment and economic integration into the world capitalist market, provided it is
accepted by the West as a junior partner in these relations."
Hinnebusch concluded that the attitudes of the respondents of his study seem to be very
typical of bourgeois ideology in the Third World.s°
The importance and interest of Barghouti's and Hinnebusch's findings for the researcher's
study of political culture in Libya is clear. Both studies were based on an empirical survey of
young people's attitudes.
2.6	 The Analysis of Political Socialisation in the Arab Countries
This section deals with political socialisation studies in the Arab countries. As previously
noted, there are relatively few studies that involve investigations of people's beliefs, values,
and orientations towards politics and the political process. Similarly, there are also few
studies which deal with political socialisation.
One of the most significant studies of political socialisation is Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi's
study The Socialisation of School Children in Libya. Importantly, he used content analysis of
the textbooks as his method. He focused on the value structure of the Libyan political
leadership as revealed in school textbooks or readers used in Libya. His main assumption was
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that "the school readers reflect the basic or core values which the Libyan leadership wishes to
inculcate in its citizens. Further, it is assumed that the readers reflect the basic value
orientations of the Libyan leadership."" El-Mogherbi used in his study the textbooks of the
first nine grades of the educational system.
In his analysis of the textbooks, El-Mogherbi used the same categories as Ridley and his
associates in their study of Communist China. 82
 According to El-Mogherbi, the reading
material fell generally into three major types: first, stories that were primarily informative, or
informational. Second, stories that had the development of specific political attitudes as their
primary intent. Third, stories whose main aim was behavioural modelling! 3 El-Mogherbi
found that the readers were dominated by themes on Arab nationalism and unity, Islamic
values, socialism, and social solidarity. For instance, he found that informational themes in
these textbooks gave information about Arab and Islamic history and Arab countries."
Political themes emphasised the Arab struggle against imperialism, the Palestinian revolution,
Arab unity, and achievements of the regime!' Behavioural themes in the textbooks focused on
the importance of collective work and fostered the sense of social responsibility as well as
general adherence to the teachings of Islam."
El-Mogherbi found that the themes in the reading books are in congruence with the official
ideology of the regime. This degree of congruence showed the concerted efforts of the regime
in socialising its citizens, in his case the school children in Libya.
A similar work, which was based on El-Mogherbi's method of analysing the content of
textbooks, was Amal Obeidi's study Political Socialisation of School Children in Libya: A
Content Analysis of School Readers 1979-1988.'7 The same types of themes were used:
informational, political and behavioural. Obeidi's findings showed that the regime had
increased the emphasis on political themes since El-Mogherbi's study. Consider that the
percentages of the three types of themes in El-Mogherbi's (1978) study were informational 38
percent, political 30 percent and behavioural 32 percent. By 1988, the percentages of the three
types of themes in the Obeith's study were: informational 36 percent, political 37 percent, and
behavioural 27 percent.
Other studies of political socialisation are based on empirical work such as Tawfic E. Farah,
et al, Political Socialisation in the Arab States!" This study covered political socialisation in
three major Arab areas: the Gulf area, the Maghreb, and Egypt. It also covered socialisation
among Palestinians. The main study which dealt with attitudes and feelings towards political
authorities was Farah's study of Palestinian children in Kuwait." Farah's sample covered 240
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Palestinian children, between 10 to 16 years. He investigated whether and how the children
support the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Yasir Arafat. Farah hypothesised
that exposure to political indoctrination would raise support levels. One of the interesting
findings was that Arafat was the best known and most highly supported leader among the
children. Arafat was viewed different in Rosemary Sayigh's study Source of Palestinian
Nationalism: A Study of a Palestinian Camp in Lebanon.9° In Sayigh's study, Arafat was
simply mentioned as one of the Palestinian leaders, and praised for living the "life of the
people." Sayigh's findings showed a consistent tendency by the respondents to impersonalize
their leaders, by referring to the "revolution" and not to individual names.91
Michael W. Suleiman's study Socialisation to Politics in Morocco: Sex and Regional
Factors looked at the attitudes and orientations of elementary school children in Morocco
towards politics and government. The sample covered 740 students, 366 boys and 374 girls.
His research also involved "an attempt to determine their knowledge of and about political
leaders and issues and their sense of identity as Moroccan nationals." 92 The findings of his
study showed that there was a strong sense of identification. The loyalty and attachment to the
country were high among the children. Two-thirds of them said that the Moroccan flag was
the most beautiful flag and Morocco was the greatest country. Yet children were well
informed and more familiar with Western leaders than with Muslim and Arab ones. Also, the
findings showed that attitudes of boys and girls towards politics and politicians tended to be
similar.93
It is clear that although political culture and political socialisation have been subject to
criticism the concepts are still widely regarded as having utility. This study benefits both from
the general theoretical works and from some of the studies carried out on political culture
outside the Arab countries, but it links in most directly with the small numbers of empirical
studies on political culture and political socialisation carried out within the Arab countries.
Barghouti's, Hinnebusch's, Farah's, and El-Mogherbi's studies have raised some of the
questions and issues which the researcher pursues in this study of the political attitudes of
Libyan university students. No overall conclusions follow from this literature, but its value
lies in showing the variety of respects in which political culture and political socialisation can
be explored. Two of the studies, in particular, set the context within which the research is set:
El-Mogherbi's work on political socialisation indicates clearly that the Libyan regime has
sought to use the educational system to inculcate Libyans, especially school children, with the
values of the regime's ideology in order to change their attitudes and opinions, while El-
Menoufi's work shows that in the case of Egypt the revolutionary regime failed in its attempt
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to use political socialisation to change the attitudes and opinions of Egyptian peasants. The
direct concern of this thesis, then, is whether the experience with Egypt's peasants will apply
to that of Libyan students.
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3. The Shaping of Libya's Contemporary
Political Culture
3.1	 Introduction
The historical background of Libya provides some understanding of the factors and elements
which have shaped the political culture of contemporary Libyan society. This chapter gives
particular attention to the role played by education and religion within the historical
background. It then goes on to examine the state ideology of the revolutionary regime since
1969 through three main stages: first, from the founding of the revolution in September 1969
to 1973; second, from the popular revolution in April 1973 to 1975; third, the period from
1976 to 1977 which include the Declaration of "the Authority of the People" in March 1977
to date. Finally, the chapter examines the revolutionary regime's use of political socialisation
as an instrument to create "revolutionary citizens." Special attention is given to the education
system as a political socialisation agent.
3.2	 Political Culture in Libya: A Historical Framework
Each historical era has played a crucial role in affecting bath the political experience and the
political environment of Libya, encompassing the political structure of the country, the
hierarchical nature of authority, and the beliefs, attitudes and behavioural patterns of the
masses. The name Libya was given by the Greeks, firstly to an area which included most of
North Africa. Secondly, the Greeks used the term Libya to refer to the region inhabited by the
'Berbers'. The original name of Libya derived from the name of a single Berber tribe known
to the ancient Egyptians. Although the name is ancient, it was not used to designate the
specific territory within the boundaries of modern Libya until the twentieth century.
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The territory known as Libya is divided by the Sirte desert, which splits the region
Tripolitania in the west from Cyrenaica in the east, while Fazzan in the south is effectively
part of the Sahara desert. In ancient history Tripolitania was controlled by the Phoenicians
and came under their sphere of influence; the Greeks controlled Cyrenaica; and Fazzan was
part of the kingdom of Garamentes. The Roman empire dominated Tripolitania and Cyrenaica
for almost four centuries, which became provinces of the empire.
The first major political transformation in Libyan history was in 642 AD., when 'Alum bin il-
cAas conquered Cyrenaica. Two years later he moved into Tripolitania, and later in 663 AD
Fazzan was put under Arab control. The Arab conquerors settled and married Berber women.
Islam was spread in the area despite the resistance of some of the Berber tribes in the desert.'
Throughout history, the regions of Libya have tended to look in different directions.
Tripolitania was part of the Maghrib and was linked to Muslim Spain; Cyrenaica came under
the political influence of the Umayyad2
 caliph of Damascus in 712 and later under that of the
Fatimids3 and the Hilalians4 As Naur states:
Tripolitania belonged to Hafsid Era, oriented towards the west including Spain, while
Cyrenaica came under the Mamluks together with Egypt, and Fazzan was oriented
towards black Aftica.5
In 1551, Libya became part of the Ottoman empire and remained part of it for nearly four
centuries until the Italian invasion in 1911. However, there was an interlude when the
Qaramanali dynasty, which was essentially an autonomous part of the Ottoman empire,
declared an independent monarchy, which lasted from 1711 until 1835.
The Italians occupied Libya in 1911 and their occupation lasted almost three decades, while
the decade of British and French administration gave way at the beginning of the 1950s to an
independent state. Under the auspices of the United Nations, independence was gained on
December 24, 1951. The new state was initially known as the United Libyan Kingdom, and
later as the Kingdom of Libya. In 1969 a military coup d'etat abolished the monarchy. The
birth of the Libyan Arab Republic was proclaimed, initiating a new era in the modem political
history of Libya.
Thus prior to the modem era of colonialism and post-colonialism, one can identify a number
of features of Libyan history. First, Libya has been colonised by numerous foreign powers.
These 'circles of colonialism' were largely due to the value and importance of Libya's
geographical location. Second, the main source of danger was in the North via the sea.
Colonialism via the Mediterranean Sea was the primary form of conquest, thus reflecting the
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strategic importance of the Mediterranean as a centre and focus of power in the old world
order.6
 Third, the different political heritages and cultural links split the country into two
parts: Tripolitania (and to a lesser extent Fazzan) belonged to the Muslim west (North-west
Africa); whilst Cyrenaica belonged to the Muslim east.'
Economic factors have always played a crucial role in shaping Libyan history. Until the
1950s, Libya was an extremely poor country. In 1952, a study of Libya compiled by the
United Nations described the country as ..."an excellent example of universal poverty in an
extreme form."' Also, Higgins in 1968 described pre-1950 Libya as "a prototype of an
underdeveloped country." 9 Thus, until independence Libya was one of the poorest nations in
the world, with a per capita income of less than $30 per year in 1951, and $100 per year in
1960. This situation began to change following the discovery of oil at the end of the 1950s,
although this was not without its own problems. As El Fathaly comments, "Wealth in itself
does not produce economic or political modernisation." 1° Increased revenue from oil led to a
drastic decrease in revenue from other areas of the economy, especially agriculture. It also
brought about a dramatic increase in migration from rural to urban centres. As El-Fathaly
states, "excessive and unguided wealth tends to generate corruption, political conflict, waste,
massive urban migration, dependency on the government and the decay of the agrarian
sector."11
To obtain some further idea of how historical factors have shaped the existing political
culture, an analysis of the education system, religion and social institutions (such as the
family, tribe, clan etc.) will prove useful.
3.2.1	 The role of the education system
The education system in any society is directly linked with the socio-economic and political
system. This is due to the potential of education to act as an instrument of support for the
political system, although history has also shown examples where the education system has
helped to nurture a counter-culture to the prevailing ethos of the ruling regime. A historical
study of the development of the education system in Libya follows the same divisions as the
study of the general history of the country, i.e. the Ottoman period 1551-1911, the Italian
occupation 1911-1943, the British and French administrations 1943-1951, and the period
under the monarchy.
During most of the Ottoman period, education was not a concern of the state. This began to
change in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Initially education was the sole preserve
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of religious institutions such as the katatib, [the Quranic schools], and zawayya l2 [religious
lodges]. These institutions, which were almost self-contained local communities, taught the
Arabic language, Quranic science, Islamic jurisprudence and the hadith. Education was thus
oriented towards religion.
Education in Ottoman times suffered from a limited curriculum and the absence of
opportunities for females, which reflected the wider societal discrimination between males and
females. It was not until the last decade of the nineteenth century that the Ottoman regime
began to introduce a more modem education system. The primary motive behind this move
was to provide employees for the state, i.e. the bureaucracy and the army. This ushered in the
establishment of:
a) Primary schools, which provided three years of study and were funded by private
means. The pupils could study Arabic and Turkish, the Islamic religion, Turkish
history, geography and mathematics. Initially these schools were located in Benghazi
and Tripoli.
b) Al-madaris al-Rushdia [mature schools], which provided education for three years to
pupils who had finished their study in the primary schools. The pupils in these schools
started at eleven years and finished at fourteen or fifteen. The schools were divided into
military and civilian schools. They provided a modem scientific curriculum and lessons
were conducted in Turkish by Turkish teachers. The state established five schools of
this type in Tripoli, Benghazi, al-nummus, Dama and Fazzan. A separate school was
established for girls in Tripoli.°
c) Preparatory schools, which filled the same role as secondary schools in the current
education system. These schools provided four years of education in which pupils
studied Arabic, Turkish, Persian and French. Turkish was the main language.
d) Technical schools. Examples of these were the Madrasat al-Funun wa al-Sana
[School of Industrial Arts] established in 1898, and al-Madrasa al-Zirdiya [The
Agricultural School] founded in 1909. Bath institutions were in Tripoli. There were
also a number of teacher training schools providing a two-year training course set up in
both Tripoli and Benghazi at the beginning of this century.
Despite the development of education in the above sectors, the Ottomans failed to develop
higher education. Students who were able and had the desire to attend higher education
establishments usually studied in the Asitana in Istanbul, al-Azhar Mosque in Egypt and the
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al-Zaituna Mosque in Tunisia. Such opportunities, however, were only open to the elite, i.e.
those whose families were able to support them financially. Some of the institutions in the
Asitana, such as the Madrasat Abna' al- eAsha'ir [School of the Clans' Children] were the
first choice for the leaders of tribes and clans throughout the Ottoman vilayet [provinces]. The
aim of these schools was to prepare the students and inculcate them with loyalty to the
Ottoman empire, creating elites who would become part of the state and continue to support
its hegemony. 14
 The Ottomans also encouraged Libyans and Arabs throughout the empire's
provinces to attend military schools.
To conclude, the main characteristics of the education system during the Ottoman era can be
summarised as the following:
a) The education system was based on religious education. The only centres of
learning in Libyan during the early stages were religious institutions situated in a
small number of cities throughout the country.
b) The education system suffered from a limited curriculum, although towards the
end of the nineteenth century a wider curriculum began to appear.
c) Education remained the preserve of the elite, who had the necessary economic
resources to enable their children to study. The appearance of elite education,
especially in the form of higher education, constituted an attempt to inculcate the
children of the elite with values such as loyalty to prepare them to be part of the
state system.
The second major period was that of Italian rule, from 1911 to 1943. The Italian period can
be broken down into two main eras, from 1911 to October 1922 (the Fascist coup d'etat in
Italy) and from 1922 until the Italian defeat in the Second World War in 1943. It is important
to mention the role of foreign schools in Libya at this time. Education was an important
instrument for foreign countries to spread their culture and later their domination. The Italians
had in fact been active in the field of education in Libya since 1810 when Franciscan
missionaries established a primary school in Tripoli. I5 By 1911 there were already twelve
Italian schools in Tripoli and Benghazi, which were free of charge. The initial approach had
been to penetrate Libya peacefully through economic and cultural activities; education was
one of the main agents that Italy used in preparing to occupy Libya.
During the Italian occupation, the government increased the number of schools all over the
country. The main purpose of these schools was to teach the Italian language and spread
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Italian culture among the students. This was all part of a colonial project aimed at
Italianization, thus creating Libyans whose loyalty and respect would be towards Rome. 16 In
his description of the education system and the teaching process during the colonial period,
Hajjaji wrote
The teaching system was primarily Italian oriented. For instance, the class day was
comprised of four hours, of which two hours were devoted to Arabic, in which the
pupils learned to read and write about Italian culture in Arabic; the other two hours
were devoted to learning Italian language and culture. It should be noted that if a pupil
failed in the Arabic class and succeeded in the Italian class, he could pass to the next
class but not vice versa."
Italy provided nursery, primary, secondary and technical schools. There were also Italian
Arabic schools which had the dual aim of attracting Arabic students to learn about Italian
culture, as well as teaching Italian students the Arabic language, which would help the
Italians in controlling Libya. The school curriculum and the contents of textbooks played a
vital role in the overall process of Italianization. For example, one book began:
Italy offers you a great deal, it protects men, property and religion ... Rome ruled the
world in the old ages, Libya flourished under Roman rule ... God give me increasing
love to Italy, my second home ... I love Italy, great love, long live Italy, let us salute the
beautiful Italian flag which is our flag too ... Long live the Duce of Italy Benito
Mussolini."
The overall aim was thus to spread Italian culture as an appendage of Italian colonialism and
to create a new generation who believed in the Italian Empire and held an admiration for
fascist ideology. Libyan citizens fought against the education system and the policy of
Italianization, especially during the early years of occupation, which resulted in the death of
many Libyans and the loss of land for many people. They refused to send their children to
Italian schools, fearing that they would lose their Islamic faith, culture and traditions. Deeb
and Deeb wrote
What at first sight appeared to have been an achievement of the Italian rule gives a
completely different picture when broken down to its various parts. It is our belief that
the local population in Libya reacted to the forced Italianization' of the colonial
educator by opening as many Katatib or Quranic schools as possible, funded by its
own personal wealth, to educate Libyan children and preserve their religion, language
and cultural heritage through those institutions."
Following the defeat of Italy in 1943, the education system carried the residue of both the
Ottoman and Italian legacies. Additionally, during the period of British rule in Cyrenaica from
late 1942 and in Tripoli from 1943, and of French rule in Fazzan the educational policy of the
British-French administrations divided Libya into three units. In Fazzan the French-Tunisian
curriculum was adopted; in Cyrenaica, the Egyptian curriculum was used; and the curriculum
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chosen in Tripoli was the one employed in Palestine during the British mandate. After revolts
by Libyans against the discrimination and fragmented nature of education, the Egyptian
system was also adopted in Tripoli."
The main characteristics of the education during this period (1943-51) were as follows:
Until independence in 1951, the curriculum of education was not stable, resulting in frequent
and extensive changes in methods and subject matter. Education policy lacked clarity and was
fragmented, resulting in differing levels of development throughout the country. Tripolitania
witnessed the Palestinian system, which was replaced later by the Sudanese education system.
Cyrenaica, on the other hand, experienced the Egyptian system of education. In Fazzan, the
French administration failed to put much emphasis on education.
As a specific effect of the 1943-51 period, the Libyan people realised the importance of
education and endeavoured to give their children the opportunity to learn. This resulted in
increasing demands to re-open the schools which had closed during the war.
The British administration paid more attention to secular education and "established
vocational schools separate from religious educational institutions." 21 They also brought in
many teachers from other Arab countries to teach. This was one major contributory factor in
inculcating Libyan students with certain political values relating to Arab nationalism and
Arab identity.
Greater opportunities for education were given to female students than before. This was due,
in part, to an English lady who was the principal of a girls' school and the co-operation and
support of many Egyptian wives of Libyans, who tried to nurture and spread female
education. This led to the establishment of a teacher training college for women in 1950,
which resulted in a dramatic increase in the numbers of female teachers.22
Post-independence, during the monarchical period, the Libyan government regarded education
• as a continuing challenge. Their first step was the declaration of Education Law No. 5 in
1952. This gave everybody a right to education and made ..."education compulsory and free
in the elementary schools, and free through every stage of education all over Libya." The two
main universities were established (in Tripoli and Benghazi) in the 1950s. 23
 The main thrust
of education policy was directed towards:
a) Consolidation of an Arab education. According to the Libyan constitution, the state
was an Arab state with Islam as its religion, and Arabic as its language. Therefore the
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primary objective of the state in education was to direct education towards these
foundations.
b) Compulsory and free education. According to Articles 28, 29 and 30 of the
constitution, all Libyans had a right to education and the state would spread education
nation-wide through the establishment of schools.
c) The establishment of a specialised multi-stream system addressed the needs of different
groups. The education system was sub-divided into non-technical education (which had
five stages) and vocational and technical education; and religious education, organised
in two stages.
Despite the fact that the foundations of the modem education system were in place, the
education system still suffered from a number of basic problems. Deeb and Deeb listed some
of these:
First 86.7 per cent of the total school population in 1967 was in primary schools;
second, technical education had not been encouraged nor were teachers' training centres
instructing enough Libyans, with the result that schools were relying more and more
heavily on non-Libyan teachers; and finally small primary Quranic schools with
traditional syllabi were attracting an increasing number of students every year.24
The role of Libya's neighbour Egypt had an important impact on the education system and the
curriculum. According to Hajjaji, "a new modified Egyptian system of teaching and
curriculum was agreed between the Libyan and Egyptian governments under which Egypt
would co-operate in developing Libyan education by sending teachers and books."15 Libya
therefore became dependent on Egypt for materials and teachers, which in turn had an impact
on the development of political ideas and beliefs amongst the student population. El-Mogherbi
concluded:
Instead of exerting efforts to create a feeling of Libyan identity and nationalism the
textbooks were full of stories about Arab history and Arab Nationalism. The textbooks
were written and printed in Egypt. They glorified the idea of Arab unity and the Arab
struggle against imperialism.2b
El-Mogherbi goes on to cite several examples from different textbooks which emphasise a
plethora of ideas relating to nationalism and an Arab nation. Take for example a seventh
grade reading book, which contained the following: "we are careful to include in this book the
elements that make the Arab student feel that a new spirit exists in him, and create in his
character the pride in language, Arab nationalism and Arab Nation." 27 This comes under the
title 'About the Flags of the Arab Countries', "If your country is your known state, the Arab
Nation is your country. You are an Arab first. Your larger nation stretches from the Atlantic
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Ocean to the Arabian Gull "28 Finally under the title 'Jam an Arab', it states: "I am an Arab.
Yes, I say it with all pride and happiness. I am not alone. Every Arab is my brother in
language, religion, feeling and nationhood ... Yes, I am an Arab from Libya."29
Although the education system in Libya did evolve over time, not all changes had an equal
effect on the identity and values of the population. As was mentioned, Ottoman and Italian
schools were a) only open to a small upper stratum of society and b) generally not popular. A
way out was religious education in Quranic schools, which helped to create a resistance
culture, especially against Italy. These Quranic schools and the post-independence teaching of
Arab nationalism left a strong mark on the majority of Libyans.
After the revolution, education became an important political instrument of the regime to
spread its ideology among its young citizens. Further details will be given later in this chapter.
3.2.2	 The role of religion
The most powerful influence on Libyan society historically was that exerted by religion. Ever
since Islam and the Arabs came to Libya in 642 AD, religion has played a very important
role. It "significantly affects the structure, values and attitudes of Libyan society. It is a
primary unit of loyalty and identity." 3° It has penetrated the social, economic, cultural and
political spheres of Libya. Religion had two somewhat contradictory effects on Libyan
political culture. As mentioned, religion helped to nurture a 'resistance culture' which helped
to protect the culture of the country and maintain the language, especially during the centuries
of foreign rule. On the other hand, it dominated traditional culture—affecting many aspects of
politics, society, and economics. In this respect it contributed to a culture of conformity and
fatalism. Therefore the importance of religion requires additional explanation.
In the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, Libya became one of the three main areas within
the Arab world where religious reformist orders evolved. These included the al-Wahabiyya
order on the Arabian Peninsula, the al-Mandiyya movement in Sudan, while Libya gave birth
to the al-Sanusiyya order. El-Mogherbi indicates that
These orders brought about a religious enlightenment and called for the return to the
early Islam and for adherence to the strict teachings of the Qur'an and the Stuma.31
The Sanusi order was an Islamic revivalist movement whose ascribed purpose was to purge
Islam of the impurities that had accrued over previous centuries. The order was based on a
network of zawayya situated at desert oases between Sudan and Tripolitania. The history of
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the Sanusi order started in the Hijaz in 1837. A few years later it moved to al-Baycla'a in
Cyrenaica where Muhammad bin All al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Hasani al-Idrisi established al-
Zawia al-Bayda 'a in al-Jabal al Akhdar [the Green Mountain], the first Sanusi zcrwiya
Dodge], in 1843. After that, the order spread across Cyrenaica, Fazzan and beyond.32
The principles of the Sanusiyya order are based on the ideas of its founder, Muhanunad bin
Ali al-Sanusi al-Kabir [The Grand Sanusi] and can be found in his book lqaz al-wasnan fi al-
carnal bi al-hadith wa al-Qur 'an [The Wakening of the Slumberer through Following the
Traditions and the Qur'an] published in Cairo in 1938. Its principles were based on the idea
that, "every Moslem must obey Allah, the Prophet Muhammad and the 'ularna'; the Qur'an
and the Surma alone are the basis for the believer's life." 33 The founder rested his beliefs on
the same foundation as Ibn Tayimiyya by rejecting taqlid [unquestioning imitation]. As
Ziadeh states
On taqlid the Grand Sanusi is very expressive. He thinks that taqlid [traditional view] is
contrary to the teaching of the Qur'an and the Suima. Citing verses from the Holy Book
and sayings of the Prophet in support of the theory that every problem has a solution in
the Qur'an, the author adds that the Prophet could express an opinion, which bound the
community of believers, because he was guided by God, but other people had no right
to ascribe to themselves opinions of this nature, i.e. binding on the community.'
The Grand Sanusi believed that a return to the original sources would remove all elements of
friction and unite all of the religious orders.35
Politically, the Sanusiyya called for an imama [a supreme Islamic governing body] and jihad
[holy war]. The Sanusiyya established a substantial number of zawayya in equatorial Africa
during the late nineteenth century. These were used to resist the French. The resistance was
focused on the Lake Chad region and was directed from Qiru, the order's centre, by its leader
Ahmad al-Sharit who as the eldest member of the Sanusi family succeeded Muhammad al-
Mandi in 1917. The emergence of al-Sanusiyya, which has been described as "an Islamic
phenomenon, religious in its fundamentals, social in its effects, and political in its
consequences,"36 played a significant role in shaping modem Libya's social and political
development. Similar to the al-Wahabiyya in Arabia and the al-Mandiyya in Sudan, the al-
Sanusiyya managed to achieve power after it transformed itself from a purely religious to a
'politico-religious' movement. The strength of the movement was based on the Bedouin tribal
connection, especially in Cyrenaica and Fa77nn, which furnished the order with its political
foundations. The relationship between the movement and the tribal system was an important
one. 37 It was the mechanism by which the monarchy, which based itself on the Sanusi order
and tribal connection, later attempted to gain political legitimacy.
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Islam plays an important function in the life of the individual in Libya throughout his or her
life, in his/her personal relationship to the universe, private and social affairs, customs and
ceremonies, and rituals prohibitions. Religious institutions and their leaders have increased
their role in the social, educational and political life of Libya since the beginning of Ottoman
rule. Even the war against Italian occupation had a religious component, reflecting the
importance of religion to national consciousness. On a region-wide scale the call of Islam
played a vital role during periods of struggle for independence, as Sharabi has written:
Islam as both an ideology and a model of social organisation, became the natural
rallying point of resistance, as exemplified in the four classic political-religious
uprisings against imperialist domination — of Abdul Qadir against France in Algeria, of
al-Mandi against Britain in Sudan, of `Umar al-Mukhtar against Italy in Libya, and of
`Izz al-Din al-Qassam against the British in Palestine.38
Religion reflected the homogeneity of the Libyan population. Approximately 95 percent of the
population were Muslims. Furthermore, as in most of the Middle Eastern countries, Islam in
Libya became a crucial factor in mobilising the people. As a political symbol,
religion was central to Arab League efforts to motivate the Libyan public to demand
independence from the United Nations Commission. A fatwa [declaration] was
published insisting that 'voting for other than independence would be a vote against
relil*ni.'39
In general, then, the role of religion in a society like Libya has created special features which
can be identified in people's beliefs, patterns of behaviour and values. It has woven itself into
the tribal and social institutions as well as playing a crucial role in social, political, cultural
and economic changes in Libya.
3.2.3
	 The role of social institutions
Unlike in Western societies, but as in most Arab countries, in Libya traditional social
institutions such as the family, clan and tribe, have played and still play a significant role in
political culture. This role will therefore be examined here.
Focusing on the family as one of these units will be useful in understanding power relations
within society, given that families have exerted influence in politics from the Ottoman era up
to the 1969 revolution. Some observations will be made about the Arab family in general, not
just in Libya, to throw light on the features and characteristics of this social unit.4°
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3.2.3.1 The family
There are a number of significant characteristics of the Arab family. First, the Arab family is
a central socio-economic unit. Barakat described this as,
the basic unit of production and the centre of Arab social organisation and socio-
economic activities. It evolved into a patriarchal, pyramidally hierarchical (particularly
with respect to sex and age), and extended institution.4'
Thus it has been the basic unit of social organisation in both traditional and contemporary
Arab society. In recent times, with the state beginning to provide more extensive services for
society, the family has faced a number of challenges. It still, however, plays a crucial role in
education and in the socialisation of its members. It remains the main source of most of the
social and cultural values, including religion and social heritage.
The Arab family is structured according to a traditional patriarchal model. The father holds
the authority and the responsibility for its running. The position of the father at the top of the
pyramid of authority is based on the traditional division of labour, which assigned him the
role of breadwinner or provider. Reinforced by socialisation and rationalisations, this role
makes him rabb al-usra [lord of the family or the father of the farnily]. 42 By contrast, the role
of the mother is restricted to that of a housewife who is subordinate to her husband: as caqila
[tied], qarina [linked] and hurma [prohibited].43 Nowadays the relationships between family
members are changing, due to such factors as the employment of women, and the migration of
some members of the family to the city for education and work. Although there have been
increased attempts at sharing authority and responsibility, the patriarchal and hierarchical
structure of the family still remains, with stratification on the basis of sex and age, i.e. women
are subordinate to men, as are the young to the old.
Barakat lists the following features that reflect the women's assigned and subordinate status
in Arab society:
a) Women are secluded and segregated. Although increasing numbers of women are being
educated and fill important roles and positions in the public domain, the majority
continue to occupy the private domain of the household.
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b) A limited number of professional careers are available to women under the existing
division of labour.
c) Personal status codes discriminate against women, especially in marriage, divorce and
inheritance.
d) Buttressed by religious ideology, which considers women to be a source of evil,
anarchy and fitna [social disorder], and kaid [trickery or deception], values and norms
are stressed that are associated with traditional ideas of femininity, motherhood,
wifehood and sexuality.
e) In the resulting social climate, some women to this day suffer forced marriage, honour
crimes, clitoridectomy, and other forms of abuse:"
Finally, although generations may not always live under one roof, there remains the tendency
for relatives to live in the same neighbourhood. This reflects the extended ties of the Arab
family, which leads to the development of a kinship structure in which members expect
support and help from one another.
In Libya the above characteristics of the family are easily identifiable. The extended family is
the basic social unit, and the head of the extended family makes the important strategic
decisions in relation to future orientations such as welfare provision and education. Women
are clearly dominated by men. This is so throughout their lives, beginning with the authority
of their fathers and continuing with that of their husbands.
During the liberation war against the Italians, as is common in most societies when faced with
external challenges, women took on a more prominent role. Anwar Basha (a Turkish officer
who joined the resistance movement in Cyrenaica against Italy) described the role of the
tribesmen and the participation of women as follows:
All the Arab tribes are sending me warriors. They arrive in small bands. Each has an
old rifle over his shoulder, his cartridges carefully wrapped and a kilo of flour. Each ten
warriors are followed by a camel loaded with a tent serving them all. Two women of
their tribe accompany them to bake their bread, mend their clothes, and clean their
weapons. The women also follow them into battle, spur them on, carry off the wounded
and dress their wounds.45
However, the role of women in Libya was limited after independence in 1951, especially with
regard to their participation in politics. An analysis of the role of women in Libyan society
will be given in Chapter 8.
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3.2.3.2 The tribe
There is an inter-relationship between tribalism, tribal structure and religion (Islam) in Libya,
which together have played a vital role in socio-economic, cultural and political development.
This inter-relationship has undergone some development since the middle of the nineteenth
century when the Sanusi order, initially a religious movement and later a political one, based
its legitimacy and popularity on the tribal system, especially in Cyrenaica and the South.
Libya is one of a number of Arab countries which "are significantly affected and
characterised by their tribal structure and tribalism as a social system."16
The form of tribalism which came to exist in Libya was shaped by the two Arab tribes which
invaded Libya in the eleventh century at the time of the Fatimid Caliph al-Mustansir. The two
tribes were the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym, both of whom originated from the region of
Najd in the Arabian Peninsula. Eventually, the Banu Sulaym settled in Cyrenaica and the
Banu Hilal passed westwards into Tripolitania and Tunisia. Today many of the tribes claim
direct descent from these two tribes, especially the Banu Sulaym.
Tribal society in Libya consists, on the one hand, of Arab tribesmen called Sa eadi, Arab-
Berber tribes called Murabitun, and on the other hand 'non-Arab' tribes. 47 Here is a short
description of the tribal structure for each region of Libya:
a) Cyrenaica. The tribal structure in this region consisted of Sa cadi tribes called the Sacada of
the Banu Sulaym. Their ancestors were divided into two main branches, the Harabi and the
Jabarina. The latter were also known as the 'sons of Jibrin-Jibril' and include the `Awaqir,
Magharba, Majabira, `Aryibat, and the Baraghith (which included the cAbid, and the
eArafa). The Harabi tribes were concentrated in Cyrenaica to the east of Barce and beyond
to the Egyptian border and included the 1.1baydat, Beasa, Hasa, Derasa, and cAilat Fayid.
Also present are the Murabutin, who were either Berber or had Arab-Berber origins. They
fell into two main sub-groups—the Murabitun Sidaqan and the Murabitun Bil-Baralcah
[holy men]. Each clan was tied to a powerful Sa'adi tribe - in other words they were under
the himaya [protection] of a powerful tribe. However, the himaya system was not very
strict: some of the Murabitun tribes were in a more powerful position than others, in that
they had their own land and sources of water.4 The most important of the non-Sacadi
tribes were the Taralci, `Awanunah, Qutcan, Minifa, Habbun, Shwacir, Jarrarra Fwalchir,
Sh-haybat, Zuwaya, Awajila and Qabail.49
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b) Fazzan The main tribes in this area were the Awlad Sulayman, the Hasawna and the
Magarha. The Awlad Sulayman were formerly one of four of the sub-tribes of the main
Al-Kcuub, in the south of Tripolitania: the others were the Warfalla, the Tarhuna, the al-
Mahamid. The Awlad Sulayrnan moved south in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
occupying most of Fazzan to become the main political force of that region.5°
c) Tripolitania. The main tribes in this area were the Awlad Bu-Saif, the Warfalla of Bin
Walid, the Fawatir, the Awlad al-Shaylch of Zlitin, the Firjan and the Qadhadhfa of Sirte.51
Among the tribes which were often considered as 'non-Arab' tribes are the Berber tribes,52
many of whom migrated into Libya from Algeria and Morocco, 53
 where their largest
concentrations still exist today. 54 The most important of these tribes and sub-tribes are the
Hawara, Qutama, Sanhaja, Lemta, Addasa, Darissa, Nafiisa, Lawata, and Zanata. 55 Berbers
can be found in a number of different areas in Libya, including Jabal Nafusa [Nafusa
Mountain], Aujila, Hun, Socra, Zuwara, Ghat and Ghadames.
The Tuarig are another non-Arab group who live in Southwest Libya in Ghat and Ghadamis.
Other peoples include Black Africans who are descendants of sub-Saharan Africans and live
in the desert and coastal areas, mixing with both Arabs and Berbers. The Tabu is another
small group which lives in various places in the southern desert.
In most Arab societies, and in Libya in particular, the tribal system has had to face a number
of challenges during the past fifty years which stem largely from the increase of the
government presence in welfare, and the movement of people from rural to urban areas. These
factors, however, do not seem to have affected the cultural role of tribes. They still play a
significant role in forming identities. It is important to note that the monarchy based its
political legitimacy on tribal connections.
To conclude, basic units, such as the family, clan and tribe, of a traditional society like
Libya's have an important impact on the life and behaviour of individuals. Despite all of the
challenges which these institutions have faced, they continue to play a major role in
socialising and inculcating social norms and culture. In other words, they remain instruments
of the socialisation process.
44
3.3	 State Ideology and the Nation Building since 1969
The aim of this section is to assess the development of ideology and nation-building in Libya,
with an emphasis on the period of the revolutionary regime since 1969. The development of
ideology of the revolutionary regime has been framed amidst tremendous political, socio-
economic and cultural changes. Ideology is what the regime has based its political legitimacy
on. It has played a significant role in facilitating political mobilisation and in shaping foreign
policy.
3.3.1	 Development of political ideology in Libya
The main ideological slogan since 1969 is Freedom, Socialism, and Unity. From these
concepts, the revolutionary leaders have developed the premises and ideals of their revolution.
However, it is important to distinguish between the three stages of the revolution, which are
covered below.
3.3.1.1 First stage: the founding of the revolution
The main characteristic of this stage was the role of the military, which was the instrument of
change and a basic element in the authority structure. Speaking on September 16, 1969, on
the 38th anniversary of the martyrdom of the great Libyan freedom fighter, Umar al
Mukhtar, Al-Qadhafi defended the role of the armed forces on September 1 as
the role of a vanguard, of a commando, of a breaker of barriers and of restrictions on
the toiling and oppressed masses of the people which had suffered throughout long
centuries...also, the armed forces will hand over the responsibility of the Revolution to
this faithful and instructive people which inspired us to start the revolution.56
According to cAtaa and Tayim, this period can be divided into two sub-stages:57
a) From the beginning of the revolution until the establishment of the Arab Socialist Union
on June 11, 1971.
b) From the establishment of the Arab Socialist Union until the Popular Revolution in
April 1973.
In all stages of Libya's political development, political speeches have constituted an important
vehicle for conveying ideas and political thinking. This was as true in this first stage after the
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revolution as it was later. In his first speech after the revolution, for example, al-Qadhafi
declared the revolution's aims:
From this day forward, Libya shall be a free sovereign Republic under the name 'The
Libyan Arab Republic' rising, by the Grace of God, to work, to highness, marching
along the path of freedom, unity and social justice, ensuring for its citizens the right of
equality and throwing open before them the gates of honest work. No oppressed,
deceived or wronged, no master and no slave but free brothers in a society over which,
God willing, shall flutter the banner or brotherhood and equality."
Another early political speech was that of September 16, 1969, which explained the
framework of the new society under the revolution. Other political speeches on different
occasions helped in establishing the ideological perspective of the revolution. Particularly
significant were those of 22 September 1969 and 5 November 1969.
One of the main elements which shaped the ideological infrastructure in this stage was the
founding of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) on June 1, 1971. The founding of the ASU was
preceded by several attempts to mobilise and prepare the masses, organising them into a
"popular framework". The Nadwa al-Fikr al-Thawri [Revolutionary Intellectuals' Seminar]
on July 5, 1970, laid the basis for the new experiment." Following a debate between al-
Qadhafi, some other members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and some
Libyan intellectuals, arrangements moved ahead for the establishment of the Arab Socialist
Union (ASU) as a people's organisation. This was based on the Egyptian political structure
introduced under Jamal cAbdul-Nasir.
In a wider sense the political and ideological atmosphere in Libya after 1969 was influenced
by the ideas of Nasir's 1952 revolution. Egyptian influence on Libya and its leadership goes
back to the beginning of the 1950s. Common ethnic, religious and linguistic bonds, were
stressed in the newspapers and magazines which came from Egypt to Libya. As already
mentioned in the previous section, the education system played a crucial role, especially since
schools were staffed primarily by Egyptian teachers and the curriculum inculcated into
students the ideology of the Egyptian Revolution, particularly Arab nationalism. School was
the most significant factor in creating an Arab nationalist feeling in Libya. Egyptian
ideological propaganda through the mass media also affected Libyan youth during the late
1950s and the 1960s, especially Radio Sawt al-Arab [The Arab Voice] in Cairo, which
transmitted the political values of the 1952 revolution and Nasir's political speeches directly
to most Arab countries. Nasir became the most admired hero among Libyans; his picture was
found everywhere. Due to such influence, the Libyan September Revolution may be
considered a child of the 'great Arab revolution'. The new revolutionary state followed
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Egyptian experience and policies, and Nasirist ideology. Consider the following messages by
al-Qadhafi to Sadat,
After the 1 September Revolution the Libyan people accepted the Egyptian revolution
from A to Z. They accepted the Egyptian anthem Allah Akbar, then they accepted the
Egyptian flag, the Arab Socialist Union, its charter and its statutes. They accepted the
slogan 'Freedom, Socialism and Unity' as well as the eagle emblem.°
3.3.1.2 Second stage: the Popular Revolution, from April 1973 to 1975
This period in the political development of Libya began by al-Qadhafi's speech on April 15,
1973, in the town of Zuwara. For the continuation of the revolution in Libya, he laid out five
principles of 'popular revolution', comprising a programme for popular revolution which
would start with the formation of popular committees in each city, village, school, faculty,
university, airport, port etc. These five points were:
a) all existing laws are to be repealed and replaced by revolutionary procedures;
b) the country shall be purged of those who are politically unhealthy;
c) civil liberties shall be accorded to the proletariat, but not to those who disdain the
masses of common people. Consequently, arms will be distributed to many sectors of
the people who do not belong to either the armed force or the militia;
d) all those who belong to the caste of parasitic bureaucrats will be removed by the
people, who ... will be the instrument for destruction of the bureaucracy; and
e) the Cultural Revolution against all that is reactionary, misleading and ruinous to young
people's minds is proclaimed.61
One of the main features of this stage was the declaration of a cultural revolution, which was
conceived of as being central to the popular revolution. The cultural revolution should turn
back to Arab and Islamic values, and restore the Arab and Islamic heritage. To this end, the
curricula of the education programmes were reviewed.
3.3.1.3 Third stage: the "Declaration of the Authority of the People", 1976-1977, and the
subsequent period to the present day
The publication of the first part of al-Qadhafi's book The Green Book, in January 1976
shaped this new stage. The Green Book has formed the base for the Libyan political structure
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since 1977. It formalises the new line in establishing a 'state of the masses'. Al-Qadhafi states
that "The instrument of governing is the prime political problem which faces human
commtmities."62 He suggests that the solution to this is direct democracy, based on Popular
Congresses and People's Committees. The creation of the Popular Congresses significantly
reshaped the political system in Libya, especially once the ASU had been disbanded and the
General People's Congress had assumed its functions.
The General People's Congress (GPC) was the institution where the final outcome of the
discussions in the various Basic Popular Congresses (BPC) was decided. It also was the
venue where the secretariats of popular congresses, people's committees, syndicates and
unions met.° (The new political structures in Libya, the BPCs and the GPC, will be
elaborated on in Chapter 7).
At the same time, as the structure of Basic People's Congresses was being developed, al-
Qadhafi was encouraging the growth of the Revolutionary Committees — intended to counter
some of the problems which were arising in the Popular Congresses and Committees. Al-
Qadhafi at this stage noted that:
The ministers and the Secretariat General of the General People's Congress (GPC)
have prepared the meeting . of the Basic People's Congresses, but despite this
preparation, participation at the meeting was very low. There are Basic Congresses
with 10,000 or 5,000 members, but often no more than 700 have attended the meeting...
the Secretariat General of the GPC is currently studying this negative aspect and its
root causes. Despite the successes of the GPC there is this problem of low attendance—
not at all Basic People's Congresses, but for the most part ... and that leads to the
failure of your work, because you are unable to guide the members of the Basic
People's Congresses in the right direction. For this reason we are considering the
formation of so-called mobilization committees which shall aid the leadership
committees of the Basic People's Congresses in "motivating the mass of the people"
before the Basic People's Congresses are convened."
Revolutionary Committees were established in both the Basic People's Congresses and the
Professional People's Congresses. This design was to counter three behavioural problems, as
Palmer and El-Fathaly indicate:
(1) the absence of sufficient revolutionary fervour among the masses, many of whom
remained at least partially wedded to the past, (2) the timorousness of the masses,
leading to a reluctance to impose revolutionary programs on members of the traditional
elite structure, and (3) the tendency of many basic people's congresses to pursue the
specific interests of their own regions without adequate concern for the general good of
the courrtry.65
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The role of the revolutionary committees was supposed not to be permanent, they would
disappear when the "state of the masses" came into existence. Further information on the
Revolutionary Committees will be given in Chapter 7.
There were two main elements which shaped this stage and helped in the development of the
political system. The first was the announcement of the "Declaration of the Authority of the
People", issued on March 2, 1977, in Sabha. According to this document, the main tool of the
transition stage of the revolution, i.e. the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), was
abolished and authority was transferred to the people through new political institutions such
as Basic Popular Congresses and People's Committees." The document included a number of
principles aimed at creating 'the state of the masses' :67
a) The official name of Libya shall be The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.
b) The Holy Quran is the law of the society in the Socialist People's Arab Jaxnahiriyya.
c) Direct popular authority is the basis of the political system in the Socialist People's
Arab Jamahiriyya. The authority rests solely with the people. The people exercise their
authority through the popular congresses, the people's committees, the syndicates, the
unions, the professional associations, and the General People's Congress.
d) Defence of the homeland is the responsibility of every Libyan man and woman.
Consequently, the people shall be armed and trained through general military training.
Law defines the method of preparing the military cadres and the general military
training.
The second element was the completion of state ideology with the publication of the second
and third parts of The Green Book. The first part had dealt with the problem of democracy.
The second part discussed economic problems, and the third part was concerned with social
problems — reflecting the significance of social structure as part of the interrelationship with
political structure. The theory attempted to give an explanation to issues concerning the
family, the tribe, the nation, women and education, as well as covering arts, sports and social
activities.
There are three main sources of Libyan state ideology and political thought of the
revolutionary regime. The first source is the Green Book. The second source is al-Qadhafi's
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Commentary on the Green Book" The relationship between the first two sources has been
described by al-Qadhafi through a comparison with Marxist texts, as follows:
The Green Book is the beginning of the theory and its basis seems the same as the
communist manifesto which started as small pages but it conquered the world at least in
most countries. Later, the other books and commentary have come to explain the new
Marxist theory.°
The third source of the state ideology in Libya is al-khi tab al-siyasi [political discourse] This
comprises all of al-Qadhafi's speeches, talks, interviews, etc. on different occasions and for
different audiences, used as a direct tool to explain issues. Al-Qadhafi has made use of a
number of different channels in his political discourse.
Dealing with the development of state ideology in Libya is important for an understanding of
political culture, because the state's legitimacy is so dependent on ideology. It is the main
cement of nation-building, and the citizenry has been the object of a particularly intense and
all-embracing attempt at ideological socialisation by the state.
3.4
	 Political Socialisation as an Instrument of the Revolutionary
Regime
The revolutionary regime needed a programme of political socialisation and re-socialisation to
change the attitudes and behaviour patterns of traditional society. These patterns were,
according to El-Fathaly and Palmer:
particularistic, lacking in civic responsibility (atomistic), tribalistic, fatalistic,
nonparticipatory, and engrained with the values of ascription and distrust."
These values and patterns of behaviour stemmed mostly from the previous periods of rule by
the Turks, the Italians and the monarchy. Former systems had maintained their control
through perpetuating tribalism, sowing distrust among diverse groups, socialising the masses
to be passive and fatalistic, and discouraging any form of mass participation and political
involvement:11 Nevertheless the monarchical regime also created a generation which believed
in Arab nationalism through an unplanned socialisation process, the education system, based
on school curricula and teachers who came from Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s.
3.4.1	 Agents of political socialisation in Libya
The revolutionary regime in the early years of the revolution relied on four agents of
socialisation: local administrative officials, the ASU, schools and the mass media. Yet only
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the education system and to some extent the mass media had any significant impact. After
1977, the main political socialisation agents were the education system, the ideological
preparation camps, mass media and the Revolutionary Committees. The informal sources of
political socialisation, such as family, tribe and peer group are operating outside state control,
therefore the regime could not use these agents in order to instil its revolutionary values.
The main political socialisation agents used by the revolutionary regime to inculcate its
citizens (especially the youth) are covered below.72
3.4.1.1 The education system
Since the revolution in 1969 the education system has been employed by the state as a means
for modernising and revolutionising Libyans. From the beginning, the new regime called for a
change in the education system to make it suitable for the new era. When al-Qadhafi
announced the "Cultural Revolution" during his famous speech in Zuwara in April 1973, he
called for a revision and review of curricula. The revolution showed its commitment to
education from the early days of the revolution through increasing the number of classrooms
and students at all levels. Encouraging females to be educated was an important element in the
education policy, to prepare them to be part of the labour force.73
Direct contact between the leader of the revolution, al-Qadhafi, and students at all levels was
one of the main tools of political socialisation, aimed at creating a revolutionary generation
with a strong belief in the revolution and the jamahiriyya [the state of masses]. He targeted
the students through his speeches, especially at the university level.
The curriculum of `revolutionization', tathwir al-manahij, started after the publication of The
Green Book in 1976, when Libya "gradually adopted into the curricula of its social sciences
the tenets of the Libyan leader's Green Book."74. Since then the Third Universal Theory,
which was based on The Green -Book, became the subject of one of the main courses within
the universities in all faculties, both for humanities and sciences students. All students
received this course in the early years of their university studies.
In pre-university education, a new course was introduced into the curricuhun programme at
all school levels, namely al-Thaqafa al-Siyasiya [political culture], which was later called al-
Waci al-Siyasi [political consciousness]. The course was supervised by the Maktab al-Itisal bi
al-Lijan al-Thawria—Shdbat al-Lijan al-Thawria bi al-Muasasat [Office of
Communications of the Revolutionary Committees—Section for Revolutionary Committees in
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the Educational Institutions]. The teachers of the course were often either members of
Revolutionary Committees or teachers who had attended a special course, Barnamij al-
Mdalim al-Thawri [the revolutionary teacher programme]. The aim of the latter programme
was to create a revolutionary teacher who was able through his belief in the ideology of the
regime to inculcate students with the regime's principles and revolutionary ideology. The role
of the revolutionary teacher was to create jiyll al-ghadab [generation of anger], which was
anti-American, anti-Zionist and anti-hnperialist, believing in Arab unity and the liberation of
all Palestine and the occupied Arab lands, in the freedom of all peoples in the world, and in
the state of the masses. The course was based on al-Qadhafi's Green Book, but also included
other elements of the ideology of the regime dealing with Arab nationalism, Arab unity, the
Arab-Israeli conflict etc.
Radical changes of the education curricula, especially in pre-university education, took place
in the late 1980s. Lijan tathwir al-manahij [committees to revolutionise the curricula] played
a crucial role in changing the educational curricula. These committees included some
members of the revolutionary committees and specialists (in all fields of studies), who were
university staff. The committees tried to revise and review school curricula and suggested
alternatives which fitted the aims of the educational process at this stage. Students at all levels
received the new curricula in the academic year 1986-87. The aim of the new curricula was to
reflect the political ideology of the liamahiriyya', the state of masses.
Introducing militarization at schools and universities was another attempt by the regime to
create the new jamahiriyyan citizen. The transformation of the educational institutions into
military barracks was a step towards putting the notion of a "popular army" into practice.
3.4.1.2 The ideological preparation camps (Mucaskarat al-rdad al-cAqaidi)
Ideological preparation camps were one of the main methods which the revolutionary regime
used to inculcate its citizens with the state ideology. These courses or camps, called dawrat
al-fdad al-caqaidi [courses of ideological preparation] were organised at different levels,
depending on the age of individuals. Students were usually the most important stratum taking
part in these camps. The courses were compulsory, especially at pre-university level, and
usually took place during schools' summer vacation or in the mid academic-year holiday.
Students stayed between 10 days and two weeks in the ideological preparation camps
attending for lectures and talks about different political subjects, either related to the ideology
of the regime or issues concerning the Arab nation such as Arab unity and the Arab-Israeli
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conflict. The lectures were usually given by members of the revolutionary committees or by
experts. In these camps students also undertook other activities such as basic military
training, sports, music and art. The revolutionary committees played a key part in this
ideological preparation.
3.4.1.3 The mass media
In the early years of the revolution, the RCC was largely dependent on the media structure it
had inherited from the monarchy. That structure consisted mainly of a government-operated
broadcasting service, dating from 1957, and five or six private newspapers operating under
press censorship. Television did not make its debut until 1968, and extensive local
programming was yet to be developed."
It was familiar for Libyans to listen to foreign broadcasts such as the British Broadcasting
Corporation or some Arab broadcasting service. Sawt al- Arab (the Arab voice) which
broadcast from Cairo was one of the main stations which Libyans during the 1950s and 1960s
listened to, and this had a great influence on them — especially in terms of strengthening Arab
nationalist and Arab unity ideas. The Libyan media failed to offer the RCC strong support for
the early socialisation process. The media thus became a target of criticism by al-Qadhafi
because of its ineffectiveness in disseminating revolutionary ideas. El-Fathaly and Palmer
state that
The leadership's evaluation of the media has been intensely critical, a view generally
shared by the public. Time after time, Qadhafi has criticised the media's ineffectiveness
in transmitting revolutionary values. His typical comments include: "we should close
down" or "it is not worth a penny," or "we should put it on auction.""
The revolutionary regime introduced the idea of al-ic lam al-jamahiri (Jamahiriyyan media) in
the late 1970s, reflecting Al-Qadhafi's views about the information medium. Al-Qadhafi in
The Green Book indicates that
The press is a means of expression of the society and is not a means of expression of a
natural or corporate person. Logically and democratically, the press, therefore can not
be owned by either of these. ..The democratic press is that which is issued by a popular
committee comprising all the various categories of society, including associations of
workers, women, students, craftsmen, etc. In this case only, and not otherwise, will the
press or any information medium be an expression of the whole society and a bearer of
its viewpoint; and thereby the press or information medium will be indeed democratic?'
In practice, People's Committees are not free from control in terms of what they publish, all
the information media and the mass media in Libya are supervised by the Secretary of
Information, Culture and Jamahiriyya Mobilisation. There are two types of newspapers. On
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the one hand, some newspapers express the views of groups such as students, farmers and
professionals. This type of press is called al-Sahafa al-mihaniya [the professional press]. On
the other hand, there are those newspapers which are not tied to any professional grouping,
but are issued by the revolutionary committees, al-Zahf al-Akhdar [The Green March] and al-
Jamahiriyya. 78 Television and broadcasting are also supervised by the Information, Culture
and Jamahiriyya mobilisation secretary.
In practice, the mass media are used for socialisation and to spread the revolutionary regime's
ideology in Libya, and abroad. Al-Qadhafi has also used the media to discuss urgent events
and to issue major policy statements.
3.4.2	 Problems and crises in the political socialisation process in Libya: a critical
analysis
The political socialisation process in Libya, as in many other Arab countries, has faced a
number of challenges and problems. The first challenge has been that the informal or primary
agents of political socialisation, such as family and tribe, were not reliable agents as far as the
regime was concerned. In many instances these agents served as counter-revolutionary
sources of socialisation, because they inculcated Libya's younger generation with traditional,
rather than revolutionary values. 79 For the younger generation it was confusing to receive
different values from different channels. In other words, the younger generation received
revolutionary values at school, through the education curricula, and in the ideological
preparation camps (fPC), and traditional values from family, tribe and kinship relations. The
latter came to represent almost an alternative to the state and its institutions. As John Davis
argues in the case of Libya,
kinship, and the natural loyalty which comes from historic domesticity, provides the
automatic comradeship, the supportiveness which men yearn after in an unsettling
world...and with this support, men do not need the state, and can manage affairs
without government. 8°
The second challenge has been the thaqafa al-istihlak [consumer culture], which is a result of
the development of world communications and the increasing exposure Libyans to global
culture through the popular satellite dishes. Libyans became accustomed to listening to and
watching foreign programmes, such as the CNN and some other satellite channels, and they
lost their interest in the internal media, which the regime uses as a channel to transfer its
ideology to its citizens. The main reasons which Libyans give to explain interest in other
media and channels of information are, first, their mistrust of the local official media,
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especially in broadcasting the news; second, the bad quality of the programmes of Libyan
television and radio; and third, the media having "too much revolution." What Lisa Anderson
says about the attitudes of some Libyans towards the educational process is similar to what
can be said about the media:
As early as the 1970s, Libyan mothers who were themselves illiterate openly expressed
doubts about the quality of the education their children were receiving—"too much
revolution," they worried, "and not enough reading" and they constituted the core of the
sceptical response to Qadhafi's subsequent educational innovations."
The third challenge has been the increasing role of the Islamic movement, reflecting the
difference between formal Islam and popular Islam within Libyan society. Most members of
Islamist groups are from the generation of the revolution, who have received the values of the
regime's ideology through the formal agents of political socialisation. The Islamist movement
became an alternative and the mosque became an important institution to instil different
values from those which the regime tried to inculcate. Although the regime has tried to control
this phenomenon in different ways, it seems that the experience of Libya has not been
different from that of other Arab Northern African countries.
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4. The Survey Process and the Sample
4.1	 Introduction
Survey research constitutes the principal method on which this study is based. The object is to
understand the nature of the political system in Libya through studying the political attitudes
of university students, who are an important stratum in Libyan society, as seen by the amount
of attention paid to them by the regime. It has sought to socialise students by inculcating them
with certain ideals or beliefs and patterns of political values. Both the education system and
media have been used to this end.
An understanding of the influence of state ideology on this significant stratum of the
population is, moreover, necessary because of the crucial role of ideology as a factor in the
Libyan political system. This research should help to illustrate the belief and value system and
pattern of behaviour of a section of Libyan citizens.
The first section of this chapter is devoted to describing the process of the survey which was
carried out in spring and summer 1994 among Libyan students at Garyunis University in
Benghazi. The aims and objectives of the survey, data collection, selection of samples and the
questionnaire design are covered.
The second section deals with data treatment and the statistical procedures. The main
statistical procedures which have been used in the analysis of the data of this study are:
Frequencies; Cross-Tabulations; Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficients; Kruslcal
Wallace Rank Order Analysis of Variance, and Cluster Analysis.
The third section concentrates on the features and characteristics of the students who made up
the sample of the study. These 'background factors' include place of family residence
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according to the area of origin and residence (urban or rural), education of parents,
occupations of parents, and the social background of the family. An important aspect of this
chapter is to compare the sample of this survey (students at Garyunis) with the whole
population of Libya, particularly with other students in the same age groups. This comparison
was made by using information about the Libyan population in general, drawn from tkiited
Nations sources as well as some Libyan sources such as the population census and data from
individual municipalities like Benghazi (1984). The chapter ends with a conclusion.
4.1.1	 Aims and objectives of the survey
The main aim in carrying out this study is to examine and explore the attitudes of university
students towards certain issues which relate to the political values of the state ideology in
Libya.
As has been indicated in previous chapters, the state ideology has played a crucial role in
Libya since 1969. The regime in Libya has tried to inculcate particular values in its citizens
through the use of socialisation agents such as the mass media and the education system
(through schools and their curricula). Some elements of regime ideology which this study
examines come from an analysis of textbooks for the ninth grade (6 years of primary, and
three years of preparatory level) in the school curricula in Libya, which the researcher
conducted previously (a content analysis of school children text books)'. These elements can
be summarised as follows:
a) The identity question is one of the most crucial elements for the individual and society.
This study explores this by looking at how the students identify themselves and what
the most important element in their identification is: family, tribe, city, the state,
Arabism and Islam represent the possible principal sources of identity.
b) Tribe and tribalism also has been targeted by the regime. On the practical side the
regime tried to abolish the tribal system especially in the early years of the revolution,
thereby seeking to neutralise its political role within Libyan society. This study looks at
the tribe as a possible source of identification and loyalty, the attachment of the
students towards the tribe and tribalism, and finally the possibility of dropping and/or
changing tribal identification.
c) The involvement of the population in the political process through political
participation is one of the methods used by the regime to create "the participant
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individual" in the decision making process through the political institutions of the
regime such as the popular congress. This study explores the attitudes towards the
political process in Libya by using university students as a sample. The relationship
between the regime and its citizens through the participation process will be explored at
many different levels. This might show to what extent the regime has succeeded or
failed in creating participant citizens in the political process in Libya.
d) The ideas of Arab Nationalism, Arab unity and the Palestinian issue have been key
common denominators of the political literature of the regime since 1969. Dealing with
these ideas is one of the main aims of this study, through an exploration of the attitudes
of the university students towards these elements of state ideology in Libya.
e) The attitudes towards the role of women in society is another theme. Several questions
related to the role of women within society and factors that might influence their role,
probe the attitudes of university students towards this issue. These factors include
religion, traditions and social values.
4.1.2	 The process of data collection
The process of data collection for the present study was based on survey research undertaken
in the period from the end of January to May 1994. The main part of the survey is based on a
questionnaire. Before starting the process of field work, the draft questionnaire was prepared
in English and then translated into Arabic.
The questionnaire was first tested on a pilot group with 'pilot testing questionnaires'. The
researcher carried out the pilot test among 50 students of different years of study in the
Geography Department in the Faculty of Arts and Education at the University of Garytmis.
This helped the researcher to evaluate and develop the questions. After deleting some of the
questions and adding others, the questionnaire was distributed to a representative sample of
500 Libyan students of both sexes at the University of Garytmis. The students came from five
faculties of the University, covering 16 of the 34 departments.
The researcher also personally interviewed 15 students at the end of the data collection
process. The purpose of these interviews was to explore in more depth some of the answers
and to provide further insight into the material which came from the respondents. This was
done by asking the students to respond orally to selected questions from the main
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questionnaire (approximately 21 questions) and one supplementary question which was not in
the questionnaire. The interview questions can be found in Appendix B.
Another source of material was spontaneous comments from some of the students who
completed the questionnaire. After collecting the questionnaires, a number of students carried
n
out informal discussions with the researcher about some of the issues in the questionnaire.
This provided further understanding of the material and allowed more exploration of the
analyses of the data in the later stages.
With regard to difficulties and problems facing the researcher, it should be noted that one
difficulty encountered by many researchers who carry out such a study, was not a problem for
her. The researcher in this study did not face any security problems in undertaking the survey.
It was not necessary to obtain permission from any officials or institutions, the only
requirement was a letter from the Political Science department at the Faculty of Economics
and Political Science, which is the researcher's department. The researcher paved the way by
visiting the selected departments of the university and handing over the letter from the
Political Science department which gave the researcher's name and the aims of the study, and
persuaded the relevant departments to cooperate.
In general, although the survey period was very interesting to the researcher, it might be
useful to mention a numbers of difficulties and problems which faced the researcher in
collecting the data at that time. These can be summarised as follows:
a) The survey had to be undertaken in a limited period of time, despite the large size of the
sample. This was due to difficulties with British visas, which put pressure on the
researcher to work hard to obtain reasonable data in a limited period of time.
b) Basic information and full statistical information, such as numbers of students in the
university, did not exist. None of the statistics were available on computer, they were held
on files which could not be easily accessed. This required the researcher to do additional
work to collect information and figures about the students through the registry of the
faculties. Care was taken not to include students who had graduated or were not Libyan.
c) There were no volunteers who could help during the period of the survey of this study.
This placed a heavier responsibility on the researcher to deal with the survey as a whole,
without any help except in the last stages of the field work, when two members of the
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Economics Research Centre at G-aryunis University helped to distribute the questionnaire
forms among some of the departments.
d) It was very difficult to collect information from different faculties when they did not follow
a common academic year. Some faculties follow a semester system, some follow a full
academic year. This meant some students were not present because of the mid-academic
year holiday which took place during the month of Ramadan. To cope with this problem
the researcher had to carry out the research process when the students of a faculty were
present.
4.1.3	 The significance of Libyan students as a sample
The reasons for using students as a sample rather than other groups within Libyan society are
manifold. 2 Firstly, they are an important stratum within society, leading the regime to pay
particular attention to them especially in terms of inculcating them with the values and
orientations related to the ideology of the political system. Secondly, the student movement
has played a crucial role within Libyan society at different stages of its development (as have
students in many Arab countries). Said and Mughisuddin have described the Arab students'
role since the end of the nineteenth century as follows:
Arab students have played an important role in the political dynamics of the region.
Prior to independence, they were leaders of freedom movements as well as channels of
communication for new ideas inspired by Western education. Since independence, they
have become the avant-garde of revolutionism, reformism, socialism, nationalism, and
Arabism in North Africa and the Middle East. Individual politicians, as well as political
parties, have often competed for the allegiance of student groups as a powerful weapon
against political adversaries.3
El-Mogherbi's general comments on the role of students in Arab countries apply clearly to the
Libyan case. According to El-Mogherbi,
in the Arab countries, students have often been encouraged by both government and
opposition leaders to carry out demonstrations and devote more of their time to politics
than to study, each group trying to marshal students, as support for its own position!'
As indicated earlier, the regime pays particular attention to the students, seeking to inculcate
them with the values of the political system. The importance of students within the Libyan
society has been given some emphasis in Chapter Three. El-Fathaly and Palmer have also
stressed this point:
University students are of particular concern to Libya's revolutionary leaders, for in
Libya, as in most developing areas, they represent a substantial portion of the nation's
intellectual elite. As recently as 1952, there were virtually no university students in
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Libya, and they now enjoy a position of enormous respect in Libyan society. This
position of respect, if not of awe, makes students potential opinion leaders of
considerable importance. Their position of respect also provides them with at least
some immunity against direct repression. To treat youths of such great promise with
excessive force would be considered poor taste and perhaps a sign of weakness. At
least some immunity, too, emerges from the fact that university students tended to
come, at least until recently, from the more influential families. To injure a student
indiscriminately would run the risk of alienating important segments of the political \
community. Finally, university students are clearly the most intensely politicised
segment of Libyan society. Starting in the era of the monarchy, no group in Libyan
society has been more vocal in expressing its opinions than the university students.5
In Libya, as in many other countries, students are always seen as the future decision-makers.
Also in the long-range perspective, "the current generation of students must bear ultimate
responsibility for the government's mobilization and government programs". 6 The failure or
success of these mobilisation processes depends to a greater degree on them due to their
position as a significant stratum within the society. According to El-Fathaly and Palmer,
The success or failure of the revolution's modemisation programs, not to mention
government efforts to reform the bureaucracy in general, will depend largely upon the
training and political socialisation of the current generation of students.'
For these reasons the revolutionary regime in Libya has realised the nature of their role and
has tried to make use of their powerful influence over the masses. These attempts started with
a training and socialisation process intended to draw the university students into the
revolutionary movement.
To understand the importance of Libyan students, it is necessary to provide some information
about Libyan youth as part of Libyan society in general. Youths represent a large proportion
of the population in Libya. According to the African Statistical Yearbook 1991, Libya's
population was 4,712,000. The Libyan Central Bank estimated the population growth rate for
Libyan nationals at 3.9 percent annually, while the World Bank predicted an overall growth of
3.5 percent annually between 1987 and 2000, one of the highest growth rates in the world. At
that rate, the population would number 6 million by 2000. 8 The increasing number of young
people among the population makes Libya a "youthful country". About 65 percent of the
population was under twenty-five years of age in 1990, and 867,000 of the total of population
were between 15 and 24, of which almost 442,000 were males and 425,000 were females.9
The northern regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica accounted for 80 percent of the population
in 1989. Population density is over 50 persons per square kilometre in the two regions, while
in the rest of the country, it falls below 1 person per square kilometre.10
The findings of the sample population as far as age structure is concerned reflect the typical
pattern of a country with a rapidly growing population, in that the majority are under 25
65
Figure 4.1: Age category of the sample
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years. Figure 4.1 shows the age category of the sample. The main age groups which have
been covered in this study are those between 17 and 24 years, which encompassed 429
students out of the whole sample of 500. The second age group was between 25 to 29 which
covered 65 students. Finally, a very small number were in the third age group (30 years and
over), this group included only six students.
Age group
According to Libyan official statistics, the total number of students in 1987/88 was 1,474,525
distributed between different levels of the education system. Table 4.1 shows the distribution
of Libyan students at the different levels and stages of education between 1969/70 and
1987/88.
According to the United Nations Yearbook 1991, by 1990 there were 44,500 male and 11,100
female university-level students in Libya. The researcher believes that the number of students
increased rapidly after 1988, especially at the university level, due to the increasing of number
of universities in Libya and additional faculties at the existing educational establishments.
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Table 4.1: Number of Libyan students in 1969/70 and 1987/88
Level 1969/70 1969/70 Total 1987/88 1987/88 Total
Male Female Male Female
E. Education 214,100 110,500 324,600 512,595 461,700 974,295
P. Education 31,700 6,500 38,200 178,740 130,275 309,015
S. Education 7,700 1,400 9,100 54,000 26,515 80,5
T. S. 1,500 1,500 22,275 6,615 28,890
Education
T. T. 3,000 1,700 4,700 14,580 26,865 41,445
Institutions
H&U 3,700 400 4,100 30,645 9,720 40,365
Education
Total 261,700 120,500 382,200 812,835 661,690 1,474,525
E. Education - Elementary education 	 P. Education - Preparatory education .
S. Education - Secondary education	 T.S. Education- Technical secondary education
T.T. Institutions - Teacher training institutions
	 H&U Education - Higher & university
education
Source: Al Jamahiriyya in 20 years, EIU Country Profile 1990-91
	 •
Between 1973 and 1993 the population of Libya increased from 2.249 million to 4.7 million."
The country underwent a very high level of population growth which increased the number
and proportion of young people, and simultaneously led to far higher participation rates in
higher education.
There are now a number of universities in addition to the two main universities of al-Fatih in
Tripoli and Garyunis in Benghazi. According to the new educational structure, the idea behind
the increasing numbers of universities, is to create specialised universities and also to
distribute universities throughout the whole country in small towns as well as the big cities.
The additional universities may give all individuals the opportunity to gain from such
education. 12 Table 4.2 shows the main universities in Libya, and the total number of students
in each university. Education in Libya until recent times has generally been free at all levels
and all university students until the mid-eighties received substantial maintenance support.
Moreover, the universities also used to provide text books and scientific instruments to all
students at a discount of 40 percent of the cost price. Also, students did not have to pay more
than five Dinars for a book, whatever the cost of the book would be. The objective was to
encourage the students to possess books and establish their own libraries. However, since the
mid-eighties the students do not receive the substantial maintenance support which they used
to receive. Students especially in the primary, preparatory and secondary schools now have to
pay for the school books which they need for their studies.
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Table 4.2: The main universities and their student numbers 1994/95
University	 Total Number of	 Location
Students
University of Al-Fatih 	 51,361
	
Tripoli
University of Garyunis
	 24,453
	
Benghazi
University of the Arabs for Medical Science
	 1,718	 Bengha7i`
University of cUmar al-Mukhtar for Agricultural
	
4,072
	
Al-Bayda
Science
University of Al-Fatih for Medical Science 	 5,538
	
Tripoli
University of Seventh of April 	 11,138
	
Al-Zawiya
University of Western Mountain 	 6,297	 Gharyan
University of Bright Star for Technological Studies 	 1,101	 Burayga
The Open University 	 15,908	 Tripoli
University of Darna	 4,427	 Darna
University of Sabha
	
5,890
	
Sabha
University of Nasir 	 6,870	 Tripoli
University of Gulf Challenge	 6,275	 Sirte
Total	 144,988
Source: General Secretary of Higher Education (Sirte)
This information about the educational position of the students and the increase of their
number within the education system in Libya, especially in higher education, shows the
significance of students as a stratum within Libyan society. It provides an important reason
for dealing with them as a basis for the sample of this study.
4.1.4
	 Selections of samples
The sample covered in this study consists of students of both sexes at the University of
Garyunis in Benghazi, which is a free public institution of higher education. The university
was founded in Benghazi on December 15, 1955 under the name of the Libyan University. It
was the first university established in Libya. The nucleus of the University was the Faculty of
Arts and Education. The University comprises a number of faculties which were established
at different times.
Some other subject areas were formerly part of the University of Garrmis, but were later
split to become separate universities such as the University of the Arabs for Medical Science,
and the 'Omar al-Mukhtar University for Agricultural Science. At the present time the
University comprises five faculties with an enrolment of more than twenty-three thousand
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students. The proportion of students in each faculty at the time of the survey was as follows
(see Figure 4.2):
a) Faculty of Arts and Education (FAE): The faculty follows the system of the full
academic year. It contains more than twelve departments. The faculty represents 25
percent of the whole population of the university.
b) Faculty of Economics and Political Science (FEPS): The faculty follows the semester
system. It contains five departments and has 48 percent of the students.
c) Faculty of Law (FL): The faculty follows the system of the full academic year. It has
four departments and its students make up just 7 percent of the total.
d) Faculty of Science (FS): The faculty follows the semester system and grants B.Sc.
degrees in nine different specialisations. Its students make up 11 percent of the whole
population of the university.
e) Faculty of Engineering (FE): The faculty follows the semester system. It consists of six
departments and with 9 percent of the total. It has the second smallest number of
students.
Figure 4.2: Libyan students distributed through the university
Faculties
With regard to what kind of approach to take on sampling, the researcher tried to avoid
sampling errors by using stratified samples with simple random sampling. The stratified
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sampling is a modification of simple random sampling and is designed to produce more
representative and thus more accurate samples. The stratified sampling may be defined as a
sample which is selected from every subgroup of the population in at least one stage of
the procedure. The basis for constructing the subgroups or strata may be one or several
properties. We may have two simple strata such as 'male' or 'female' or a large
number such as 'age at last birthday', ... the stratified sampling enables the researcher
to make comparison of the properties of the strata as well as to estimate population
characteristics.13
There are two major reasons which lay behind this decision to use stratified sampling. These
reasons are:
a) The university is by nature stratified and divided into different years, departments and
subjects of studies, and between males and females.
b) It simplifies the execution, which enables the researcher to avoid some of the problems
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.
The sample of the study represented 23,434 Libyan students at Garyunis University, and
consisted of 500 Libyan students of both sexes: 238 were female and 262 male. The sample
numbers were proportionate by gender and faculty. Table 4.3 gives details of the distribution
of the sample among the faculties of the university and includes only Libyan students.
The researcher chose 500 students as a representative sample after she realised that there was
no need to take a larger sample, since Libyan students are fairly homogenous in age, and in
social and cultural levels.
The first step to obtain a representative sample from all the faculties was to select the
departments in each faculty from which to take the sample. The decision was based on the
size of the departments and the number of students in the department.
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Table 4.3: The population of the study—University of Garyunis students (Libyan
students only)
Faculty Number of
males
Number of
sample
males
Number of
females
Number of
sample
females
Total Total of
sample
Faculty of 1,735 35 4,215 89 5,950 124
Arts & l
Education
Faculty of 7,941 169 3,331 72 11,272 241
Economics
& Political
Science
Faculty of 586 13 1,019 22 1,609 35
Law
Faculty of 844 19 1,651 36 2,495 55
Science
Faculty of 1,232 26 880 19 2,112 45
Engineering
Total 12,338 262 11,096 238 23,433 500
Source: Field survey carried out by researcher, 1994
The numbers in the sample (per faculty) reflect the numbers of students in the faculty. The
largest faculties in the university are the faculties of social science, in comparison to science
faculties. This is due to the increasing number of specialist universities covering particular
scientific subjects for instance medical studies. The number of social science students
represented in the sample of this study accordingly came to 400, while 100 students came
from the faculties of Engineering and Science.
Table 4.4 gives more detail about the sample size by faculty, department, subject of study and
gender. Five departments were represented in the sample out of a total of fifteen departments
in the faculty of Arts and Education. These departments were Arabic Language and
Literature, English Language and Literature, History, Sociology and Mass Media. The total
number of students taken from the whole faculty was 124, 35 male and 89 female,
representing 24.8 percent of the whole sample. Four departments were chosen from the
Faculty of Economics and Political Science. These departments were Economics, Business
Administration, Accounting and Political Science. The total number of the sample taken from
the Faculty of Economics and Political Science was 241 students, 169 male and 72 female.
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Table 4.4: Sample size by faculty and departments and gender (Libyan students only)
Faculty Male Female Total Total of Samples
Faculty of Arts & Education 35 89 124 24.8
•	 Arabic Language-Literature 8 19 26 5.4
•	 English Language-Literature 6 17 23 4.6
•	 History 7 18 25 5.0
•	 Sociology 7 18 25 5.0
•	 Mass Media 7 17 24 4.8
Faculty of Economics & Political Science 169 72 241 48.2
•	 Economics 42 18 60 12.0
•	 Business Administration 42 18 60 12.0
•	 Accounting 42 18 60 12.0
•	 Political Science 43 18 61 12.2
Faculty of Law 13 22 35 7.0
Faculty of Science 19 36 55 11.0
•	 Zoology 7 14 21 4.2
•	 Mathematics 6 11 17 3.4
•	 Chemistry 6 11 17 3.4
Faculty of Engineering 26 19 45 9.0
•	 Electrical Engineering 9 7 16 3.2
•	 Industrial Engineering 8 5 13 2.6
•	 Civil Engineering 9 7 16 3.2
Total Samples 262 238 500 100.0
Source: Field survey, 1994
As shown in the Table 4.4, the total number of students from the Faculty of Law selected for
the sample was 35, 13 male and 22 female. This faculty represents almost 7 percent of the
total number from the whole sample. The selected departments from the Faculty of Science
were Zoology, Mathematics and Chemistry. The total number from this faculty was 55
students, 19 male and 36 female, representing 11 percent of the whole sample. Finally, three
departments in the Faculty of Engineering were selected, namely Electrical Engineering,
Industrial Engineering and Civil Engineering. The selection number for these departments was
45 students, 26 male and 19 female. This represented 9 percent of the whole sample of the
study. (Figure 4.1 the male and female ratio of Libyan students within the faculties of
Garyunis university).
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4.1.5	 Structure of the questionnaire
The questionnaire of this study was designed to cover a number of subjects through which the
• political attitudes of the representative sample of this study, 'the university students', could be
investigated. 14 All questionnaires were completed in Arabic.
In this part of the chapter, it is useful to introduce the contents of the questionnaire. The
sections of the questionnaire can be summarised as follows:
Section one (Questions 1 to 15). This section was the face sheet of the questionnaire
(personal data is usually found at the start of any questionnaire). The face sheet questions
were concerned with the basic information on each respondent, including place of family
residence, place of birth, age, sex, marital status, year of university study, the faculty and the
subject of the study, parents' occupation, level of parents' education, family income and
social status of the family.
Section two (Questions 16 to 18). Questions in this section were designed to explore the
identity issue among the students. One of these questions dealt with the most important
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aspects of student identification related to Arabism and Islam, by asking them to select one of
the possible answers being an Arab, being a Muslim, or identifying with both equally. The
reasons for the identification as an Arab are then assessed by another question in which the
respondents were asked to choose one of the possible answers (religion, language, both
equally). A final question dealt with how the students identify themselves and what they
consider the most important element of their identity: family, tribe, city, state, Muslim, and
Arab.
Section three (Questions 19 to 21). This section was designed for the collection of data to
help explore the attitudes to tribe and tribalism. The questions covered issues like tribal
loyalty and attachment.
Section four (Questions 22 to 39). This section was designed to investigate the attitudes to
political participation among the students, through questions which explored their
participation in the political system and the awareness of their roles in the political process in
Libya.
Section five (Questions 40 to 53). This section dealt with attitudes of the students towards
Arab issues, such as Arab unity and the Palestinian issue (Arab-Israeli conflict).
Section six (Questions 54 to 62). This section was designed to investigate the attitude of
students towards the role of women in society.
4.2	 Data Treatment and Selecting Statistical Procedures
After the field data had been collected, the next step was the analysis of the data. This process
started by coding the data in order to allow them to be processed and analysed statistically.
Each variable of the data was given a code number. The choice of statistical tests and
analytical methods varied according to the nature of the research questions. The researcher
tried to adopt the most common straightforward methods which have been used in social
science research. As the focus of research was based on a study of the political attitudes of
university students, the analysis was centred on six groups of variables. The first group
related to the background variables or the "face sheet variables." These variables are gender,
age, place of family residence, parents educational level, family income, social status. The
second group dealt with identity and the sources of identity such as Arabism, Islam, tribe,
family, state and city. The third dealt with tribe and tribalism. The fourth dealt with political
participation. The fifth group dealt with some Arab issues such as Arab unity and the
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Palestine (Arab/Israeli) conflict. Finally, the sixth group dealt with the role of women in
society.
The data was analysed using the SPSS statistical package. The main statistical procedures
are: 15
a) Frequencies: Simple counts of each value for a variable, e.g. numbers respectively
male and female for the variables set.
b) Cross-tabulation: One of the simplest and most frequently used ways of identifying the
presence or absence of a relationship between two variables. In cross tabulation, at the
simplest two-variable level, one variable forms the rows of a table and another the
columns. Each cell contains the cases which have the appropriate row and column
values. For example, in a cross-tabulation of sex against the variable rural/urban with
the rows as rural/urban and the colunms as sex, then there are four cells, namely male
urban, male rural, female urban and female rural. Sample data chi-squared can be used
to test for the statistical significance of observed associations of variables.
c) Spearman rank order correlation coefficients: A statistic measuring the extent to
which two sets of discrete data place the distinct items in the same order. Values vary
from one, in which there is a complete correspondence of ranks, to zero in which case
there is no correspondence. An example would be the relationship between ranking the
importance of family as a source of identity and religion as a source of identity.
d) Kruskal-Wallace rank order analysis of variance: This is a useful alternative to the
analysis of variance. Like analysis of variance, this tests whether sorting cases from a
sample into categories produces groups which have differences that are statistically
significant. Here the data is ordinal and the test is of mean ranks. An example would be
differences in mean ranking of the importance of Islam as a source of identity by
father's occupation.
e) Cluster analysis: In statistics, the search for relatively homogeneous groups of objects
is called cluster analysis. Cluster analysis is used to classify objects or cases into
categories. The goal of cluster analysis is to identify homogeneous groups or clusters.
Also, in cluster analysis the initial choice of variables determines the characteristics
that can be used to identify subgroups. In this study the main cluster analysis has been
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carried out using the variables dealing with sources of identity. Here the different
composition of ranks indicate different 'identity types'.
As this study is an exploratory study, the abovementioned methods, were used in an
exploratory way, not to test hypotheses, but to obtain reasonable information from the data in
terms of patterns .16
In this thesis the researcher has combined a quantitative examination with material drawn
from a review of official and historical sources and with the content analysis of school texts.
However, given the lack of social attitudes studies of Libyan society the greatest attention has
necessarily been devoted to the survey findings.
4.3	 The Characteristics of the Sample
It is useful to give more details about the characteristics of the sample, in terms of gender,
place of family residence (i.e. urban versus rural origin), educational specialisation of the
respondents (i.e. faculty and subject of study), parental occupational levels, parental
educational levels, family income and social status. As these factors may influence the
respondents' answers and attitudes towards the issues which this study is based on, they need
to be brought into the analysis.
4.3.1	 Place of family residence
One of the main background variables relates to the place of family residence (or specifically
urban-rural origins). It seems a natural assumption that people might have different attitudes
according to their family residence, whether urban or rural.
It should be noted that it was difficult for the researcher to find a practical definition for the
division between urban and rural as regards to the place of family residence is of the
representative sample of this study. The problem was solved through using the general norms
used for the census in the municipality of Benghazi city and some other cities in 1984.
Administratively at that time Libya was divided into 24 provinces (baladyat), each of them
comprising one main urban centre. The census considered as urban not only the main town of
each province, but also the area which was administered as part of that town. In addition to
that, any other settlement within the province which had more than 5000 inhabitants was also
considered as urban." By UK standards a settlement with a population of only 5000 would
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not necessarily count as urban in the twentieth century, but this level was regularly used in the
nineteenth century and it is the level used officially in Libya. It may be that this administrative
definition overstates the urban element, bringing some people into the urban category who are
not truly urban, but it seems to be the only practicable one to employ.
In order to understand the nature of the division between urban and rural in the sample of this
study, it is important to give brief details about the background of the urbanisation process in
Libya. According to the African Statistical Yearbook, Libya's total population in 1991 was
4,712,000 in comparison to 1,986,000 in 1970. One of the significant features of population
growth in Libya has been the increasing proportion of the population concentrated in
metropolitan areas such as Benghazi and Tripoli. This process accelerated following the oil
discovery in the 1960. Three main factors might explain the movements from rural to urban
areas in Libya:
a) The return of many Libyan expatriates who left the country during the Italian era.
b) Discovery and exploitation of oil resources, which has attracted thousands of workers
into the cities looking for employment.
c) Attraction to the better facilities found in cities (health, education, entertainment) and
an entirely different way of life.
The major cities which experienced rural-urban migration in Libya before the 1970s were
Tripoli, Benghazi, Dama, Ijdabia, Tobruk, Bayda and Barce. Since the late 1970s these cities
increased their share of the country's population from 22.9 percent in 1954 to 27.4 percent in
1964. During the same period, the two cities Benghazi and Tripoli had a population of more
than 80,000 and increased their share of the population, from 18.8 percent to 22.4 percent's
Another type of migration has appeared during the late seventies, which is urban-to-urban
migration. This process was enhanced by the return of some former migrants to their towns of
origin. In 1979, over 66 percent of urban-bound migrants have come either from a city or a
town.19
As far as the sample is concerned, the vast majority of the respondents came from an urban
background. Only few students came from rural areas. In the survey the students came from
55 different areas, cities, villages, small towns, etc.
Figure 4.4 shows the place of family residence (urban-rural) of the representative sample.
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It was not unexpected for the researcher to find that 428 (86.0 percent) of respondents came
from urban areas and 72 (14.0 percent) came from a rural background. The reasons for the
high urban percentages can be summarised as follows:
a) The urban population in Libya in general is high in number, as in most of the Arab
Middle Eastern countries.
b) Students from rural areas prefer to go to universities which are close to their family
residence, especially female students.
c) The university in which the survey was carried out is Garyunis University in Benghazi.
It is one of 13 universities around the country (see table 4.2). The researcher has noted
that most of the respondents came from Benghazi (64 percent), with about another 10
percent coming from Benghazi's suburbs and surrounding areas, and 4 percent each
from Tobruk and Tripoli.
One interesting fact about this figure is that urban females represent 92.0 percent and rural
females represent 8.0 percent of the female sample. In contrast, urban males represent 80.0
percent of the sample and rural male students represent 20.0 percent of the male sample.
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The larger proportion of urban female students is related to the fact that women tend to
choose their faculty or university in the area where their families live for social and cultural
reasons. Some families do not allow their daughters to stay away from home or in another
city, despite the facilities which every university provides for their students, such as free
accommodation.
4.3.2	 Parents' education
Parental educational level is one of the main background factor variables in the questionnaire
of this study. This variable might have a significant influence on the political attitudes of the
sample.
As mentioned in Chapter Three, Libyan society had a lack of education in the period before
independence. Afterwards, the education system in Libya, in common with most Arab
countries, suffered from a limited curriculum and few qualified teachers. Furthermore, during
the monarchy, education was shaped by religious elements more than in any other period.
Even with the expansion in secular and Islamic schools, vocational education, the
establishment of the first Libyan University, the inclusion of rural and Bedouin children for
the first time into the educational system and the creation of an adult education programme,
the educational system still did not meet the country's need of trained technical, managerial,
and skilled personne1.2°
The overall literacy rate among the Libyan population over 10 years of age at the time of
independence in 1951 did not exceed 20 percent. By 1977 the rate had increased to 51 percent
overall, 73 percent for males and 31 percent for females, in consequence of expanding school
opportunities. 21 In 1988 it was estimated that only 5 percent of men and 10 percent of women
were still illiterate.22 These official figures for the overall population have to be contrasted
with the survey finding that 17 percent of the students' fathers and 50 percent of their mothers
were illiterate. This shows that most of the students were the first generation within their
families to have been educated. The probable explanation for this discrepancy was the
absence of a formal educational provision for their parents. Even the system that did exist was
not taken seriously by many people as children especially girls were not sent to school for
financial or social reasons. This gap in educational experience between parents and children
illustrates the enormous changes in Libya and is an important illustration of the degree of
social change which has occurred.
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Table 4.5: Parental education
Educational Males' Males' Females' Females' Total Total
level fathers mothers fathers mothers fathers mothers
N N N M1 N rol
Illiterate 24.0 58.0 11.0 42.0 17.0 50.0
Can only
read
7.0 6.0 2.0 6.0 5.0 6.0
Can read
and write
17.0 8.0 10.0 7.0 14.0 7.0
Primary 13.0 11.0 14.0 12.0 14.0 12.0
Preparatory 11.0 7.0 16.0 14.0 13.0 10.0
Secondary 5.0 3.3 20.0 8.0 12.0 5.0
Intermediate
college
7.0 5.5 6.0 6.0 7.0 5.0
University
and over
15.0 2.0 21.0 6.0 18.0 4.0
Total 262 262 238 238 500 500
Number of
Respondents
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 4.5, demonst.iates that the female's' fathers are better educated than the males'. As far
as the mothers' educational level is concerned, Table 4.5 shows that mothers of females and
males had less education than the fathers of males and females. Also, the percentages of
illiteracy among the mothers of the respondents are quite high. It seems that the educational
level of females' mothers as shown in Table 4.5 was slightly higher than the educational level
of males' mothers. It is worth comparing the literacy levels of the respondents' parents with
that of the Benghazi population (aged 15 or more) in 1984. more than 30 percent of
males and more than 40 percent of females were illiterate. The respondents' fathers were
substantially more literate than the general population had been ten years earlier, and the
mothers were slightly less literate. The difference for women reflects the timing of the
introduction of compulsory education. The educational level of the fathers indicates that their
social status was higher than that of the general population.
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43.3	 Parents' occupation
Parents' occupation is another of the 'face sheet' variables on which this study is based. This
variable may have a significant reflection on the students' attitudes towards the issues
investigated.
It is important to justify the method which has been used to classify parents' occupation. In
the first stage of classification, the parents' occupation was identified by two open questions
(questions 8, 11a and 11b, see Appendix A). The first was asked about the father's
occupation. The second was about the mother's occupation, and had two parts. The first half
was: "Does your mother work?", and the second part was: "If yes, what is your mother's
occupation?".
The second stage was based on classifying the parents' occupation by using the census of the
municipality of Benghazi in 1984 as a preliminary guide. However, the categories employed
there mixed occupation and field of activity (e.g. working in the public service, working in
production etc.) and could not form the basis for a ranking of occupation. It was necessary to
modify this so substantially that direct comparisons of the general population in 1984 and the
students' parents are not possible. All parents who were self-employed were classified under
the category "businessman." Any parents who were working as doctors, engineers, university
lecturers, teachers or in any skilled job with higher education were considered as
professionals. Figure 4.5 shows the respondents' fathers' occupations. As can be seen, there
are some differences between males' and females' fathers' occupations.
Figure 4.5 shows that females' fathers had higher percentages than males' fathers in certain
categories such as 'businessman', and 'professional'. Almost 24.0 percent of females' fathers
were businessmen, compared with 16 percent of males' fathers. Also, 33.0 percent of females'
fathers were government officials, compared with 26 percent of males' fathers. 19.0 percent
of females fathers were professionals compared to 16 percent of males' fathers. There were
only small percentages of the fathers of both sexes who were working as settled farmers or
labourers. The low percentages in these categories are due to the small number of rural
students in the sample.
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As far as the mothers of the respondents are concerned, it seems that most of the mothers were
not economically active. There were -only three categories of mother's occupation: not
economically active, professional or administrative official, and labourer.
The findings show that 91.0 percent of the males' mothers were not economically active, and
almost 89.0 percent of the females' mothers were not economically active. In contrast, 5.0
percent of the males' mothers were professionals or administrative officers and 8.0 percent of
the females' mothers were professionals or administrative officers. Furthermore, almost 2.0
percent of the males' mothers were labourers as were 3.0 percent of the females' mothers.
Most of the women who were economically active were professional or government officials.
According to the respondents' answers, most women who were in the labourer category were
working as cleaners at schools, hospitals and offices, or as labourers in factories.
It seems that the explanation for the low numbers of economically active mothers is related to
the low percentages of mothers' education in general. It is also affected by the early marriage
of women and their role in the family.
It is useful to mention that women in Libya have obtained many opportunities to work and
participate in most of the economic activities of the society during the last three decades.
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Attir, in his study about development and modernisation in the Libyan society, describes the
role of women in Libyan society since the late thirties as follows:
It was common in the family to find just one member who was working to obtain
income, usually the father played such a role. The work to obtain economic benefits
such as money was monopolised by men... .It seems that women had entered the labour
market on a simple level in the late thirties and forties as cleaners in hospitals, schools
and houses. Then the situation developed for the women to became teachers, and
nurses. The extension of education among women, gave them the opportunity to enter
several fields such as engineering, medicine, and teaching at universities.24
There are no official reports that show the role of women as part of the labour force in Libya.
A large number of women are working in the education system. This reflects one of the main
policies of the country, namely to use female teachers for the whole of the early years of the
education system (primary and preparatory schools).
4.3.4	 Social status of the family
Social status is one of the main background factors or face sheet variables, which the
researcher expected to effect the attitudes of the respondents towards the main issues of this
study.
Social status in this study was measured in practice by two main questions (numbers 13a and
13b, see Appendix A). The first asked the respondents a direct question about their family
income. The second question asked them to categorise the social status of their family. Each
question had a number of alternative answers to assist the respondents to choose the most
relevant answer. There were some other control questions which were intended to help the
researcher to find out more information about the social status of the respondents. These
questions (12, 14a, 14b, 15, see Appendix A) were about the number of family members, type
of family residence (including the rooms in the family house) and whether the family owned
certain goods such as cars, air-conditioning, video, etc. In practice, the degree of variation in
ownership of items etc. was not high and these were not used in the specification of social
status.
It was very difficult to choose the most suitable method to measure family income and social
status. Since 1969, especially after 1977 (the issuing of The Green Book), economic
structures have changed due to the regime's attempt to create the "State of the Masses".
These include the following changes:
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a) The "partners, not wage workers" policy in light industry, the services sector, etc. This
is a notion al-Qadlaafi introduced in order to replace the traditional employer-employee
relationship with the concept of profit-sharing. However, in practice the effects of this
policy have not been very great.
b) The adoption of the Equal Wages Law Number (15) in 1981 by the General People's
Congresses. This was designed to organise the wages and salaries system of the native
workers in Libya. The first article of this law guarantees equal wages for equal jobs
and responsibilities with the amount sufficient to satisfy basic needs.25
c) The emergence of a policy of economic liberalisation from 1988. The regime's
economic policy has moved towards liberalisation, by allowing private enterprises in
the retail trade, small scale industries and agricultural businesses and by the abolition
of state export and import companies.26
There was, moreover, the problem of updated information such as official reports and
material, relating to the economic activities in Libya. Unfortunately, these are scarce and often
out of date. Thus they couldn't be relied upon when measuring and classifying family income
and social status.
The researcher therefore tried to resolve the problem of classification of social status
practically, by talking to a range of employees of Garyunis University and asking for their
views on the relationship between income levels and general social status. There was a rough
consensus on the scale, as shown in Figure 4.6. Thus, income level has been used as a proxy
variable for social status.
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Figure 4.6: Family income per month
Male	 Female
Gender
In Table 4.6 the researcher has replaced the income categories, which were actually measured,
with the labels that the Garyunis University Staff thought could be generally applied to those
income levels. This was necessarily an approximate procedure, but it gives some idea of
social status by income. The values in the table are of course the same as in the figure.
By looking at Figure 4.6 and Table 4.6, we can see that 5 percent of the male respondents
were from families in the labour category with a monthly income of less than 120 Libyan
dinars, and 3 percent of the females' families were in this category. The second category
(lower-middle class, with a monthly income between 121-199 L.d.) accounted for 16 percent
of the male and 11 percent of female.
The middle category with a monthly income of 200-300 L.d. covered 39 percent of the male
respondents, and 50 percent of the female respondents. The middle is the largest category of
the whole sample for both sexes. In contrast, the upper middle category, with a monthly
income of 301-500 L.d, contained 25 percent of the males and 28 percent of the females. The
last category, with a monthly income 501 and over L.d. covered 16 percent of the male
respondents and 10 percent of the females.
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Table 4.6: Social status of the family
Categories Male Female
[°/0]
Total
Lower 5 3 4
Lower-Middle 16 11 13
Middle 39 50 44
Upper Middle 25 28 26
Upper 16 10 13
Total Number of 262 238 500
Respondents
Source: Field survey 1994 - note that in this and other tables percentages may not sum to 100
because numbers have been rounded to the nearest whole number.
To conclude, according to the tables and figures shown above, the most common categories of
social status of the respondents' families, were these of the middle and the upper middle
income strata. It is also worth noting that female respondents were more likely to come from
middle and upper middle backgrounds than were male respondents.
It is not possible to make an exact comparison of the social status of the students' parents
with that of the general population, because there is no general income distribution data
published for Libya or Benghazi. However, it is evident from the social status labels which
the Garyunis staff gave to the income levels that the students do come from more affluent and
higher status backgrounds.
4.4 Conclusion and Summary
This chapter was intended both to describe the process of survey design and execution and to
give some general background information about the students in the sample obtained. The
students are primarily urban and the majority come from the Greater Benghazi area and
surrounding districts. They come from a variety of social backgrounds, but again it is
important to emphasise the regime's commitment to a relatively egalitarian social system, and
the relatively even standard of living (by comparison with other Arab societies) which prevails
in Libya. It is very important to remember that education at all levels is free in Libya,
although at the time of the study there were no maintenance grants. This latter reason may
well be important in reducing the participation by those from poorer backgrounds in higher
education, but those whose families could not afford to support them into higher education
were not, by definition, in my sample.
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The study will now explore the influence of background on identity, attitudes to tribalism,
extent of political participation, attitudes to gender issues, and attitudes to general Arab
issues. It must be emphasised, however, that the most important characteristics of the students
may well be what they have in common rather than what differences of background could
indicate. In many senses they are a homogeneous group and the most important distinctions
are not those among them, but between them and previous generations in Libya. Indeed,
subsequent analyses will show that social background has little influence on attitudes,
although there are important differences among the students with regard to both attitudes and
conceptions of identity. The major exception is the influence of gender on attitudes towards
the women's role.
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5. The Issue of Identity
5.1	 Introduction
Identity is one of the most significant factors related to the building of a nation, and the
formation of a political community. In empirical studies it is one of the major concepts in
understanding how people in different ethnic groups, religions and nations perceive
themselves.
The identity issue is a confusing one, especially in Arab societies. Saad Eddin Ibrahim
mentions identity, authority and equality as the main issues which underlie the building of a
modem nation. 1 But the problem is that although most Arab societies accept the existence of
one common identity, which is "the Arab identity", there are other competitive political
identities: "regional identity" (operating at various levels e.g. national or subnational),
"Islamic identity", and "ethnic identity." It is unclear what the hierarchy of these identities is.
But most people have more than one identity.
The identity question is particularly important to the Libyan system because of its attempts to
create a national identity based on Arab nationalism. Arab identity is intended to serve as an
alternative to regional and local identities (such as those linked to tribe, city or region). The
revolutionary regime has sought to abolish the political role of some of these units such as the
tribe, giving more emphasis to their social role, that is, to provide their members with social
values, morals, and security. Also, through its attempts to build a nation, the regime has used
nationalism in the wider context. This concept was linked with Arabism and Islamism as other
important sources of identification.
This part of the study will explore identity through a number of questions which are intended
to clarify how students in Libya identify themselves. What are the most important elements
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for their identification? What is the role of Islamism and Arabism in terms of identification?
And what is the role of identification as walad cayla [the son of a family], and walad qabila
[the son of a tribe]. The traditional identification with tribe is still powerful among Libyans,
as in most of the other Arab countries.
These are the key questions raised when exploring the attitudes of the 262 male and 238
female university students concerning their identity. I will cover factors which might influence
their identification, such as gender, social status, place of family residence, parents' education
and the subject of study. A number of analytical procedures are used to explore the attitudes
of the representative sample. These procedures are cross tabulation and cluster analysis.
There is some homogeneity in Libya, in so far as almost all of the population are Arabs and
Muslims. However a Berber minority is present, which shares the religion, history, and
culture of the Arab majority and even uses Arabic as a second language. Furthermore, they
have adopted the Arabic alphabet to express their various dialects in written form. In general,
these groups are integrated into the system, with fewer problems than similar groups in some
other North African Arab countries, such as Algeria. Furthermore, the political literature of
the regime considers Berbers as Arabs who immigrated to the region before Islam. Yet the
Berbers are still aware of their identity as a distinctive group in Libyan society. They have
their own language, which has Hamitic roots.
In this study sample, the researcher only came across three cases of individuals who did not
identify themselves as Arab. Two of the cases in the survey identified themselves as Muslim
Berbers. They distinguished themselves as Berbers because of the language. The third case
identified himself as an African Muslim. He justified his identification because of his
distinctive language, skin colour and the geographical location of his home—near the
Southern Libyan border.
While there are no big differences between "Arabs and non-Arabs" in Libyan society, there
are still important differences in the identification of individuals. Libyan society, like many
other Arab societies, is based on traditional identifications such as family, tribe, religion, and
city. For instance, when meeting for the first time, there are certain questions people usually
ask: ha qabila ant [Which tribe do you belong to?], and ha 'i cal 'la [Which family do you
belong to?]. There are also phrases like walad-bint Cal 'la [I am a son-daughter of a specific
family], or ana min qabila [I belong to a specific tribe]. There are also ties with particular
localities.
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In such a society the deeds of individuals bring collective fame or shame to the family and
tribe. Hence the good or bad reputation of a family or tribe crucially influences the lives of
individuals socially, politically and economically. The clan or tribe can interfere even at a
personal level, such as in the decision of marriage, especially for females.
This chapter explores the identity issue through three main questions as shown in the
questionnaire (questions 16, 17, 18, see Appendix A). The first question involved asking the
respondents about the most important aspect of their identity by giving them three choices:
being an Arab, being a Muslim, or being an Arab and Muslim. The second question involved
asking the respondent how they identified themselves, ranking in descending order the
following potential answers: son or daughter of a specific family, belonging to a specific tribe,
coming from a particular city within Libya, being a citizen of the Libyan state, being a
Muslim, and being an Arab. The third question was based on selecting one of the following
statements: I am an Arab because of my religion, I am an Arab because of my language, I am
an Arab because I belong to an Arab state.
5.2 The Notion of Identity: A Review
Identity can have many different levels.. People can have a sense of belonging to a religious
grouping, a culture, a state and a region, all at the same time. Identities are not exclusive of
others. Moreover, the weight which individuals give to particular elements of their identity can
change over time. The task is to assess what weight individuals give to the different elements
of their identity, and how those elements relate to one another.
One recent study which highlights this point is Da Costa's (1994) study of Cape Town
Muslims (South Africa). His study was based on research on the geography of religion,
conducted in Greater Cape Town between 1985 and 1989. He tried to find out whether the
group identified itself as South African, or whether the national-origin sub-groups still
identified themselves in terms of their countries of origins. Did the group accept the different
racial classifications which had been imposed upon it by colonialism and later by apartheid
legislation, or had the group become welded into a socially distinguishable religious
community? Or were there combinations of these identities which had given rise to a system
of multiple identities?2
Da Costa found that, despite the heightened religious identity within a minority religious
group, other forms of identity are not excluded. Half the Muslim population of Great Cape
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Town saw themselves as part of other population categories, such as 'Coloured', 'Indian' and
so on. Moreover, at least one fifth of the Muslim population considered their religious identity
as Muslims less important than their identity in terms of other categories. 3 Despite these
findings it was the case that religious identity within a group could override all other forms of
identity. This appears through the behaviour and experience of most members of the Muslim
community, where most of them preferred to use Islamic forms of greeting and gave their
children Arabic names. The researcher added that under very special socio-political
circumstances minority groups may not see themselves as part of the country of residence,
and may not express any significant national identity. In this study only one respondent
considered himself as South African.
A study by Al-Salem is one of the few on this topic undertaken in Arab countries. Al-Salem
studied the issue of identity in selected Arab Gulf States during the period 1979-1982, using a
representative sample of 500 high school students from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain,
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. He found that the students in the Arab Gulf states
appeared to have no general Pan-Arab identity.4 The only formulated identity that had
developed among the students was a sense of belonging to the existing state. Pan-Arab
nationalism had lost its meaning by the 1970s and, according to the sample of students asked,
Pan-Arabism considered was a myth. .
There is, moreover, often a gap between what people say about their identity and how they
act. As al-Salem states,
What is true of Arab nationalism is also true of the pan-Islamic movement: there is a
vast difference between theory and practice. The wealthy Muslims of the Gulf states
who talk about the distribution of wealth according to Islamic theory do not necessarily
practice what they preach.5
This study is seeking to contribute something to the few studies in the Arab countries, and the
Middle East in general, through an exploration of the attitudes of 500 Libyan university
students towards self-identity.
5.3	 Analysis of the Data
The purpose of this section is to analyse and explore the attitudes of the university students in
Libya towards the identity question through a numbers of dimensions of potential
identification such as Arabism and Islamism on the one hand, and the traditional sources of
identity such as region, tribe, family, city and the state, on the other hand.
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In political sociology, attitudes are usually considered to be influenced by background factors,
often referred to as 'face-sheet' variables (see chapter 4). Such possible background factors
are gender, urban versus rural origin, parental occupational levels, household income,
household size and the social status of the family from which the respondents come. It is
important to emphasise that some of these factors do not vary very much among the sample.
Libya is a relatively homogeneous society with regard to household incomes (in comparison
with other Arab societies), and the respondents are all students entering into a common status.
However, as the discussion in Chapter 4 shows, there is some significant variation in many of
these background variables and it is worth considering the potential impact of this on attitudes
towards identity.
5.3.1	 Arabism and Islamism: possible sources of identity
To find out the relative strength between Islam and Arabism as source of identities, the
respondents were asked which of the following was most important to them: being an Arab,
being a Muslim, or both equally. The result can be seen in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Importance of identity by gender and place of family residence
Categories	 Number of
respondents
Being an Arab
[%1
Muslim Both equally
[0/01
Urban male	 209 2 21 77
Rural male	 53 2 11 87
Urban female	 219 1 9 89
Rural female	 19 0 21 79
Urban	 428 2 15 83
Rural	 72 1 14 85
Male	 262 2 19 79
Female	 238 1 10 89
All	 500 2 15 84
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 5.1 is based on gender and the place of family residence (urban/rural). Even when
considered together in a three variable model (that is, by looking at urban/rural distinctions
for males and females separately), these background factors do not have much impact on the
way the Libyan students see themselves. As shown in the table, the results show that the
combination of Islam and Arabness is the key to identity for most of the respondents, although
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this is somewhat less so for rural women and for urban men, both of which categories have
relatively large proportions citing Islam alone.
Arabness by itself counts very little in identity. For instance, those who identified themselves
as Arab alone by the two background factors (gender and place of family residence) covered
only 1 percent and 2 percent of each category. Muslimness by itself is considerably more
important. Between 9 percent and 21 percent identified themselves as Muslim. But between
77 percent and 89 percent identified 'both equally' as being of the greatest significance. It
seems clear that the overwhelming majority of respondents were not prepared to distinguish
between Arabism and Islam as sources of personal identity.
5.3.2	 Reasons for identification as an Arab
This section explores the reasons why respondents identify themselves as Arabs. The question
(number 18 see appendix A) puts three different alternatives as possible reasons for
identification as an Arab. These alternatives are religion, language, and belonging to an Arab
state.
The significance of the question with respect to Arab nationalist thought is very important. In
most Arab nationalist thought there are a number of different elements of Arab identity such
as language, history, religion. But the relationship of Arab nationalism to Islam remains at the
centre of discussion. One of those who discussed this feature was Sate al-Husri. According to
Bezirgan
Al-Husri argued that Islam as a religion, is not among the basic component elements of
Arab nationalism but yet cannot be entirely overlooked in the process of the
development of national consciousness. His argument is based on his concept of
religion. To al-Husri, there are two types of religions in the world. One is the universal,
like Islam and Christianity, which are not the religion of a particular nation or race but
which tend to link several nations in a bond that is stronger than language and history.
The second type is what he calls 'national religions' such as Judaism, which is the
religion of specific people. National religions, he maintains, constitute an integral part
of nationalism and cannot be divorced from the political life of the nation.6
For al-Husri, whose writings are historically oriented, Islam played a crucial role in the
evolution and spreading of Arab nationalism for two main reasons. Firstly, Islam was the
driving force behind the Arab conquests which spread the Arabic language, and secondly, it
became the 'protective force of division and disintegration'. But this does not mean that Arab
nationalism remained tied to Islam.' Al-Husri gave special emphasis to history as one of the
main elements of nationalism.
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Often a nation defines itself by having a distinctive language. For al-Husri, for instance,
language is a pillar of nationalism, while history is the feeling and memories of the nation.8
Michel 'Aflaq was another thinker who paid a great deal of attention to the relationship
between Islam and Nationalism (Arabism). 9 Islam is the beginning of Arabism and Islam for
the Arabs is the
clearest expression of their cosmic consciousness and their general outlook. Above all
Islam is the most splendid form of their language and literature and the largest slice of
their national history.19
'Aflaq was aware of the role of religion and he completely rejected Marxist ideas about
religion. He maintained that any attack on religion would create a barrier between the political
leadership at the top and the masses of people at the bottom."
'Abdul Rahman al-Ba77a7 was another advocate of the linguistic-historical approach. He
argued that there was no contradiction between Arabism and Islam. In his view, Islam can not
be included as a 'necessary' element in the formation of Arab nationalism." In his book,
Hadhi Oawmiyyatuna [This is our Nationalism], Al-Ba zza z stated that:
If we equate religion and nationalism, we would exclude one-tenth of the Egyptian
population, and one-fifth of the Syrian population and about one-half of the population
of Lebanon from Arab nationalism. We would also exclude a sizeable proportion of the
Iraqis, Palestinians, Jordanians, and Sudanese, as well as a great number of Arabs who
have immigrated to America, Africa and the other continents. But on the other hand,
when we lose these millions (of Arabs), the theory (that Islam is an essential element)
would have us consider every Muslim in Asia, Africa and Europe as brother to the
Arab Muslim brothers in the national sense, which means that the sons of the same
nationality will have the same political destiny and one ultimate national interest, and
requires the establishment of a social and political solidarity and association among
them."
The relationship between religion and nationalism as a general concept was one of the key
questions to which the state ideology in Libya paid a great deal of attention, especially in the
Green Book. According to al-QacPaafi
The social, i.e. the national factor is the driving force of human history there is no real
rival to the social factor in influencing the unity of one group except the religious
factor, which may divide the national group or unite groups with different
nationalism.14
As far as the relationship between Islam and Arab nationalism is concerned, for al-Qadhafi,
Islam is the fundamental basis of Arab identity, of unity within the Arab nation and between it
and all Muslims. Islam, for al-Qadhafi, is also the most significant political and cultural
weapon against imperialism and intellectual domination!'
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The relationship between Islam and the Arab nation as an ethnic identity is a close organic
one. In the Arab nation, Islam as a message has been spread by its sons to all peoples. Al-
Qadhafi maintained in 1973 that Islam was neither an Arab nor an Eastern religion, but an
international and universal mission. 16 According to Deeb and Deeb,
Al-Qadhafi regarded Islam as national in character in the sense that the Arab lands had
been the land of the prophets, the Arabic language the language of the Qur'an, and the
Arabs had been chosen to carry this message. It is al-Qallaafi's attempt to reconcile the
nationalist and the universal conceptions of Islam without abandoning either that have
led him to oscillate from one conception to the other, depending on the situation
encountered."
Al-Qadhafi's conception of Arab nationalism or Arabism was simply tied to his Islamic
identity. He was brought up in a society which did not encompass religious divisions among
its indigenous population. He was criticised for this by Arabs from the Eastern part of the
Arab countries who saw his beliefs as a divisive influence that could alienate non-Sunni
Muslims as well as Christians." According to Deeb and Deeb al-Qadhafi's reaction to this
criticism was that:
Islam includes the 'people of the book' all those who believe in God and his prophets
are Muslims, and consequently, Christians and Jews were Muslims even before the
coming of Prophet Muhammad. He believes that the adoption of an all-inclusive view
of Islam would make it possible to transcend divisions based on religious and sectarian
grounds."
Al-Qadhafi thus oscillates between Islam as a universal religion and Islam as the national
religion of the Arabs. Al-Qadhafi believed the "Arab and Islamic identity were inextricably
linked, therefore, he felt the Arab revolution must also be an Islamic one."26
The sample survey gives the reasons why Libyan students identify themselves as Arab. Their
answers reflect their attitudes to state ideology in Libya. The analysis is based on the face
sheet variables (such as place of family residence, gender, subject of the study, social status,
and parents' education). Table 5.2 shows the results of the survey, by gender and the urban-
rural divide, in a three-variable model. The reasons for identifying oneself as an Arab among
Libyan students were: religion, language and being part of an Arab state.
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Table 5.2: Reasons for identification as an Arab by gender and place of family residence
Categories Number of
respondents
Religion
N
Language
IcAl
Arab State
EN
Urban male 209 58 23 18
Rural male 53 55 21 23
Urban female 219 56 20 23
Rural female 19 53 21 26
Urban 428 57 22 21
Rural 72 54 21 24
Male 262 58 23 19
Female 238 56 20 23
All 500 57 21 21
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 5.2 shows, first, that the Islamic element is strongest among the respondents. There are
no great differences between the categories of the respondents. The researcher suggests that
this is due to the regime's socialisation process which gave the same norms and values to the
students as a whole. Furthermore, it seems that the regime has succeeded in creating a
collective attitude towards certain issues among the students. For instance, comparing the
result of the general attitudes of the respondents in Table 5.2 with the regime's ideology, we
can see that the majority of respondents reflect the regime's values through their attitudes
towards religion (Islam) as an important element of their identification as Arabs. However, a
significant minority was oriented towards other factors, such as language and Arab state, as
shown in the table.
Table 5.3 is a similar cross tabulation for the question which deals with reasons for being an
Arab by father's educational level. Here the parental educational level as an ordinal variable
has no statistical significance, although there is a tendency for religion to become less
important, the higher the father's education level.
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Table 5.3: Reasons for being an Arab by father's education
Father's education 	 Number of
respondents
Religion
N
Language
['Al
Arab State
[%1
Illiterate
	 87 70 18 20
Read Only	 23 65 13 17
Read and Write
	 68 53 27 19
Primary	 69 59 19 23
Preparatory	 65 65 14 22
Secondary	 62 52 24 23
Intermediate
	 33 52 30 18
University and above
	 91 50 25 23
All	 500 57 21 21
Source: Field survey 1994
A similar analysis for the same question, analysed according to the educational level of the
respondents' mothers, can be seen in Table 5.4. Again there is a tendency, although not a
significant one, for religion to be less important, the higher the level of mother's education.
Table 5.4: Reasons for being an Arab by mother's education
Mother's education Number of
respondents
Religion Language Arab State
IN IN EN
Illiterate 252 59 19 21
Read only 29 86 7 7
Read and write 37 43 38 19
Primary 58 60 21 19
Preparatory 52 46 25 23
Secondary 27 63 15 22
Intermediate 27 41 37 22
University and above 18 39 22 39
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 5.5 shows the reasons for Arab identification by subject of study and faculties of the
respondents.
The study background (humanities or sciences) of the respondents did not have much impact
on the way the students rank the reasons for being an Arab. However, there was an exception
in the Faculty of Science among Zoology students who were oriented towards language as the
main reason for identification as an Arab (52 percent).
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Table 5.5: Reasons for being an Arab by subject of study
Faculties and departments Number of
respondents
Religion
[°/01
Language
[°/01
Arab state
[°/0]
Faculty of Economic & Political
Science
241
60 65 13 22
•	 Economics 60 55 28 18
•	 Business Administration 60 65 13 18
•	 Accounting 61 59 25 16
•	 Political Science
Faculty of Arts & Education 124
•	 Arabic Language 27 74 7 15
•	 English Language 23 57 22 22
•	 History 25 48 16 36
•	 Sociology 25 60 24 16
•	 Mass Media 24 42 21 38
Faculty of Law 35 49 23 26
Faculty of Science 55
•	 Zoology 21 33 52 14
•	 Mathematics 17 53 35 12
•	 Chemistry 17 41 29 24
Faculty of Engineering 45
•	 Electrical Engineering 16 56 25 13
•	 Industrial Engineering 13 46 23 31
•	 Civil Engineering 16 69 0 31
All 500 57 21 21
Source: Field survey 1994
It is appears that the subject of study did not make any significant difference to the
respondents' reasons for being an Arab.
Figure 5.1 explores the reason for being an Arab by social status. It seems that there was no
significant difference between the categories of social status. The percentages of the
respondents for the main three alternatives (religion, language, and Arab state) were quite
close, with no big differences.
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Figure 5.1: Reasons for identification as an Arab by social status
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Sources of identity
The findings of this study show that Libyan students mainly identify themselves as Arabs
through the Islamic religion. They do not distinguish between Arabism and Islamism. The two
concepts for them are the same, or at least have a strong relationship. Religion is thus a very
important element in Arabism or Arab nationalism for students. Language and awareness of
being a member of an Arab state are less important factors in identifying oneself as Arab.
These findings in general reflect Libyan state ideology. Students seem to fit in within the
political value system of the regime. Generally speaking, the background of the students does
not make much difference.
5.3.3	 Exploration of different dimensions of identity sources
This section explores other possible dimensions of the identity question. When the respondents
were asked about identifying themselves, they were also asked to rank the following possible
sources of identity in order of importance from one to six: Family, Tribe, City, State, Islam
and Arabism.
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Some subsequent analyses will use procedures which are based on rank order correlations, in
which the full potential of the rank ordering of data is employed. However, Figure 5.2 lays out
what the respondents thought to be most important.
Figure 5.2: Most important source of identity
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Sources of identity
Figure 5.2 shows that there is considerable variation in the most important source of identity.
Although Islam was the major factor, only a third of respondents ranked it as most important
to them. Arabism (23 percent) and Family (17 percent) were also of considerable significance.
It is interesting to look at the overall pattern of the ranking of response to the questions
dealing with components of identity. Here the ranking is simplified by creating three
categories, taking 1 and 2 as 'High', 3 and 4 as 'Middle', and 5 and 6 as Tow'. Table 5.6
shows the pattern for the first question.
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Table 5.6: Simplified ranks of sources of identity
Rank Family Tribe City State Islam Arabi=
[°/0] r/01 [Vo] NI] [°/0]
High 19 16 18 24 52 55
Middle 16 19 50 52 25 21
Low 58 59 24 16 8 15
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 5.6 shows that Family and Tribe are ranked low by more than half of the respondents.
In contrast, Islam and Arabism are ranked highly by more than half of all respondents. City
and State get a middle rank by about half of all the respondents.
It is worth exploring the pattern of inter-relationships amongst these variables which deal with
possible sources or dimensions of identity. Since all these variables were measured on ordinal
scales, the simplest way of doing this was to compute rank order correlation coefficients (see
chapter 4) amongst the variables. The resulting matrix for the six sources of identity variables
is given in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Spearman rank order correlation coefficients - identity variables
Source of
identity
Family Tribe City State Islam
Family
Tribe 0.33
City -0.27 -0.15
State -0.42 -0.48 0.31
Islam -0.33 -0.20 -0.48 0.12
Arabism -0.43 -0.41 -0.31 -0.12 0.34
Source: Field survey 1994
A pattern of relationships can be discerned. There is a positive Family/Tribe relationship, but
ranking of these two variables is negatively associated with other rankings. City and State are
positively related, but identification with City is negatively related to identification with Islam
and Arabism. State identification is positively, albeit weakly, related to Islam and negatively
and weakly, related to Arabism. Islam and Arabism are strongly positively related. All these
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
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There were no significant correlations between rankings on the source of identity variable set,
and the rankings of components of Arab identity. These last components were strongly and
negatively inter-correlated, but this is to be expected with a three rank order set.
The above findings, although simplified, are interesting. It does seem that there may exist two
fairly strongly distinguishable sorts of respondents, with a less clearly marked intermediate
category. At an exploratory level we can identify a Family/Tribe identity set as against an
Islam/Arabism identity set, with an intermediate group relating more to both City and State —
in summary indicating some sort of territorial basis for identity.
Figure 5.3 shows the results of the gender-urban/rural two-way tabulation in relation to the
highest rankings given for the possible components of identity. Again there was little real
variation. The apparent difference between rural males and females was not statistically
significant, since the numbers of rural females in the sample was so small. However, the
stronger commitment of urban females to Arabism as a source of identity was statistically
significant.
Figure 5.3: Identification by gender and place of family residence
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Sources of identity
Similar cross tabulations of sources of identity by subject of study showed no real systematic
pattern of variation.
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Figure 5.4 shows the pattern of variation by social status of family. Again what is interesting
about this chart is the absence of significant differences in either the substantive or statistical
sense. The social status of the family makes little difference in these matters.
Figure 5.4: Identification by social status
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Social Status
Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 show the limited impact of the father's and the mother's educational
background, leading to the same conclusion on these variables as was given for social status.
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Table 5.8: Identification by father's education
Father's
education
Number of
respondents
Family
rol
Tribe
N
City
[%1
State
[%1
Muslim
[%1
Arab
[%1
Illiterate 87 20 10 6 9 35 23
Read only 23 26 9 4 4 48 9
Read and
write
68 15 3 18 4 40 18
Primary 69 10 7 6 4 36 35
Preparatory 65 6 6 19 8 34 25
Secondary 62 21 3 8 10 32 26
Intermediate 33 27 0 0 3 39 30
University
and over
91 19 6 11 8 36 18
All 498 17 6 10 7 36 23
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 5.9: Identification by mother's education
Mother's education 	 Number of
respondents
Family Tribe City State Muslim Arab
1%) [°/0] [Vo] EN [Vo] N
Illiterate	 252 19 6 9 7 33 24
Read only	 29 0 7 7 3 55 28
Read and write	 37 5 5 14 8 41 24
Primary	 58 22 9 9 5 38 17
Preparatory
	 52 15 2 10 15 37 19
Secondary	 27 15 7 15 7 26 30
Intermediate college	 27 7 4 15 4 44 26
University and over
	 18 28 0 6 0 50 17
All	 500 17 6 10 7 36 23
Source: Field survey 1994
Another analytical procedure which can be applied here is the Rank Order Analysis of
Variance using the Kruslcal-Wallace procedure (see Chapter 4), in which ordinal variables are
sorted by category. The categorical variables employed here are gender and the urban/rural
distinction. Some significant variation was identified by this approach. Females gave a
slightly higher mean ranking to family and tribe than did males, whereas males gave a slightly
higher ranking to Islam and Arabism. For the urban/rural division the main difference was
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that urban respondents gave a slightly higher mean ranking to family, and rural respondents a
slightly higher ranking to Arabism.
5.3.4	 Cluster analysis: a typology of respondents
In Chapter Four we introduced cluster analysis which is a "technique used to identify groups
of of objects or people that can be shown to be relatively distinct within a data set. The
characteristics of these people within each cluster can then be explored." 21 Here we will use
cluster analyses to classify the representative sample of university students into subgroups
according to their attitudes towards the issue of identity.
Figure 5.5: Cluster analysis and sub-clusters
i 
iNon Tribal/Family I fTribal/Family	 I
1
There are two main stages at which the cluster analysis procedures have been used. The first
stage is based on three clusters. The second stage is based on two clusters. The procedure
indicated that these were the levels at which differentiated clusters emerged through large
changes in the fusion coefficient. 22 Figure 5.5 describes the three cluster levels according to
the sources of identity variables tribe, family, city, state, Muslim and Arab.
The clustering procedure was based on the ranks given to the different sources of identity.
These ranged from 1 to 6, in that the students were asked to rank the sources of identity in
order from highest to lowest and there are six sources of identity. Table 5.10 shows the
numbers of students in each cluster giving the highest rank, 1, to each of the different sources
of identity. Table 5.11 shows the mean rank given to each source of identity by the students in
that cluster.
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There are three clusters. Cluster 1 comprises the students who are very much tribal/family
oriented. Cluster 2 comprises those whose primary identification seems to be Islam alone.
Cluster 3 includes those who are both Islam and Arab oriented. When two clusters are
formed, Clusters two and three (primarily Islamic and Islamic/Arabist) fuse and remain
differentiated from Cluster one, the Tribal / Family cluster.
Table 5.10 shows the actual cluster analysis. The three clusters show how the students rank
their identity by rank order. Cluster 1 indicates identification with the traditional institutions
of society such as family, tribe, city. As can be seen from the table, in cluster 1 family as a
source of identification was given the highest rank with 60 percent. 24 percent was given to
tribe and city. The state was given a lower rank of 5 percent. Islam as another source of
identification was given about 8 percent and zero for Arabism.
Table 5.10: Cluster analysis for the most important source of identity - highest ranks
only
Source of identity Cluster 1
N
Cluster 2
tcY.1
Cluster 3
N
Family 60 19 0
Tribe 24 2 0
City 24- 2 16
State 5 0 9
Islam 8 62 38
Arab 0 16 36
All 89 98 257
Source: Field survey 1994
Cluster 2 covers the Islamists; that is, respondents who are oriented towards Islam as most
important source of identification. Islam was given the highest rank of 62 percent. Only about
19 percent of respondents were family oriented and 16 percent identified themselves with
Arabism. Finally, a small percentage of respondents (2 percent each) identified themselves
with tribe and city. No one gave the state as an identification source.
Cluster 3 respondents are bath Islam and Arab oriented: Islam was given 38 percent and
Atabism 36 percent. For this group the relationship between Islam and Arabism is a very
strong one. About 16 percent of the respondents identified themselves with the city and 9
percent identified themselves With the state. Finally, no-one of this cluster identified
thenitelves with family and tribe.
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In summary, the first group was very traditionally oriented and identified itself by family, and
with a slightly smaller number identifying by tribe and city. The second group named Islam or
being a Muslim as the most important source of their identification. The third group identified
Islam and Arabism together as the most important element for their identity.
Table 5.11 shows the mean rank (see Chapter 4) for the most important source of identity of
three clusters. The first cluster is very much family and tribal oriented. Mean ranks are 2.1
for the family and 2.3 for the tribe. In contrast, the lowest mean ranks were for the
identification as Muslim or Arab (4.0 and 5.3). The city and state were given a middle
ranking (3.3 and 3.9).
Table 5.11: Mean rank for the most important sources of identity by three cluster
analysis
Source of identity Cluster 1
Family/Tribal
Cluster 2
Islamist and Arabist
Cluster 3
State/Lslam/Arab
Family 2.1 3.0 5.4
Tribe 2.3 4.4 5.4
City 3.3 5.3 3.4
State 3.9 4.6 2.6
Muslim 4:0 1.2 L9
Arab 5.3 2.1 2.1
All 89 98 257
Source: Field survey 1994
The second cluster were Islamist and Arabia Identification with Islam ranked highest (1.2),
followed by Arabism (2.1). The lowest rank in this group was given to the city and state, 5.3
and 4.6. Family in this group was given a middle rank, 3.0.
The third cluster is also very Islam and Arab oriented. The highest rank was given to
identification with Islam (1.9) and Arabism (2_1). However, the state was given a middle rank
of 2.6, with the city at 3.4. The lowest ranks were given to family and tribe, both at 5.4.
Table 5.12 shows the mean rank of the most important source of identity by two groups of
clusters. These clusters were created by fusion, out of the three shown in Table 5.11. The two
new clusters which came out of this were: a tribal and family oriented group versus Islam and
Arab oriented group.
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Table 5.12: Mean rank of the most important source of identity by two cluster analysis
Source of identity	 Cluster 1	 Cluster 2
Family/Tribal 	 Islamist/Arabist
Family	 2.2	 4.8
Tribe	 2.5	 5.2
City	 3.5	 3.9
State	 3.9	 3.1
Muslim	 3.9	 1.8
Arab	 5.0	 2.1
All	 103	 341
Source: Field survey 1994
For Cluster 1, the highest rank was family (2.2), and tribe (2.5). The lowest mean rank was
given to Arab at 5.0. City, state and being a Muslim were given middle ranking (3.5, 3.9 and
3.9). For Cluster 2 the highest rank was given to Muslim and Arab (1.8 and 2.1). In contrast,
state and city were given the middle rank (3.1 and 3.9). The lowest ranks were given to family
and tribe (4.8 and 5.2).
Further analyses were carried out in which the cluster membership of respondents was related
to their answers to the two main identity questions. In the first question the respondents were
asked to choose whether they regarded themselves as primarily Arab, Muslim, or both
equally. Cluster membership made no significant difference to the pattern of responses, with
80 or more percent in each cluster opting for 'both equally' and about 15 percent in each
cluster opting for 'primarily Muslim'. Only for Cluster 1, which is family/tribal oriented were
there any respondents who asserted that their primary identity was Arab (7 percent).
In Table 5.13 the ordinal or "face sheet variables" which represent background factors are
combined with cluster groups. Background variables here are gender, urban/rural place of
respondents, family income, fathers' occupation, fathers' education, and mothers' education.
It is clear that there are some differences among the clusters. One of these differences is
gender. Female respondents formed a slight majority of the third group cluster, which is
Islam/Arab oriented. They represented about 55 percent of this cluster.
A plurality of respondents whose fathers were businessmen was found in the second cluster
which is primarily Islamic in orientation. The highest percentages of respondents whose
fathers were government officials (37 percent) concentrated in the third cluster.
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Table 5.13: Characteristics of cluster groups
Categories Cluster 1
Family/Tribal
Cluster 2
Islamist/Arabist
Cluster 3
State/Islam/Arab
•	 Male 61 58 45
•	 Female 39 42 55
•	 Urban 81 85 88
•	 Rural 19 15 12
•	 Family income
<120 Ld 6 4 2
121-199 Ld 11 15 14
200-30014 40 38 46
301-50014 29 29 27
501> 14 14 14 12
•	 Fathers' occupation
Businessman 19 28 25Government official 27 29 37Professional 25 16 20Settled farmer 4 3 4Labourer 15 9 4Retired
•	 Fathers' education
. 9 15 10
Illiterate 25 18 16Can read only 6 6 4Read and write 8 16 12Primary 11 14 16Preparatory 8 8 18
Secondary 15 12 12
Intermediate 8 5 7
University 20 19 17
•	 Mothers' education
Illiterate 56 55 46
Can read only 1 3 8
Read and write 5 8 9
Primary 18 9 11
Preparatory 7 10 12
Secondary 7 4 5
Intermediate 3 5 6
University 3 5 4
All 89 98 257
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5.4 Conclusion and Summary
In this chapter we have reviewed the attitudes of the university students towards the identity
question, and Arabism and Islamism as possible sources of identity. The general findings
show that students were not prepared to distinguish Islam from Arabism as a source of
personal identity, as the majority identified 'both equally' as having the greatest significance.
This result reflects to some extent the regime's approach to Arabism and Islam shown in the
analysis of the regime's ideology earlier in this chapter which makes no distinction between
Arabism and Islam.
When we explore the reasons for being an Arab given by the respondents through potential
answers (religion, language and being a member of Arab state), the findings show that the
majority of respondents indicated religion as the main reason for Arabism. Language comes
second, while "belonging to an Arab state" is the lowest. It seems that attachment to the
existing state is quite low among the respondents and the awareness of being a member of the
state is weak. This low level of belonging to the state could be interpreted as being a
consequence of the strong identification with Islam and Arabism. Additionally, identification
with tribal/family units undermines the identification with the state, in so far as tribal/family
units function as important social networks. In Libya, these social organisations represent an
alternative to the institutions which might exist in a 'modern' civil society. The lack of a
history of Libyan statehood is clearly one further factor explaning the weak identification with
the state.
Other dimensions of identity were explored through the question "how do you identify
yourself" The respondents were asked to rank the possible sources of identity (family, tribe,
city, state, Islam, and Arabism) in order from one to six according to their importance.
Different analytical procedures proved quite useful here. In a simple ranking most respondents
gave family and tribe 'low' status, city and state 'middle' status and Islam and Arabism were
given 'high' status. Thus, Islam and Arabism were ranked highly by more than half of all
respondents; city and state were ranked less highly; and family and tribe were given the lowest
ranking. Moreover, the findings show that there might be two sorts of identity patterns, one
focusing on Islam and Arabism, the other one focusing on localist values associated with
family and tribe. Such a result proved that people could have more than one identity.
The result of the cluster analysis show the emergence of three groups emerged among the
students: first, a tribal and family oriented group second, a primarily Islam oriented group
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and, an Islam and Arab oriented group. By fusing these three clusters together, we found one
tribal and family oriented group, and another, Islam and Arab oriented group.
Although some Libyan students were very much locally oriented, as reflected by their choice
of tribe and family as most important for their personal identity, most students asserted a kind
of mixture of Islam and Arab way of identification.
Further noteworthy points are the following. First, there were no significant differences among
the students based on their backgrounds. This would seem to be attributable to the fact that
they all went through a common educational system. Thus, most of the students ended up with
the same values and attitudes towards the identity question.
It is also noting that the main identity forms expressed by the respondents correspond quite
closely with the regime's view of the appropriate identity for Libyans. Given the absence of
differences by 'background' among the respondents, it seems as if the formal educational and
ideological preparation processes have produced the kind of identity set which they were
intended to.
The existence of significant numbers of students who identified strongly with Islam is
extremely interesting. In the light of developments in Libya subsequently to the study,
especially in the Benghazi region, it may indicate that this sort of identity which has become
translated into support for 'fundamentalist' groups. However, this can be no more than
informed speculation here. Nevertheless in conditions of tension such an identity might well
turn towards fundamentalist solutions. The only real distinguishing factor of this group is that
it was differentially female. Other background factors were not significant. The necessity for
further research is evident.
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6. Attitudes Towards Tribe and
Tribalism
6.1	 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to focus on tribe and tribalism in Libya. The aim is to explore
the attitudes of the generation of the revolutionary regime towards tribe and tribalism. It seeks
to find out if tribalism is still part of Libyan life, even though the tribal system was formally
abolished by the regime.
The issue of tribe was already mentioned in Chapter 5 in questions which dealt with the
source of identity, together with other possible sources (family, city, state, Arabism and
Islam). For the respondents tribe along with the family, localist and traditionalist values, is an
important source of identification.
This chapter is based on three main questions dealing with tribe and tribalism (19a, 19b, 20
and 21, see Appendix A). It includes four main sections. The first part seeks to deal with the
tribe as a concept. In other words, it is a review of the definition of tribe by looking at relevant
material, such as previous studies and specialist encyclopaedias. The second section looks at
the relation of tribes to the rest of society and to regime ideology. The third section is an
exploration of the sample's attitudes towards tribe and it is based on data analyses of the
relevant questions of the questionnaire. The final part evaluates the findings and tries to assess
the degree of attachment of the Libyan society to their tribe.
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6.2	 The Concept of Tribe: A Theoretical Framework
This section of the chapter deals with the concept of tribe. According to The Social Science
Encyclopaedia, tribe and its associated abstract, tribalism, may be defined as follows:
A social organisation of peoples living (usually) in the tropics and (usually) employing
little technology ..., the tribe also is bigger than a family, but somehow not the same as
a nation. It is tied together by complex bonds of kin and duty.'
According to A Dictionary of the Social Science, 'tribe' is defined as a
system of social organisation which includes several local groups — villages, bands,
districts, or lineages — and normally includes a common territory, a common language,
and a common culture. The elements constituting the tribe may or may not be co-
ordinated by formal or centralised political power. Ideally the term tribe implies a large
element of solidarity based on strongly shared primary sentiments. Such solidarity
becomes contractual in nature as the tribal organisation becomes more formally
organised.2
As indicated by the two definitions, tribe is a social organisation based on solidarity. The
concept of solidarity was introduced by cAbd-al-Rahinfin Ibn Khaldim, the renowned Arab
sociologist-historian (1332-1406). He calls this factor casabiya [solidarity, group feeling, or
group consciousness], a word which he borrowed from classical usage and to which he gave a
new, positive meaning. The group to which an individual feels most closely attached is his/her
clan or tribe, the people with -whom he/she shares a common descent. But, politically,
casabiya can also be shared by people not related to each other by blood ties, but by long and
close contact as members of a group .3 However, the term tribalism can be used to refer to the
placing of family ties before other political allegiances!'
Analysing the tribe, especially in Arab society, has produced a number of characteristics
which give meaning to the concept. First, solidarity among its members is the main element of
a tribe as a social organisation. Common descent is an important, but not exclusive element in
this. Second, age determines the social role within the tribe and its hierarchy. Third, males
dominate over females within the tribe. This results in higher respect and social value for men.
Najwa Adar in her study The Concept of Tribe in Yemen states that
the tribal concept includes an emphasis on maleness. The tribe as it is presented to the
society as a whole is male. At formal functions segregation by gender is the rule, and
women are represented by male kin. Women do not vote in tribal elections and do not
share tribal obligations of protection equally with men. Significantly, a tribeswoman is
referred to as Bint al-Qabila (tribesman's daughter),... despite the male presentation of
qabyala, women are not considered any less tribal than men. In the plural Qaba'il refers
to tribal men and women. Tribal women are expected to adhere to tribal standards of
honour, generosity, and industry. Women are known to bear arms in some areas of
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Yemen, and women who succeed in "male" activities are admired by men and women
alike.5
In anthropology three kinds of tribal units have been identified: simple acephalous tribes,
acephalous segmentary tribes, and centralised tribes. Gould and Kolp write:
First, simple acephalous tribes are constituted of autonomous bands or villages. In
these component units membership is based largely on kinship which is often bilaterally
recognised. As an examples of such tribes include the Mende, lbo, Great Whale Eskimo
etc. These tribes are acephalous because they lack a clearly designated head or council.
Secondly, Acephalous segmentary tribes also lack a clearly defined head. They are
comprised of localised unilinear kin groups—lineages and clans, each of which claims a
territory and itself may possess formal political organisation. Politically each kinship
segment is independent of the other, although a few provisions—mainly ceremonial—
exist which allow two or more to act in concert on certain occasions. Thirdly,
centralised tribes possess a single power source—king, council, or other form of
administration. Such tribes generally are larger than either of foregoing types. In Africa
some centralised tribes emerged when one kinship segment in segmentary system won
political ascendancy over other unilinear groups.6
Ibn Khaldfin interpreted Arab history in terms of conflicts and struggle for power between
badw [bedouin] versus hadar [sedentary]. 7
 For Ibn Khaldiln, the differences of condition
among people are the result of the different ways in which they make their living.' He
characterised badw-hadar relationships as confrontational because of their intrinsic conflict of
iriterests.9 This traditional division in Arab society, based on the two concepts badw and
hadar, still remains part of Arab .culture and has not disappeared.
Although adapting the division between badw and hadar might help us understand some of
the characteristics of Arab society and the tribal structure in particular, the tendency among
the scholars to link tribe and badawa [the nomadic style of life] is not acceptable. Tribalism
can exist equally as a social organisation in cities as in rural areas or in the desert among the
nomadic tribes. Some tribes are a combination of badawa [the nomadic style of life], filaha
[cultivation] and sukkan al-mudun [city habitation]. The al-Fawai'r in Syria, the Bani
Rabi"in Kuwait and Iraq, and the canza in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait are examples of
such a combination.'6
Instead of the division badw – hadar, Barakat suggests a tripartite division that includes
village life:
by identifying village or peasant life as a third, distinct pattern of living. That is, rather
than relying on the cliche of badu—hadar conflict to understand contemporary Arab
society, we should utilise recent social science research on the village to characterise a
triad of distinctive social patterns rooted in tribal, village, and urban life.n
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Adopting such an analysis is significant for understanding the tribe as one of the main social
organisations in contemporary Arab society. The tribe as a social organisation can be found
both in villages and cities, despite the remarkable changes that occurred in the economic and
political sphere. It is quite normal to find individuals referring to themselves as tribesmen,
even if they live in urban areas. Therefore, loyalty and attachment to the tribes still play an
important role in personal identification. In Libya many tribes exhibit all three patterns of
living (tribal, village, urban), but there are also quasi-tribal families which originated in the
Ottoman period and are hadar [urban] but not badw. This division between tribes and quasi-.
tribes seems to have no contemporary political significance, and inter-marriage among the
groups is normal now, but this has only developed during the period of the present regime.
In order to understand the nature of the three patterns of living which shape contemporary
Arab society, we can refer to Barakat's study The Arab World: Society, Culture and State,
which focuses on these three patterns: tribe, village, and city. The significance of this can be
seen both with regard to social organisation and with regard to value orientations.
6.2.1	 Social organisation
Tribal solidarity based on blood, symbiotic ties and premises of equality are the most
distinctive features of Bedouin social organisation. The basic units of the Bedouin social
organisation are qabila [tribe], cashira [clan], hamula, fakhda, batn [sub-tribes], and family,
which includes both the ahl, cayla [extended family] and usra (nuclear family). Barakat also
indicates that the main activities of tribes are political, consisting of management of relations
with other tribes and the government. One of the most important features of Bedouin society
is classlessness, unlike other sectors of Arab society. 12
The village social organisation, is an intricate net of interrelationships of extended families.
One of the main differences between bedouin and peasants is based on the relationship to the
land rather than kinship ties i.e "to be landless or detached from family is to be uprooted until
death. To die is to return to the land like seeds, whose planting—that is, burial—beings the
process of renewal and rebirth.. .death in the collective memory of the peasants is defined by
continuity in land cultivation."13
The basic kinship unit among peasants in villages is the extended family rather than the tribe.
Family structure is based on a web of relations centred on land cultivation. Moreover, village
class structure is based on land ownership. In some Arab countries many villages are referred
to as Icafr or beni [village], which indicates some historical relationship between the social
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organisation in agricultural communities and that in Bedouin tribes. Such relationships can be
seen in north and north-eastern Yemen.14
The main feature of the city is based on functions rather than size of population. City
functions include serving as the centre of economic, political, religious, and cultural activities.
Barakat mentions that al-madina, which is the Arabic word for city, is the centre of political
and economic power. The neighbourhoods and institutions are the base of social organisation
in the city.
In Libya there is no real peasant population along the lines of Egypt or Yemen. But the badw
system of social organisation exists throughout society, including non-badw groups. Thus, the
social order of the nomadic system is at least formally present in the whole society.
6.2.2	 Value orientations
The main values orientations of Bedouin culture are casabiya [tribal solidarity], furusiya
[chivalry], karam [hospitality], basatta [simplicity] and al-fardiya [individuality]." These
values are sometimes used to distinguish between tribal and non tribal populations. Najwa
Adar in her study The Concept of Tribe in Rural Yemen indicates that
When a person asks a modem-day tribesman "On what basis does the tribal population
consider itself tribal and distinct from the non-tribal population?" the answer is likely to
be expressed in terms of adherence to a given values system. One is told that the
tribesman is courageous, hospitable, discerning, knowledgeable of custom, and
independent.16
As indicated, the emphasis here is on the value system where tribesmen identify themselves as
tribal on the basis of shared values. The tribal concept combines a moral compulsion to
cooperate with members of one's group with an emphasis on personal autonomy.I7
The value orientations of the village (peasants) in Arab culture are directed towards land,
family, the local community, religion, social class, and time. Some of the values which are
associated with the land are fertility, continuity, patience, and spontaneity.
The value orientations of city-dwellers are embedded in an intricately balanced social
structure based on the interrelationship of class, family, and religious establishment. Barakat
has distinguished three types of urban bourgeoisie in the Arab countries. First, the traditional
urban bourgeoisie can be found in Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. These are the class of
notable families, that control the religious establishment and political system. Moreover, the
main values of this group are based on "strife and struggle; not daydreaming" especially in
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searching for material profits and power. Such strife emphasises realistic evaluations,
moderation, cunning, cleverness, opportunism, and innovativeness.0
The second type of Arab urban bourgeoisie is the new national bourgeoisie who took over the
political system in a number of Arab countries after independence in for example, Egypt,
Syria, and Iraq. The values of this new bourgeois elite are based on nationalist and socialist
values on the one hand (Iraq, Syria, Egypt are good examples) and national liberation
movements (in Algeria and among the Palestinians) on the other hand.
The third type is a composite between old and the new bourgeoisie, with Lebanon and Tunisia
providing examples of this type. Their values are based on Western liberalism, emphasising
the values of success, pragmatism, free economy, consumption, Western education, and
individuality.19
Exploring the three patterns of Arab society i.e. tribe, village and city, leads to the question of
what relationships exist between them. Baralcat explored the following interrelationships:2°
a) Conflict and cooperation between these three groups. Cooperation is based on economic
exchange, i.e. trade and exchange of basic commodities and services which the city
provides for both village and the Bedouin, such as health, religious, and educational
services. However, the conflicts between these three groups result partly from the need to
control the land and its products. For instance, "city dwellers have always attempted to
dominate villages, in some instances, they used Bedouin tribes to do the job. This alliance
ensured urban dominance of the peasants in the Fertile Crescent, Yemen and the Nile and
the greater Maghrib. Urban domination resulted in the imposition of a feudalistic system,
taxation, and absentee landlords residing in urban centres, and led to the emergence of
landless peasants."21
b) Stereotypes and images. Clear stereotypes exist for each group. As an example, the
Bedouins have traditionally shown great pride in their subculture and looked down on
peasants as weak and submissive to their masters. They also refused city life, which for
them is a source of corruption, deviance and softness. Peasants have shown pride in village
life and the land, which they see as a source of dignity. They, regard Bedouins as lazy
parasites, people who survive by raiding to steal the products created by others. City
people consider both Bedouins and peasants as primitive. However, there are also some
positive images among these subcultures. For instance, the Bedouins are known for their
courage, hospitality and noble character. The peasants and village life are represent
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simplicity, quiet and natural beauty. The Bedouins and peasants in turn are fascinated by
the city and its distinct affluence and pleasures.22
c) Sources of common values and norms. One of the main source of values in the cities and
villages is tribalism and Bedouin orientations. This was a consequence of the Bedouin
migration to the agricultural communities and urban areas. It can be said that most of
Arab countries nowadays are dominated by Bedouin values. Iraq provides one such
example where Bedouin values are running high especially among the rural tribes, which
account for 60 percent of the Iraqi population, and whose way of life is close to the
Bedouin. They share certain values such as solidarity, patriarchal hierarchy, hospitality,
revenge, honour crimes. 23 Libyan society is still influenced by Bedouin values through the
customs and traditions, even in the urban community. Another source of common values is
the city. From the city came modernisation, changes in the economic norms and the
emergence of new classes. Finally, the family as a basic unit of social organisation still
remains a source of common value orientation.
Tribal identity exists in many Arab societies among both peasants and city dwellers, as well
as in nomadic groups. In Yemen, where peasant agriculture dominates, 24 tribes are extremely
important. In Libya, most people have recent clear Bedouin connections, even if they
themselves are now urban. It may well be that distinctions based on tribe and city (villages are
not an important social form) could emerge eventually, however as large - scale urbanisation
is relatively recent phenomenon, these distinctions have not (yet) fully developed.
The significance of tribes can also be seen in how much energy has been invested in
ideological attempts to replace traditional tribal loyalties and attitudes in many Arab
countries, especially in Libya. Therefore, to help to understand the nature and role of the
tribes in Libya in the present time, it might be useful to focus on tribe as a concept in the
ideology and practice of the revolutionary regime. This is done in the following section.
6.3	 The Tribe in the Ideology and Practice of the Regime
In order to understand the role of tribe in Libyan society as a social and perhaps as an
invisible political organisation, it is important to focus on the ideology of the regime and the
practical side of its policies towards tribe and tribalism. However, analysing the ideological
and practical sides is not an easy matter. In some Middle Eastern countries such as Iran,
Saudi Arabia and Yemen, as well as Libya, as Khoury and Kostiner argue, new social and
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economic formations and ideological commitments have replaced traditional parochial
loyalties and sentiments. However, the values of the tribal society have continued to affect the
state. Indeed, from the perspective of the state, modernisation and rapid social change were
often regarded as counterproductive in that tribes were given a renewed role, through their
participation in the conflicts these changes inevitably produced.25
In the case of Libya, it might be useful to raise the following questions in order to help to
understand the ideological and the practical framework of the Libyan regime towards the
tribe. First, to what extent has the regime sought to alienate the tribe from having a role in
Libyan society, especially in politics? Secondly, has the tribe as a social organisation become
a source of political legitimacy for the regime, especially since the beginning of the 1990s?
Finally, has the regime succeeded in replacing the traditional loyalties to tribes and families
among its citizens through the process of state - building and the creation an Arab identity?
Answers to these questions must make a distinction between, first, the ideological perspectives
of the regime towards the tribe, and second, the actual implementation of policies towards
tribal groupings especially in the past few years.
63.1	 The tribe in the ideological perspective
Tribes in Libya had a clear and significant role in the former regime before 1969.
Historically, the Sanusiyya movement, which was the basis for the political legitimacy of the
regime, emerged from a tribally-based society, and the symbiosis between the S cadi tribes of
Cyrenaica and the Sanusiyya movement was almost complete.
The revolutionary regime has regarded the tribe an important social organisation which is
essential to the individual as a source of social values, as well as a tool for education and
socialisation. Al-Qadhafi in his theory (The Green Book) argues that a society has a number
of social structures central to its vitality; they are the family, the tribe and the nation, all of
which are non-political in nature.
Al-Qadhafi believes that the tribe is a natural 'umbrella' for social security. Like the family,
the tribe provides individuals with benefits, advantages and ideas. Although many countries
have attempted to weaken, if not destroy, tribes in the name of progress and modemisation, al-
Qadhafi believes that the tribe has a certain role to play in the socialisation process. From
childhood to adulthood, people gradually and systematically absorb tribal customs and
traditions which influence their values, mores, ideals and behaviour. Al-Qadhafi suggests that
this practical life experience in tribal acculturation can benefit society if it is transformed into
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a social education. To him, such education is not only practical and valuable but also much
"better and more human than any [formal] school education."26 Moreover, the tribe is not
considered to be a political organisation. Any political dimension will change its role of social
security and in the socialisation process.
The regime originally saw tribalism as harmful because of its divisive effects, undermining
collective nationalism (Arabism). Ideologically, al-Qadhafi rejects any political role for tribes,
just as he rejects any role for a party system. He maintains that the party is the modem form
of the tribal and sectarian system. Society governed by one party is exactly like that which is
governed by one tribe or one sect.27 Clearly the regime seeks to down-play any political role
for tribes and to concentrate on the social role of tribes as a tool of education and source of
security for the individual.
6.3.2	 The tribe in the practical perspective
The practical perspective of the regime towards the tribe started in the early years of the
revolution. In order to consolidate the revolution, the revolutionary regime tried to dismantle
the old elite and tribal structure. As El-Fathaly and Palmer state,
It was easier for the new regime to deal with those in opposition who had roots deeply
engrained in the fabric of Libyan society. Particularly sensitive in this regard were the
tribal chiefs. The tribal chiefs had prospered under the monarchy. Indeed, the local
administrative boundaries of the dominant tribes were the de facto boundaries of local
government, and tribal leaders dominated the local administrative positions.n
For the purpose of the study, it was useful to classify the practical policies of the regime
towards tribe into two phases. The first phase started with the beginning of the revolution in
1969, during which open hostility was shown to tribalism, and great efforts were made to
reduce, indeed eliminate, tribal loyalties and attachments. 29 Administrative boundaries based
on de facto tribal lines were restructured and this was followed by the dismissal of all local
officials, including governors and mayors, most of them had been tribal leaders or their
relatives; and their replacement by new local administrators whose values and social origins
were compatible with those of the RCC. These were usually educated members of less
prestigious tribes with no ties to the old elite structure." Throughout this phase, the
revolutionary regime under the leadership of al-Qadhafi had done its best to undermine the
traditional structure. In order to minimise tribal and regional identification El-Fathaly et al
indicate that
the tribal system was legally dismantled and a single political organisation, the Arab
Socialist Union (ASU), was created in June 1971 to fill the void. The legal status of
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tribes was destroyed by dividing tribal areas into zones crossing old tribal boundaries,
combining parts of different tribes within one zone. Leadership also was radically
changed because sheikhs, whose positions were inherited or selected on ascriptive basis,
were replaced by zone administd	 ators selected on the basis of skills and education.31
In the second phase, the regime has surprisingly employed the tribal structure to promote its
activities. Tribal influence permeates the popular congresses and popular committees. In the
selection for the popular committees in 1990, tribalism was evident in the process of choosing
the members of the popular committees even in the city of Benghazi. 32 This illustrates a
complete policy reversal of the regime. Since the early 1990s the regime has paid great
attention to the tribal system. One of the most visible activities of al-Qadhafi in the last two
years, has been his visits to the tribes.
The tribe was also used as a tool of pressure to get rid of some opposition to the regime inside
the country and outside. In an interview in al-Hayat, one of the Arab newspapers based in
London, the Amin al-wanda [Secretary of Unity] indicated that the tribe could be utilised as a
tool for 'encircling the betrayal phenomenon' in Libyan society (i.e. to counter the opposition
to the regime). Most tribes were encouraged through their tribal leaders to write a Wathiqat
cand wa Mubala [a certificate of allegiance] to prove their loyalty and attachment to the
revolution and its leadership.
Al-Qadhafi had expressed the same idea when he mentioned the necessity of 'tribes
encompassing the social betrayal'. 33 The latter strategy involved encouraging tribes and their
leaders to issue statements denouncing those in the tribes who had betrayed the country and
the regime. Pressure on the tribes could lead them to expel those of their members who were
against the regime. This strategy is similar to that used by Saddam Husain in Iraq after the
Gulf war.
The regime is now faced with a contradiction over its relationship with the tribal system. On
the one hand it has sought to utilise good relations with tribes as a source of legitimacy with
important social functions. On the other hand by so doing it has let a tribal element, which it
wished to be confined to the social sphere, back into the political process even if merely in an
informal way.
As a matter of fact, the importance of tribe and tribalism for the students is evident through
their political activities inside the university especially during the selection of the secretaries
of students' congresses of the faculties (Umana ' al-Mu 'tamarat al-Tulabyya).
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In general, then, it is clear that there are some differences between the practical and the
ideological sides of the regime's policies towards the tribe. The ideological side seeks to limit
the political role of tribe, whilst encouraging its role as a social organisation and a tool of
education. The practical side was also at one stage an echo of this ideology. However, in
recent years the regime has realised the important role of the tribe within Libyan society. This
approach has attempted to win tribal support, and hence legitimacy, through conceding at the
social level. The attempts of the regime to alienate tribes from playing a role in politics have
in fact been unsuccessful. In the early 1990s, it seems that the tribe became one of the main
sources of political legitimacy of the regime and one of the key factors in stabilising the
internal situation, especially after the increase of external pressures through the imposition of
United Nations sanctions.
6.4	 Exploration of the Attitudes towards Tribe: Data Analyses
The purpose of this section is to explore the attitude of the respondents toward tribe and
tribalism in Libya through the questions raised in the questionnaire. These dimensions of the
exploration relate to loyalty and attachment to the tribe and the possibility of changing or
dropping the tribe as one of the sources of identity. These dimensions were based mainly on
three questions in the questionnaire (19a, 19b, 20 and 21, see Appendix A).
The data analysis was carried out by using cross-tabulation, cluster analysis and Spearman
correlation coefficients. The first data exploration covers tendencies of attitudes towards
loyalty and attachment to tribe among the respondents.
6.4.1	 Exploring the tendencies of loyalty and attachment towards tribe
The first exploration of attitudes to tribe and tribalism among the university students is based
on two questions. The first question involved asking the respondents whether they belong to a
tribe. The second question deals with the strength of feeling of loyalty and attachment towards
the tribe.
The responses to the first question illustrates that almost all respondents hold a tribal
attachment. The result shows that about 96.0 percent of the respondents see themselves as
belonging to a tribe.
Figure 6.1 shows the strength of loyalty and attachment of respondents toward tribe by sex
(i.e. male/female) and place of family residence (i.e. urban/rural). From 492 respondents
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about 45 percent are very attached, about 45 percent are attached and just 10 percent of the
respondents are not attached.
Figure 6.1: Loyalty and attachment towards tribe by sex and place of family residence
Gender and place of family residence
We can compare the above—mentioned results with the results of another survey conducted by
El-Fathaly and Palmer in 1973 which dealt with political development and social change in
Libya. The questionnaire of that survey contained several items relating to tribalism. One of
these questions was the same question: "Do you feel loyal and attached to your tribe?" The
results of El-Fathaly and Palmer's research showed that tribalism was very much a part of
Libyan life. Almost 33.2 percent of respondents were very attached, 38.2 percent were
attached, about 9.4 percent were somewhat attached, and 19.1 percent were not attached. The
authors concluded that because the tribal system had been abolished by the government prior
to the survey, a non-response rate of almost 40 percent for the tribalism items made the data
difficult to interpret. However, the high rate of non-respondents allowed to the researchers to
reach the conclusion that tribalism still remained a part of Libyan life,
To some extent these results are similar to the results of the present study. The two studies
conducted in the 1973 and 1994 both find attachment and loyalty towards tribe to be very
clear and quite strong despite the differences between the samples of the two surveys. It is
evident that the regime's efforts at weakening the tribal system and identification with it have
not succeeded.
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In Figure 6.1 the difference between males and females is interesting. 51 percent of females
were clearly very attached to their tribe, 39 percent were attached and 9 percent were not
attached. In contrast, about 40 percent of male respondents were very attached, 50 percent
were attached and 10 percent of male respondents are not attached. Thus, it seems that female
students were more attached and loyal to their tribes than male respondents.
The difference between urban and rural respondents is also clear. The strength of attachment
to the tribe is greater among rural respondents. 62 percent of rural respondents are very
attached to their tribe, 32 percent are attached, and 6 percent are not attached to their tribes.
Only 43 percent of urban respondents are very attached, while 47 percent urban respondents
are attached and 10 percent are not attached.
The indication that urban people are less likely to be very attached to the tribe reflects a
generally accepted view of the attitudinal differences between rural and urban people. A
possible explanation for the differences in their loyalty and attachment to their tribe between
male and female respondents is that the males in general are more involved in activities within
society. These activities, such as being a member of non-governmental organisations like
clubs or other professional organisations such as unions, are generally confined to urban
areas.
Table 6.1 indicates loyalty and attachment towards the tribe by family income. There was no
clear pattern, but there appeared to be no significant differences between the respondents by
their families income. Thus the overall pattern does not suggest that tribal attachment is
related to wealth.
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Table 6.1: Loyalty and attachment by family income
Family income	 Number of respondents Very attached
%I
Attached Not attached
<120 L.d.* 18 39 33 28
121- 199 65 46 45 9
200- 300 215 50 43 7
301- 500 131 36 53 9
501 +L.d. 63 51 35 14
* L.d - Libyan Dinars
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 6.2 shows the loyalty and attachment by the father's occupation of the respondents. In
general, there are no significant differences in terms of the father's occupation.
Table 6.2: Loyalty and attachment by father's occupation
Father's Occupation	 Number of
respondents
Very attached
[°/0]
Attached Not attached
rom
Business Man	 98 56 40 4
Govemment Officials	 146 46 44 10
Professional	 85 . 41 46 11
Settled Farmer	 16 56 31 13
Labourer	 30 40 47 13
Retired	 56 43 43 14
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 6.3 gives the percentage of loyalty and attachment to the tribe by father's education.
The researcher expected that the higher the education of the father's respondents the lesser the
attachment to their tribes would be. However, the findings show that there is no statistical
significance of differences.
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Table 6.3: Loyalty and attachment by father's education
Father's
education
Number of
respondents
Very attached Attached Not attached
Illiterate 85 45 47 8
Read Only 23 44 35 22
Read & Write 64 41 47 11
Primary 69 58 36 6
Preparatory 65 49 43 8
Secondary 61 44 43 13
Intermediate 33 46 52 3
University and
over
90 38 50 11
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 6.4 gives the percentages of the tribal loyalty and attachment of respondents by
mother's education. As a general pattern it seems that the higher the mother's education level,
lesser importance is attached to tribe. Among the first three categories of respondents, it
seems that the attachment is quite high to the tribe, especially in the first category "very
attached". This shows that those whose mothers are not educated or hardly educated are more
attached to the tribe, but there is .no consistent trend at other levels.
Table 6.4: Loyalty and attachment by mother's education
Mothers'
education
Number of
respondents
Very attached Attached Not attached
[IN roi [%]
Illiterate 245 49 41 10
Read only 29 59 35 7
Read and write 37 46 51 o
Primary 58 41 53 5
Preparatory 52 44 46 10
Secondary 27 26 48 26
• Intermediate 26 31 50 19
University and
over
18 39 50 6
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 6.5 shows the percentage of respondents' loyalty and attachment to the tribe by subject
of study. Overall, the table indicates that there is no significant difference between those who
study humanities or sciences in terms of loyalty and attachment to the tribe. Nor is there is
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any relation between the attitudes towards the loyalty-attachment and the respondents'
faculties. But there are some small differences by subject of the study.
Table 6.5: Loyalty and attachment by subject of study
Faculty & Subject of
	 Number of Very attached Attached Not attached
Study	 respondents
Faculty of Economics &	 241
Political Science
•Economics
	
60 . 45 45 10
*Business	 60 38 48 13
•	 Accounting
	 60 53 41 7
•Political Science
	 61 41 44 15
Faculty of Arts &	 124
Education
•	 Arabic Language
	 27 48 52 o
•	 English Language
	
23 46 50. 5
*History	 25 72 28 o
•	 Sociology	 25 28 64 4
•	Mass Media	 24 22 65 9
Faculty of Law	 35 53 29 18
Faculty of Science	 55
*Zoology
	
21 71 19 10
•Mathematics	 17 53 41 6
•	 Chemistry	 17 35 53 12
Faculty of Engineering
	 45
•Electrical Engineering	 16 13 81 6
•	 Industrial Engineering	 13 39 46 15
•	 Civil Engineering	 16 69 19 13
Source: Field survey 1994
Figure 6.2 shows the tribal loyalty and attachment by the sources of identification variables
(as shown in Chapter 5, Family, Tribe, City, State, Islam and Arab). This Figure reflects
some statistically significant differences. Among the respondents who are family oriented and
identify themselves by family, 46 percent are very attached, 44 percent are attached and just 9
percent are not attached to the tribe. Among those who identify themselves with Tribe, 63
percent are very attached, which is the highest percentage among the respondents in general,
37 percent are attached, and none of them is not attached to the tribe. This result is not
surprising because the more people identify themselves with their tribe the more attached and
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One can notice from the table that among the group, Cluster 1, 50 percent of the respondents
are very attached to their tribes, 43 percent are attached and only 7 percent of this group are
not attached to their tribe. This result was expected because the more people are tribally
oriented, the more they will be attached and loyal to their tribes. Among those who belong to
the Islamist group, Cluster 2, about 40 percent are very attached, 47 percent are attached and
only 12 percent are not attached to their tribes. In the third group cluster 3 (Lslamist/Arabism
oriented), about 45 percent of the respondents are very attached, 48 percent are attached and
only 7 percent are not attached to their tribes.
Table 6.6: Loyalty and attachment by cluster identity, 3 variables
Clusters of
identity
Number of
respondents
Very attached
[°/ol
Attached
[%]
Not attached
[°/0]
Cluster 1 88 50 43 7
Cluster 2 95 40 47 12
Cluster 3 256 45 48 7
Cluster 1: Traditional oriented identification, tribe/family 	 Cluster 2: Islamist oriented
Cluster 3: Islamist/Arabism oriented
Source: Field survey 1994
It seems that the identification with Islam and Arabism in Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 does not
reflect any crucial significance. This is contrary to what the researcher expected, namely that
the more Islamist and Arabism oriented respondents are, the less attached they would be to
their tribes. In general, it can be said that there is no great difference between the three
clusters.
6.4.2	 Exploration of possible attitudes towards tribe
The second exploration of the terms tribe and tribalism is based on two main questions. These
questions are 20 and 21 (see Appendix A). The first question involved asking the respondents
the following:
• If it were possible, would you like Libyans to drop tribal identification and think of
themselves only as Libyan?
The second question deals with the possibility of an individual changing tribes. The
respondents were asked the following:
• If you have the chance would you like to change to another tribe?
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The purpose of this part is to explore the possible attitude toward the tribe as one of the
sources of identification. In this part an analysis similar to the one in earlier section will take
place by using cross-tabulation and cluster procedures. As in the previous section the
background factors or the 'face sheet' variables will form part of the analysis of the data.
Responses to the first question are particularly revealing. When respondents were asked about
the possibility of dropping tribal identification within Libya and identifying themselves only as
Libyans, about 47 percent the respondents accepted the idea and 52 percent did not. Given the
level of identification with tribes, this willingness of nearly half the respondents to drop tribal
identity is surprising. However, we should remember that people identify with the tribal
system in a society in certain circumstances. Many who do identify with it in such
circumstances might prefer to live in a society where tribe did not matter, and would therefore
be willing in principle to drop that identity. The results of this question may be compared with
El-Fathaly and Palmer's study which has been mentioned earlier. Their survey contained a
similar question which was: 'If you had the chance, would you like to drop all tribal
identification?'. El-Fathaly and Palmer found that 41.0 percent of respondents answered 'yes'
for dropping the tribal identification and 59 percent were against it.35
There are some small differences between the two studies in this question of dropping tribal
identification. More respondents in this study (47 percent) are ready to drop the tribal
identification than in El-Fathaly and Palmer's study (41 percent). However, the differences
were not substantively significant.
As far as the second question is concerned, the response was to be expected, given that most
Libyans belong to a tribe and seem attached to it. The result was that about 3 percent would
agree to changing their tribe and 95 percent of respondents rejected changing their tribe.
Figure 6.3 gives the percentage of respondents willing to drop their tribal identification, by
sex and place of family residence (urban and rural). Looking at the result by gender, it seems
that there are some differences between male and female respondents in their attitude towards
dropping tribal identification. As shown in the table, female respondents are more likely to
reject dropping the tribal identification than males. 53 percent of male respondents accepted
the idea of dropping the tribal identification, whilst among the female respondents just 41
percent accepted dropping tribal identification.
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Figure 6.3: Readiness to drop the tribal identification by sex and place of family
residence
Male	 Female
	 Urban	 Rural
Gender and place of family residence
As shown in Figure 6.3 rural respondents were more willing to drop tribal identification,
which is a surprising result because usually rural dwellers are more attached to their tribes,
with 53 percent of rural respondents accepting the idea as compared with 46 percent of urban
respondents.
Table 6.7 shows the attitude of respondents towards 'dropping tribal identification', by family
income. The table indicates that among the five categories of family income, those with lower
incomes were more willing to drop tribal identification than those with higher income. 61
percent of respondents whose family income was less than 120 Libyan Dinar said 'yes' to
dropping the tribal identification and just 39 percent answered 'no'. A similar distribution
existed among respondents whose families' income was between 121 and 199 Libyan Dinar.
Among those whose family income was between 200 and 300 Dinars, 40 percent said 'yes'
and 59 percent said 'no'. Among the respondents whose families income between 301 and 500
dinars, 49 percent said 'yes' and 51 answered 'no'. In the last category of family income,
among those whose family income was over 501 dinars 51 percent answered 'yes' and 49
percent answered 'no' towards dropping tribal identification.
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Table 6.7: Readiness to drop the tribal identification by family income
Family income Number of
respondents
Yes
[IN
No
N
< 120 L.d.* 18 61 39
121-199 L.d. 66 61 39
200-300 L.d. 220 40 59
301-500 L.d. 131 49 51
501+ L.d. 65 51 49
* L.d - Libyan Dinars
Source: Field survey 1994
The table shows that the poorest (by family income) are not those attached to tribe—which is
opposite to the assumption which is often made that tribal identification is more likely among
the poor. But here the lower income group is not as attached to their tribes and they represent
the highest percentage of respondents who accepted the idea of dropping the tribal
identification. It is, also, surprising that it is the middle stratum which appears most attached.
Moreover, it seems that the differences between the strata are not all that great. These
differences were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This can be explained by assuming
that the poor sometimes do not benefit from their tribes as a social and economic network,
unlike the middle strata.
Figure 6.4 shows the attitude of respondents towards dropping tribal identification by father's
occupation. It appears that respondents whose father's occupation is either businessman or
settled farmer are more likely to be attached to their tribe. These two categories have the
lowest percentage, they cover 37 and 35 percent of respondents who said 'yes' to dropping the
tribal identification. However, those whose father's occupation is labourer and those whose
fathers were retired cover the highest percent among the respondents who agreed to drop the
tribal identification.
135
Figure 6.4: Readiness to drop the tribal identification by father's occupation
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Table 6.8 gives the percentage of respondents' attitudes toward dropping tribal identification
by father's education. The interesting thing about this table is that the respondents whose
fathers were illiterate are the highest percentage (55 percent) among those who accepted
dropping tribal identification.
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Table 6.8: Readiness to drop tribal identification by father's education
Father's education Number of
respondents
Yes
[%31
No
[°/01
Illiterate 87 55 45
Can read Only 23 39 61
Read and Write 68 52 47
Primary 69 46 54
Preparatory 65 43 57
Secondary 62 50 50
Intermediate 33 42 52
University and over 91 41 59
Source: Field survey 1994
Respondents who came from a poor educational background seem generally to have less tribal
identification. It may be that those who come from that background do not benefit from the
association of tribe. Tribalism may have become a network of privilege, therefore those who
did not benefit from it were willing to drop their tribal identifications.
A similar cross-tabulation has been used to explore the respondents' attitude toward dropping
tribal identification by mothers education. The result shows that among those whose mothers
are illiterate, 53 percent accepted the idea of dropping the tribal identification which is the
highest percentage of those who said 'yes' and just 46 percent refused. Among those whose
mother's education was at university level. 50 percent said 'yes' and the same percentage said
'no'. Those whose mother's education was primary and intermediate formed the lowest
percentage among respondents who accepted the idea of dropping tribal identification, which
was only 35 and 37 percent respectively.
The highest percentage among respondents who refused dropping tribal identification were
those whose mother's education was primary, followed by 63 percent where the mother's
education was intermediate, then 60 percent where their mother's education was preparatory,
51 percent where their mothers' education was secondary and 50 percent where their mothers
education was university.
In general, it seems that there are some differences of respondents' attitudes toward dropping
tribal identification by both father's and mother's education but no consistent progression can
be traced. The interesting aspect of this data is that those coming from illiterate-backgrounds
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are the most willing to drop tribal identification, while the university educated are the least
willing, but in between there is no clear progression by education.
Table 6.9 shows the percentage of respondents' attitude toward dropping tribal identification
by the subject of study. In general, the table indicates that the area of study between those
who did humanities and those who did science does not make any significant difference. There
are some small differences by faculty but the larger differences are between subject
groupings.
Table 6.9: Readiness to drop the tribal identification by subject of study
Faculty & Subject of Study Numbers of
respondents
Yes
[°/0]
No
[°/0]
Faculty of Economics Political Science 241
•	Economics 60 50 50
'Business Administration 60 48 50
•	 Accounting 60 40 60
•	 Political Science 61 57 43
Faculty ofArts & Education 124
•	 Arabic Language 27 33 67
'English Language 23 30 70
•	History 25 36 64
•	 Sociology 25 52 44
'Mass Media 24 42 54
Faculty of Law 35 54 46
Faculty of Science 55
•	 Zoology 21 38 62
'Mathematics 17 29 71
•	 Chemistry 17 65 35
Faculty of Engineering 45
•	 Electrical Engineering 16 38 63
•	 Industrial Engineering 13 69 31
•	 Civil Engineering 16 69 31
Source: Field survey 1994
Figure 6.5 shows the attitude of respondents toward dropping the tribal identification by
sources of identification. As indicated in the table these sources are family, tribe, city, state,
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Islam and Arab. This table shows that the respondents identifying themselves by Islam and by
the state are more ready to drop the tribal identification, with 51 percent in each category.
Figure 6.5: Readiness to drop tribal identification by the sources of identification
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	 	 /Ersz El No
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Sources of identity
Among those who identify themselves by tribe, 48 percent were willing to drop the tribal
identification and 52 percent did not accept the idea of dropping tribal identification. Also,
among respondents who identify themselves by family, 47 percent accepted the idea of
dropping the tribal identification and 51 percent were not willing to drop the tribal
identification. Among those who identify themselves as Arab, 60 percent of the respondents
were against dropping the tribal identification, and 40 percent said 'yes' to it.
In general, it is surprising that those who identify themselves by tribe are more willing to give
up their tribal identification than those who identify themselves with family, city and 'Arab'.
It was those who identified themselves as Arab who were least likely to give up the tribal
identification. This is surprising, as Arabism ought to suggest less attachment to tribe.
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6.5 Conclusion and Summary
The main aim of this chapter was to explore the attitude of the respondents towards the tribe
and tribalism. This was based originally on three questions. The analyses showed that there
was no significant variation for the question which dealt with changing tribes. The vast
majority refused this option. This is interesting in itself because it illustrates the continuing
emotive content of tribal identity for the respondents.
The result of this study seems quite similar to the result of an earlier study by El-Fathaly and
Palmer in 1973 which included certain items about tribe and tribalism. Their study showed
that tribalism was still part of Libyan society. In El-Fathaly and Palmer's work, non-
respondents to the question posed were assumed to support the hypothesis that people were
still in favour of the tribe and tribalism, on the grounds that they were too scared to express
such an answer. The findings of the recent study are quite similar, indicating that almost all
respondents asserted a tribal identity and a small majority were not ready to drop the tribal
identification.
This study shows that tribe is still a major source of personal identification in Libyan society.
The vast majority of the respondents in the study were not willing to change their tribes.
However a substantial minority were willing to drop the tribal identification altogether.
Statistical analyses have shown some small differences between respondents according to
background variables, such as differences between gender, and between rural and urban
respondents in their attitudes towards tribe. Moreover, those who came from a poorly
educated background, were less in favour of the tribal identification thus it is possible to
suggest that they regard tribalism as a network of privilege. They seem to perceive that they
do not derive any benefit from the tribe, unlike those who came from a higher educational and
social background.
In general, the findings of this study demonstrate that Libyan society is still a tribal society.
The tribe is one of the strongest social organisations, and tribalism still plays a significant
social role. It may be an invisible political unit, but it has emerged as one of the main sources
of legitimacy of the Libyan regime in the last few years.
The findings of this part of the study are complex and interesting. A large majority of the
students were very attached or attached to their tribe, and almost no one wanted to change
tribe. At the same time nearly half of the students were in favour of dropping tribal identities
in Libyan society. One surprising result of the survey is that when the relationship between
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strength of attachment to tribe and willingness to drop tribal identity was investigated, this
relation was strong and negative. 72 percent of those who were not attached to their tribe
wished to drop tribal identity compared with 31 percent of those who were strongly attached
to their tribe. An unexpected fact here is that a substantial minority of those who were
strongly attached to the tribal system were willing to drop tribes as a form of identity. This
divided position is actually rather similar to the divided position expressed over time by the
regime. It seems clear that there is a substantial minority of students who would prefer that
there was no tribal system but who accommodate to it because it is there and is important.
This also quite closely corresponds to the regime's position. It was initially against tribalism
but has had to accept tribes into a sort of partnership which in some ways substitutes for a
civil society, although rejecting any formal political role for tribes. The views expressed by
the students might be considered to belong to three sets. The first is represented by those who
are strongly attached or attached to their tribe and who do not wish to drop tribal identities.
They seem likely to have a non-instrumental as well as an instrumental view of the role of
tribes. For those who want to drop tribal identities and are not attached to their tribes, both
the instrumental and non-instrumental bases are rejected. Those who are willing to drop
identities but remain attached are probably somewhat instrumental in their view of the tribe -
i.e. it has a role so they remain part of it. The regime's position has tended to either extreme
of this continuum. At first it tried to reject tribes but it has subsequently asserted their non-
instrumental role in ideological terms. At the same time it has accepted their instrumental role
outside the formal political sphere.
It is important to remember here, as throughout this thesis, that the respondents are close in
generational terms to the Libya of their grandparents which was an essentially tribally ordered
society. Despite the enormous demographic and educational changes since that time, family
socialisation has certainly continued to reinforce tribal identities in ways which reflect both
the traditions of common descent and of Bedouin value systems, even when the actual
Bedouin form of life is no longer the experience of the great majority of Libyans, especially
the urbanised population. It would be necessary to engage in detailed qualitative
(ethnographic) research to explore the exact character of tribal identity in the new social
context. However, it would have been very remarkable if an identity form with such a long
history and with such a central role in the social order, had indeed disappeared within two
generations.
This general account is supported by the review of the regime's policies towards the tribe and
tribalism. On the one hand its initial efforts to eliminate tribes from society have been
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replaced by an acceptance of their existence and on the other hand an effort to confine their
role to the social sphere.
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7. Attitudes towards Political
Participation
7.1	 Introduction
In this chapter, the attitudes towards and the engagement with political participation of the
Libyan university students will be examined. The term 'political participation' is used in this
study to refer to "the act of taking part in the formulation, passage or implementation of
public policies. This applies to the activities of any person, whether an elected politician, a
government official or an ordinary citizen, who is active in any way in the production of
policy within any type of political system." Most of the literature on political participation
deals with systems where there is competition between parties, and is therefore not very
relevant for our purposes here.2
Political participation in Libya will be examined by focusing upon the institutions for
participation which the regime has created. One of the main such institutions is the Basic
People's Congress (details will be given in the section which follows). This chapter looks at
the relation of the respondents to these institutions of political participation because they play
a crucial role in Libya's political system.
The chapter has two main sections. The first focuses on the political system in Libya. This
covers the development of Libya's current political system, how it functions, and its progress
through two main periods, firstly from 1969 until 1977, and secondly from 1977 until the
present day. The transformation within the Libyan political system reflect the changing
strategies employed by the revolutionary regime towards the mobilisation of its citizens.
Focusing on the changes will provide an insight into the character of the channels of mass
political participation which the revolutionary regime constructed. The second section
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explores the attitudes of the respondents towards political participation in tenns both of their
active engagement and their views as to its effectiveness. This section deals initially with the
experience of participation which the respondents have had, firstly within their families and
then at school and university. The final section is the conclusion.
7.2	 The Political System in Libya: An Outline of the Framework
To understand the mechanisms of political participation in Libya, it is important to focus on
the nature of the political system, especially since March 2, 1977, when the Declaration of the
Establishment of the People's Authority was issued. This period is significant in
understanding the political structure of the system, because, despite all the practical changes
within the system, in principle it still bases its structure on the Popular Congresses and the
Popular Committee.
The periods, first from 1969 until 1977, and second from 1977 until the present, are
distinctive due to different mobilisation and modemisation processes initiated by the
revolutionary regime. The "mobilisation process" involved changing the political system in
order to provide different channels for mass political participation.
7.2.1	 The first period from 1969 until 1977
The 1 September 1969 coup d'etat was completed without any civilian involvement. As a
result, the RCC consisted of military officers who carried through the coup and exercised both
executive and legislative functions in the early days of the revolution. According to Article 18
of the Constitutional Proclamation of December 11, 1969, the RCC is,
The highest authority in the Libyan Arab Republic. It exercises the function of supreme
sovereignty and legislation and draws up the general policy of the state on behalf of the
people.'
On September 8, 1969, the RCC appointed civilians to the Council of Ministers to help
operate the government, but even then it reserved for itself complete authority in all fields. It
sat at the top of the pyramid, issuing proclamations, laws, and resolutions; ensuring the
support of the armed forces; overseeing the activities of the government; and creating new
institutions to promote the objectives of the revolution.4
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In order to create a primary link between the people and the government, the RCC established
the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) on June 11, 1971. This was a Nasirite-style mass
organisation. In a speech on June 12, 1971, al-Qadhafi stated that
the new political institution would create a sacred popular alliance of the sons of
Libyan cities, villages, country and desert. Giving them all the opportunity to
participate politically in planning and supervising future policies.5
The Arab Socialist Union was one of a series of experiments made by the RCC in order to
build structures of elite-linkage, channels for participation and instruments for the regime's
legitimacy. According to Hinnebusch, this organisation had multiple purposes:
On the one hand it was meant to fill the "vacuum" left by the banning of parties and an
effort to dismantle tribal structures, to prevent political activity by both traditional
chiefs and party leaders by cutting them off from their traditional bases of support, and
to bring the voluntary organisations, trade and professional unions under government
control. On the other hand, it was to mobilise mass support and bring the various social
and political forces into a cadre promoting common co-operative activity directed from
above.6
The regime hoped that creating such organisations would motivate, encourage, politicise and
mobilise the population towards development goals of the revolutionary regime. But this
experiment failed, especially with regards to mobilisation and participation, for a number of
reasons. These were given by El-Fathaly et al as:
First, negative preconceptions based on the Egyptian counterpart. Secondly, a complex
organisational structure which confused the public. Thirdly, a failure to understand the
traditionalism of the public and the central role of traditional leaders in the development
of public perceptions. Finally, a failure to co-ordinate with the new modernising local
officials.'
As a consequence of these failures of mobilisation, al-Qadhafi declared a 'Popular
Revolution' on April 15, 1973. In a major speech he announced a five-point program to
revolutionise the administrative structures of the government by turning the masses against the
inefficient, corrupt bureaucracy, and abolishing outdated laws.' The main objectives of this
revolution were listed in an official government text as follows:
(1) The Annulment of all laws in effect, and the continuation of the revolutionary work
with the establishment of new procedures and penalties; (2) purging of the country of
deviationists was to be tolerated. They conspired against the revolution. This applied to
people who "preach communism and capitalism as well as Muslim Brethren if they
engage in clandestine activities"; (3) freedom belongs to the people and not to its
enemies: arms would be distributed to the people for whom the revolution was started
as an experiment; (4) to launch an administrative revolution; and (5) to launch the
cultural revolution.9
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The first step in the Popular Revolution was the formation of Popular Committees, elected
directly by the people. Al-Qadhafi declared that people everywhere should establish Popular
Committees in each village, city, university, institute, school, port, airport and organisation,
and should move towards the five points enunciated on April 15, 1973. 10 The Popular
Committees were to become the official authority in the governorates and municipalities, and
also in the management of institutions, public corporations, companies, faculties and
universities.
El-Fathaly et al argue that the Popular Committees involved for the first time popular
participation in the selection of local leaders and gave the opportunity of popular participation
in policy-making processes. 11
 But the Popular Revolution did not bring about mobilisation,
participation and development. The new political leaders, as Flinnebusch states,
were often poorly prepared to exercise their tasks, were guilty of negligence,
incompetence or indiscipline, or took the Popular Revolution as merely an opportunity
to leap to positions of power, without showing much concern for popular service.°
Accordingly al-Qadhafi expressed dissatisfaction not with political participation or the
expertise of the bureaucracy, but with popular mobilisation. El-Fathaly et al indicate that one
of the difficulties in developing a capacity for mass mobilisation was rooted in the conflict
between the ASU and the Popular Committees which were the central institution for popular
mobilisation.° As a consequence of this failure of the Popular Committees in the mass
mobilisation process, al-Qaclhafi embarked on another method of mobilisation and institution-
building, in an attempt to encourage the masses towards participation, especially after the
break-up of the RCC in 1975. This new structure was based on the "Basic Popular
Congresses" (BPC). 14
In the first part of his book, The Green Book, al-Qadhafi introduced the new format of
popular democracy as a unique form of direct democracy, based on sultat al-shdb [the
authority of the people]. The Basic Popular Congresses represented a tool to help the people
to be involved in the political process at the grass-roots level. Thus the BPC was formed
locally, according to place of residence all people (males and females) would be members of a
congress. These congresses would select their People's Committees. They would also choose
their secretariats, which, in turn, would constitute the Municipality People's Congresses.15
At the national level, the General People's Congress (GPC) was made the highest political
instrument of government in Libya. The General People's Congress was described by al-
Qahadafi as "not a gathering of members or ordinary persons as is the case with parliaments.
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It is a gathering of the Basic Popular Congresses , the people's committees, the unions, the
syndicates and the professional associations.""
According to The Green Book, the topics discussed by Basic Popular Congresses or the
Popular Committees, syndicates and unions, would take their final shape in the General
People's Congress. What was drafted by the GPC, which would meet at least once a year
(more if emergency meetings are called), would, subsequently, be submitted to Popular
Congresses, People's Committees, syndicates and unions.17
Practically, the GPC's duty is to study, discuss and approve the policies of the country, its
general planning, budget, peace and war treaties, to check and to guide the executive and
popular authorities. (Further details will be given in the following section).
7.2.2	 The second period from 1977 to date
Al-Qadhafi's ideology is based on a criticism of existing political theories and economic
models in the world today. He argues that neither communism nor traditional democracy has
dealt effectively with the many problems facing contemporary societies."
The state ideology in Libya criticises the party system, although Libya as a country has had
no experience with political parties even before the revolution. The Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC) after the revolution in 1969 continued the monarchy's ban on the organisation
and operation of political parties. The December 1969 Decision on the Protection of the
Revolution, the Penal code and Law No. 71 of 1972 render strict legal injunctions against
unauthorised political activity.
In The Green Book, al-Qadhafi describes the political party as the modem dictatorial
instrument of governing and the party system as an overt form of dictatorship. Al-Qadhafi's
criticism of the political party system comprises the following:19
a) Political parties are not a democratic instrument because they are composed of people who
have common interests, have a common outlook, belong to the same locality or have the
same belief. The party thus represents and promotes the interests of only a segment of
society. Such segments form parties to attain their ends and impose their doctrines on
society as a whole.
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b) In such a system, competition between parties frequently escalates, often resulting in a
dominant party or parties ignoring the rights and interests of minority-party members.
c) Political parties, in their struggle to gain power, often destroy the achievements of their
predecessors, even if those achievements were for the general good.
As a solution to these dilemmas al-Qadhafi proposed the system of People's direct democracy,
based on Popular Congresses and Popular Committees. According to al-Qadhafi, the
sovereignty of the people is indivisible. Parties govern on behalf of the people, but his
principle is that there should be no representation in lieu of the people.
The development of Libya's current political system has been an evolutionary process which,
very likely, is still incomplete. Despite some changes in the main structure, based on the Basic
Popular Congresses and Popular Committees which are still the core of the political system.
The Declaration of the Establishment of the Authority of the People was issued on March 2,
1977. This declaration defined new central principles relating to the people's authority;
nevertheless it was not a constitution. Together with some other resolutions, the Declaration
revised the governmental organisation laid down in the 1969 Constitutional Proclamation. The
March 1977 declaration also changed the name of the country to the Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahiriyya. The word `Jainahiriyya' was an invented one, which was introduced into
the political dictionary. The word may be translated as "people's power" or the "state of the
masses.
/720
Article 3 in the Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People stated that
the people's direct democracy is the basis of the political system in the Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya, where the authority is in the hands of the people
alone. The people exercise their authority through the people's congresses, the people's
committees and the professional unions. The authority of the people is comprised of
People's Congresses, People's Committees, Professional Unions and General People's
Congress.21
The structure of the 'authority of the people's system' or 'direct democracy', according to the
ideology of the state which is based on the Green Book, is comprised of four elements. These
are covered below (see Appendix C).
7.2.2.1 The Basic People's Congresses
In accordance with Article 3 in the Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the
People, people are allocated to Basic People's Congresses on the basis of their place of
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residence. All citizens register as members of the Basic People's Congress in their areas.
Also, every Basic People's Congress shall choose from its members a committee to lead the
Congress.22 A number of comments can be made about the practical experience of the Basic
People's Congresses as a base for the new institutions of political participation:
a) In practice, those who participate in the meeting of the BPCs become more aware of
politics at the local, national and international levels. The BPCs do therefore function as a
mechanism for political education.
b) Membership of the BPC is not limited to men or political activists but is open to all people.
This therefore includes women, who constitute half of the Libyan population. In the early
years of the BPCs, social traditions in practice obstructed women's participation. To find
a solution to this problem al-Qadhafi implemented a suggestion that they could meet in
separate chambers to express their views on issues arising in the BPC, if traditions did not
allow women and men to assemble in a single hall.23
c) The passivity and the lack of motivation of the people to practice their responsibilities
through the BPC was a very clear phenomena. This passivity was due to a number of
reasons. First, some people stayed away because they were not familiar with such an
experiment. Others attended the BPC sessions but did not take an active role in the
discussions. Second, some of the Revolutionary Committee? misused their duties and
functions and became dominant in the BPCs. The Revolutionary Committees are regarded
by the Libyan system as an instrument of the People's Revolution, as a means to guide the
masses.25 One of the duties of the revolutionary committees is,
to encourage the Popular Congresses to intensify their ideological work, to help the
masses make progressive decisions and to get such decisions implemented by the
People's Committees.26
But among the population there was a feeling that decision-making in the BPCs was
dominated by particular groups. Theory proved to be very different from practice. In theory
the BPCs were the main decision-making institution through which people were involved in
the political process at the grass-roots level. The people and the people alone were supposed
to have the prerogative and indeed the authority to make-decisions, 27 with no veto over the
people's power.28 There were certainly some instances where the BPC's decisions could affect
national policy. In 1983 for instance, al-Qadhafi introduced the idea of al-tdlim al-manzili
[home education]. He asked those parents who were able to do so to keep their school-age
children at home. There they should be given, under parental tutelage, the basic elements of
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primary school knowledge." Al-Qadhafi's proposal was rejected by the BPCs and caused an
enormous amount of discussion and criticism in Libya. However, in other cases the opinions
of the BPCs went unheeded. Al-Qadhafi acknowledged that sometimes direct democracy did
not work: "Theoretically, this is the genuine democracy. But realistically, the strong always
rule, that is, the stronger part in the society is the one that rules".3°
7.2.2.2 People's Committees (PC)
Article 3 in the Declaration of the Establishment of the Authority of People stated that the
masses of the People's Congresses shall choose People's Committees which are responsible to
the People's Congresses.31
 The membership term on the People's Committee is limited to three
years, and a Committee member can be removed at any time by a two-third vote. Resignation
must be accepted and approved by the Committee.32
The PCs are administrative tools chosen by the BPCs. The latter dictate the policy to be
followed by the People's Committees and supervise its execution. According to The Green
Book, both administration and supervision become popular, and the outdated definition of
democracy—democracy is the supervision of the government by the people—comes to an end.
It will be replaced by the right definition: democracy is the supervision of the people by the
people.33
7.2.2.3 The Unions and Professional Associations
According to The Green Book, all citizens who are members of the Popular Congresses
belong, professionally and functionally, to 'categories'. On this basis they can establish and
organise themselves into unions and professional associations. 34 The purpose of these
professional unions is to defend the professional rights of their members.
7.2.2.4 General People's Congress (GPC)
This is the highest political authority and instrument of government in the country. The GPC
possesses bath legislative and executive powers. It is the national conference of the People's
Congresses, People's Committees and Professional Unions. The delegates to the GPC come
from the latter bodies, who choose them by direct choice involving raising hands in open
meetings.
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According to Article 3 in the Declaration of the Establishment of the Authority of the People,
the GPC has a General Secretariat to execute the general policy of the state as defined by the
Congress, drawing up the agenda of the GPC and executing its resolutions and
recomrnendations.35
The president of the GPC is openly selected to preside over sessions, to sign its laws, and
accept the credentials of ambassadors. The GPC also elects the General Secretariat, which
has taken over the function of the council of ministers in the previous system. The secretariat
includes a Secretary-General and a number of Secretaries, each of whom supervises one
section of activities in the state. They cannot, however, make decisions to determine the
general policy of the country. The main duty of the Secretary General and the Secretaries is to
implement decisions made by the GPC.
The People's Congresses, People's Committees, Professional Unions and the General People's
Congress are the main structures of the political system in Libya and represent channels for
mass political participation.
Further reference should now be made to the Revolutionary Committees — a movement
which is not officially part of the political system in Libya. The rise of this movement started
when al-Qadhafi in the late 1970s gave up his post as a Secretary General of the General
People's Congress (GPC) and all other official positions and titles except that of the Leader of
the Revolution. He introduced the idea of a separation between the Revolution and the
people's authority and civil administration. As Leader of the Revolution he devoted his time to
the revolutionary activities. Effectively this gave him a legitimate and strong position from
which to continue to influence the country's policies.36
In this role, in 1977 al-Qadhafi called on the Libyan revolutionaries to form committees all
over the country: in every educational institution and office, and in the armed forces. The
Revolutionary Committees became highly organised, with a structure parallel to the People's
Committees.37
The membership of the Revolutionary Committees is open to anyone who believes in the
Leader of the Revolution's ideology, therefore it is not based on election. They are directly
under al-Qadhafi's command and have enormous power. They carry out their duties with The
Green Book as their guidance. Al-Qadhafi described the Revolutionary Committees' role as
follows:
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The revolutionary committees role is to help the masses take a firm grasp of the reins of
power and all sources of power within society. In a Jamahiriyya, revolutionaries are
[not] simply enthusicists [sic], mere zealots; they are the prophets of a healthy
civilisation and a life of dignity where man will live happily and freely.38
The members of the Revolutionary Committees operate outside the framework of the Popular
Congresses. They are regarded as a temporary movement, performing duties which are
temporary. They involve themselves in revolutionary activities at the grass-roots level. They
seek to raise the level of the political awareness among the people so that the latter can
practice their authority through the Basic Popular Congresses. According to one of the many
pamphlets of The Maktab al-Itisal Bi al-Lijan al-Thawria [Communications Office of the
Revolutionary Committees], the duties of the Revolutionary Committees are as follows:39
a) Tahrid: inciting the masses to exercise authority.
b) Tarsikh: firmly establishing the people's authority.
c) Mumarasat al-riqaba al-thawrzyya: practising revolutionary supervision.
d) Tahrik: agitating the Popular Congresses.
e) Tarshid: directing the Popular Committees and the secretariats of the congresses to the
right path.
f) Himaya, difda wa ddwa lil-thawra: protecting, defending and propagating the revolution.
The Revolutionary Committees initially possessed no formal authority. However, from March
1979 they became responsible for supervising 'elections' at the level of the Basic People's
Congresses. The Revolutionary Committees became rapidly al-Qadhafi's direct link with the
masses.° in' 1979 the Revolutionary Committees started the publication of their own
newspaper. A weekly entitled al-Zatif al-Akhdar [The Green March] was followed in 1980 by
'al-Jamahiriyya'.
As mentioned earlier, the role of the Revolutionary Committees is a temporary one. Their role
is to incite the people to exercise authority, to take power and revolt. As the popular masses
are gradually raised to the level of the RC, the intention is that the RC will cease to exist. This
stage has not been achieved, so the RCs continue to finiction.
The Revolutionary Committees have developed a broad power base within society and have
become tools to destroy the opposition (the enemies of the revolution) inside or outside
society. A wave of dissatisfaction and alienation emerged among many segments of society as
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a consequence of the heavy tactics used by the Revolutionary Committees to silence any
opposition. In effect, their role undermined any meaningful popular participation and stifled
freedom of expression. Many citizens felt that they were not able to express themselves. They
were frightened that any criticism might be misunderstood as opposition to the Revolution and
its Leader.41
One of the problems arose when revolutionary committees intervened in the work of the PCs
by putting forward their own candidates, who were enthusiastic admirers of the Leader of the
Revolution and were committed to furthering the goals of the revolution. In doing so the RC
usually objected to other candidates and prevented the Popular Congresses from operating as
they should.42.
The institutions of mass participation presently face a number of problems, the main one
being the possibility of people's apathy towards involvement in the political process. The
success of the Libyan experiment depends on citizens playing an active role in political
discussions and running the government through the BPCs and PCs.
The relationship between the Leader of the Revolution and the masses is an important one. As
mentioned earlier, since 1979 al-Qadhafi has given up all official posts and titles except his
title as "Leader of the Revolution". His role became very visible through this new function of
guiding the Revolution. This position gave him the power to instruct the Popular Congresses
in how to exercise their role in running the country. In addition, people depend on al-Qadhafi
giving his opinion on many issues with which the Popular Congresses deals. His role has
increased as he has tried to fill the void that was created by setting up a loose political
structure for a state without govemment.43
As a consequence, al-Qadhafi's involvement in every decision taken in the country has led
some critics to accuse him of establishing a political system in which he has no formal role
but where in practice he takes a major part in decision—making.
The following section deals with political participation in Libyan society by exploring the
attitudes of university students towards the participation process and their degree of
engagement with it.
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7.3	 The Political Participation of Students in Libyan Society:
Data Analysis
Exploring attitudes to political participation among the students is the major concern of this
part of the study. Three main topics relate to the political participation and attitudes of the
respondents. The first deals with the experience of the respondents' participation within their
own families' affairs. It may be expected that the participation of the respondents in family
affairs and their relationships with their parents at different stages of their lives may affect
their participation in the political system and the other activities.
The second topic concerns the respondents' participation experience at school and university,
asking whether they were active at either of these institutions. The third topic covers attitudes
of the respondents towards political participation and their awareness of the political process
within the political system in Libya by investigating whether they were active within the
institutions of political participation or not.
A general aim of this section is to find out whether there is any relationship between the
political experience of the respondents in the early stages of their lives (either within the
family, school or university) and their participation within the political system.
7.3.1	 The participation experience of the respondents within the family
The experience of individuals within their families, and their participation in the affairs of the
family may not only affect their political behaviour and their participation in the political
matters within society, but may also add to an awareness of their role in the political process.
The aim of this section is to explore the experience of participation in family affairs and
attitudes towards this process.
The questions asked were numbers, 23, 24, 25a, 25b, 26a, 26b, 28a, and 28b in the
questionnaire (see Appendix A).
The experience of individuals within their families reflects the nature of the relationship
between parents and children. To explore this relationship, the respondents were asked how
they would describe their parents' treatment of their children: strict or relaxed. The response
to this question showed well over half of the respondents (68 percent) described their parents'
treatment of their children as relaxed, while only 30 percent described their parents' treatment
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as strict. Thus it seems that most of the respondents lived in a flexible and relaxed atmosphere
with their parents.
The family atmosphere is very significant for the individuals. By looking at the early
experiences of the individual in a family and the nature of relations among its members—that
is, non–democratic or democratic—one may draw some interesting conclusions about the
consequences on political participation. Therefore, the respondents were asked about the
responsibility for making decisions within their family.
The survey results indicate that for 30 percent of respondents, the responsibility for decision-
making within the family rested with the father. Only 5 percent indicated that the mother was
responsible for decision-making. In the latter case the reason was usually due to the death of
the father or to divorce between the parents and with the respondent living with his/her
mother. 22 percent of the respondents said that both of their parents were responsible for
decision-making, whilst 42 percent indicated that the whole family was responsible for
decision-making.
The next question looked at the role of the respondents in family decision-making when they
were children. It asked whether the respondent had a voice in family decisions as a child. 70
percent said they had no such voice, while 29 percent did. The decisions which they
participated in related to matters concerning toys, trips, clothes, etc. Taken together the
responses to these two questions show that at least 29 percent of the respondents had
experienced a democratic atmosphere.
When those who answered positively were asked at what age they began to participate, 43
percent said between the ages of 6 and 11, 38 percent said between 12 and 15, 9 percent said
between 15 and 18, and 5 percent said between 18 and 22. Given that the decisions in which
they participated were only minor ones relating to their own personal welfare, the rate of the
level of participation in family decision making (29 percent) is low.
A further question explored the attitudes of respondents towards the idea that children should
take part in family discussions in general. The respondents were asked whether they favoured
children's involvement in decision-making within their families. More than half of the
respondents (about 66 percent) supported the idea. Those who gave a positive answer were
asked at what age children should take part in family discussions. Half the respondents, about
52 percent, supported the idea of children starting to take part in family discussions when they
are between 6 and 11, 31 percent said between 12 and 15, 7 percent said between 15 and 18,
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and only 2 percent said between 18 and 22 years old. From the results, it is clear that
respondents were generally favourable to children taking part in family discussions before the
age of 15.
An individual's willingness to express himself/herself in political debate may be affected by
his/her experience of freedom of expression within the family. Respondents were therefore
asked whether they felt free to talk to their parents about their family's affairs. The response
showed that 85 percent felt free to talk to their parents, while only 14 percent did not. Those
who gave positive answers were asked with whom they did talk, father, mother or both
parents. In response to this 7 percent of the respondents said they talked to their fathers alone;
half of the respondents (50 percent) talked to their mothers alone; and about 42 percent felt
free to talk to both parents.
73.2	 The participation experience of respondents in school activities
The researcher assumes that the involvement of individuals in different activities, whether
political or non-political, tends to strengthen the likelihood of an individual participating in the
general political system. The more people were active and involved in participation in the
early stages of their life, the more likely they are to be involved effectively in the political
participation process. Therefore, the purpose of this section and the next is to examine the
respondents' experience of participation at school and in university activities. The intention is
to find out if there is any relationship between the respondents' participation in such activities
at school and at university, and their participation in the political process within the regime
later. This part is based on questions 29, 30a, 30b in the questionnaire (see Appendix A).
The respondents were asked first to describe their teachers at school. The object of this was to
find out about the atmosphere at school and the relationship between students and teachers.
More than half of the respondents, 58 percent, said that their teachers were strict, while 40
percent described their teachers as relaxed.
Next, respondents were asked about their experience of participation in political activities in
the early stages of their lives. About 52 percent of the respondents participated in activities at
school, whilst 48 percent did not participate. Those who gave a positive answer were asked
what kind of activities they participated in. To understand the responses made to this question,
it will be necessary to give some description of the character of political activities to which
respondents were referring. In what follows, therefore, the researcher will give the survey
result for each political activity and then describe the character of that activity. The activities
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to which the respondents referred were: Ideological Preparation Camps (IPC); popular
demonstration; ideological competitions; political experience through the school system;
ideological revolutionary meetings; and students union activities.
About 69 percent of those who answered 'yes' participated in the Ideological Preparation
Camps. These camps usually take place during summer school vacation or in the mid
academic-year holiday. Students stay between 10 days and two weeks at the ideological
preparation camps. They are given lectures and talks about different political subjects either
related to the ideology of the regime or issues concerning the Arab nation, such as Arab unity
and the Arab-Israeli conflict. These lectures are usually given by members of the
Revolutionary Committees or by experts on the topics. The students in these Ideological
Preparation Camps also practice other activities such as basic military training, sports, music,
and art, and undertake visits to factories and other symbols of the regime's achievements. In
principle the ideological preparation camps are compulsory: students have to attend,
especially at school or in the early years of their university study, but 30 percent of the
respondents who had participated in political activities had not been to an IPC and 48 percent
of respondents had not participated in any political activities. This shows a real gap between
the formal structures of participation and their actual achievement.
About 25 percent of the respondents participated in one of the popular demonstrations in
which schools and universities are quite often involved. Popular demonstrations take place in
different parts of the country to support the regime in its internal or foreign policies and
indicate loyalty to the regime, or to show support for Arab issues such as the Palestine issue
or Arab unity.
One of the other activities which some respondents were involved in was the al-musabaqat al-
aqa'idiay al-madrasiya [ideological competitions between schools]. In these competitions
students participate in academic quizzes in all the courses which they study. Part of this
involves questions on the ideology of the country. 11 percent of respondents participated in
these ideological competitions between schools.
Nine percent of the respondents mentioned that they had gained political experience through
the school system. Each school is called Al-Jamahiriyya al-musaghara [the small
Jamahiriyya], which is based on the people's authority system as shown in The Green Book.
Each class within a school constitutes a Popular Congress with a Popular Committee, and
therefore the students are members of these congresses through which meetings and
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discussions are organised. This allows them to practice their roles for the similar system
outside the school.
Multaqayat al-lijan al-thawtya [ideological revolutionary meetings] were another one of the
activities in which students participated. These are the annual meetings of the Revolutionary
Committees (RC). Usually those who attend such meetings are members of the Revolutionary
Committees. About 3.4 percent of the respondents participated in the ideological meetings.
Finally, only 1 percent of the respondents participated in students' union activities.
Those who did not participate in any of the activities at school were asked about their reasons
for not participating. The results are given in Table 7.1. It seems that most reasons given for
non-participation in political activities at school were not political.
Table 7.1: Reasons for non-participation in political activities at school
Reasons	 Percentages	 Number of	 respondents
[°/0] 
Radical change
	 2	 4
Not suited
	 2	 5
Do not like	 18	 47
No time	 16	 43
Not Serious
	 1	 3
No opportunity	 28	 74
Useless	 5	 14
No reasons given 	 25	 65
Family resistance/Father
	 3	 8 
Total	 100	 263
Source: Field survey 1994
Using the cross-tabulation procedure, the relationship between participation in political
activities at school and the type of family residence of the respondents (urban and rural) is
shown in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2: Participation in political activities at school by place of family residence
Category	 Number of respondents 	 Yes
[°/0]
Urban	 428	 48
Rural	 72	 75
Source: Field survey 1994
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As shown in the Table 7.2, only 48 percent of urban respondents participated in the political
activities at school, against 75 percent of rural respondents. Whilst the number of rural
respondents was small in comparison to the number of urban ones, there is still a strong
statistical significance. Rural respondents are more involved in the activities at school than
urban respondents. The explanation for this may be the lack of other activities in rural areas.
The rural schools usually are the main centres of activity for both students and their families.
Table 7.3 records the proportions of males and females who participated in the political
activities at school. About 56 percent of male respondents participated in political activities as
against 47 percent of female respondents. It is clear that male students were more likely to
have participated in the activities than female students, although the difference is not large.
Table 7.3: Participation in political activities at school by gender
Sex	 Number of respondents	 Yes
[°/0]
Male	 262	 56
Female	 238	 47
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 7.4 shows the participation of respondents in political activities at school by father's
education. There is no consistent pattern.
It is clear that those whose fathers were illiterate or had less education were more active at
school, although this pattern is not wholly consistent. For instance those whose father's
education was intermediate do not correspond with the general trend. The low level of
participation by those whose fathers had a university-level education is interesting. This could
reflect cynicism. With regard to the mother's education, no significant difference in the
participation of the respondents at school was found.
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Table 7.4: Participation in political activities at school by fathers' education
Fathers' education	 Number of respondents	 Yes
EN
Illiterate	 87	 62
Read only	 23	 52
Read and write	 68	 52
Primary	 69	 62
Preparatory	 65	 42
Secondary	 62	 50
Intermediate	 33	 64
University and over 	 91	 39
Source: Field survey 1994
The source of the respondents' identification (family, tribe, city, state, Muslim or Arab) is
another variable which can be related to the respondents' involvement in school activities. The
only result of statistical significance here was with regard to those who identify themselves by
the Libyan state. Less than half of the respondents who identified themselves by the Libyan
state (43 percent) participated in the activities at school, while 54 percent did not participate.
But the findings show that those who were aware of the Libyan state and its political system
were more involved in the activities at school.
7.3.3	 The participation experience of respondents in university activities
The purpose of this section is to examine the respondents' experience of participation in
university activities. This part is based on question numbers 31a, 3 lb, 31c, 32a, 32b, and 33
(see Appendix A).
The respondents were asked whether they participated in the political activities at university.
11 percent of the respondents gave a positive answer, while 89 percent of the respondents
answered 'no'. It is clear here that the students at university participated much less in political
activities than when they were at school. Such a finding can be explained in terms of most
political activities at school being (in theory) compulsory. Also students at university became
more interested in their future career than other activities.
Those who gave a positive answer were asked about the activities in which they participated.
38 percent said they participated in the ideological courses for new students in the first year.
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Through these courses the students were instructed in the regime's ideology and some other
political issues (such as Arab unity and the Arab-Israeli conflict).
24 percent of the respondents participated in national ceremonies. These ceremonies take
place on certain days in the year, such as the anniversary of the Revolution. 14 percent of the
respondents participated in popular demonstrations, which are a way to support the regime
and its policies. Furthermore, 13 percent of the respondents participated in the ideological
preparation camps and 11 percent participated in ideological meetings.
Those who did not participate in the activities at university were asked about the reasons why
they did not participate. As indicated in Table 7.6, about 33 percent of the respondents
mentioned that they did either not have the ability or the time to be involved. 22 percent
mentioned that there was no opportunity and they preferred to keep away from such activities.
9 percent indicated that these activities were disorganised and useless, whilst 7 percent argued
that there were no real political activities in Libya. 5 percent said they did not like to attend
because a few people always dominate these activities, especially members of the
Revolutionary Committees. 5 percent of respondents simply said they did not like to deal with
politics. 2 percent of the respondents indicated that all these activities were merely
propaganda for the current regime. Another 2 percent said that they were scared, because
there was no freedom to express their opinion. Finally, some female respondents (about 13
percent) said that all activities were dominated by male students. Note that in Table 7.5 the
respondents by percentage do not sum to 100 because some people gave more than one
reason.
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Table 7.5: Reasons for non-participation in politics at university
Reasons
	 Percentages	 Number of
respondents
No ability to participate/No time	 33.4	 149
No opportunity	 22.1	 99
No answers	 13.1	 59
The political activities are disorganised and useless 	 9.4
	 42
No such political activities in Libya and are not genuine
	
7.0
	 31
The political activities are dominate by a few people
	
4.9	 22
Do not like to do so	 4.7
	 21
The political activities are just propaganda
	
2.2	 10
Scared to participate	 2.2
	 10
Male students dominate	 13.2	 59
Total	 447
Source: Field survey 1994
Examining the participation of respondents in political activities at university by background
factors might help to find some differences among the respondents in their attitudes. The first
of these variables is place of family residence. The findings indicated that there was little
difference between students of urban and of rural residence.
Table 7.6 shows the participation of the respondents in political activities at university by
gender. The result shows that there is a statistical difference: 15 percent of the male
respondents participated, but only 6 percent of the female respondents did.
Table 7.6: Participation in political activities at university by gender
Sex	 Number of respondents 	 Yes
Male	 262	 15
Female	 235	 6
Source: Field survey 1994
There is no statistically significant relationship between the parents' educational level and the
respondents' political activities at university. Similarly, family income, faculty and subject of
study and father's occupation all made no significant difference to the respondents'
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participation in the university activities. In general, then, background variables did not make
much difference; which again shows the homogeneity of the students.
The researcher assumed that those who participated in school activities might be similarly
interested at university. As can be seen from Table 7.7, the result shows that among those
who participated in the political activities at school, 17 percent continued at university, while
among those who had not participated in the activities at school 4 percent became involved at
university.
Table 7.7: Participation in political activities at university by participation in activities at
school
School activities	 Number of respondents	 Yes
Yes	 295	 17
No	 237	 4
Source: Field survey 1994
There is a relationship between participation in the activities at school and at university, but
this is weak. The interesting thing about these findings is that there is a drop-off between
school and university (i.e many stop participating in the activities at university).
The Students' Congress is one of the main centres of student activity in the university, and
membership is open to all students. Through this Congress students discuss their problems
and attempt to emulate the Popular Congresses. A question related to this point involved
asking the respondents whether or not they were a member of the Student Congress in their
faculty. Only 26.4 percent of the respondents were members, which represents a clear
minority of students. Those who gave a negative answer were asked about the reasons for
being non-members and the results are given in Table 7.8.
As can be seen in Table 7.8, there were many reasons which the respondents mentioned for
non-participation. In particular, 31.2 percent of the respondents said they did not have the
time or ability to participate in such activities and to study at the same time; 11.3 percent said
they did not care about these matters; and 11.3 percent said there was no Students' Congress
in their faculty. It should be noted that, in fact, all E3culties do have such congresses, although
they may not be very active. 9.7 percent said the Students' Congress did not have any
decision-making power. 8.5 percent said that they did not know anything about the Students'
Congress. 3 percent said that a few students dominated the Students' Congress and most of
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them were members of the Revolutionary Committees. The replies indicate that the
respondents were aware that those few who dominated the Students' Congress were motivated
by personal interest and their personal aims rather than looking for wider solutions to
problems facing the students in the university. Another factor which the respondents indicated
was the lack of encouragement to attend. Some mentioned that no one would listen to their
views if they attended; others that they did not like the heavy responsibilities; finally, some
female respondents did not attend because they were more focused on their role at home.
Table 7.8: Reasons for not participating in students' congresses
Reasons
	
Percentages	 Number of respondents
[%] 
Lack of knowledge	 8.5	 31
No encouragement	 2.8	 10
No time and ability 	 31.2	 113
Do not care	 11.3	 41
Member self-interest 	 3.0	 4
No decision-making power	 9.1	 33
No one will listen 	 2.2	 8
A few students dominate 	 3.0	 4
None in the faculty	 11.3	 41
Heavy responsibilities	 0.8	 3
As a woman I am not going to waste my time 	 1.1	 4
Total	 100	 306
Source: Field survey 1994
Next, the respondents were asked whether they attended discussions in the faculty Students'
Congress. The response to this question shows that only 4 percent of respondents attended
regularly, 42 percent attended from time to time, and finally 53 percent never attended the
Congresses. It might be useful to mention that there is a difference between membership and
attending the Congresses. In theory all students should be members of these Congresses but in
fact only 26.4 percent of the respondents regarded themselves as members. However,
sometimes students were forced to attend the meetings by the cancellation of all the classes
and the closing of the libraries in the faculty at the time of these meetings, but usually such
methods did not work because students just remained at home.
It is clear that most respondents had little motivation to participate in political activities at
university, given their absence from one of the main activities at university, that is, attending
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the students' congress meetings. This channel of participation is similar to the main channel of
participation within society, the Basic Popular Congresses. Such findings lead us to question
the role of students in the political participation process and the wider decision-making
process in Libyan society.
7.3.4	 Political participation and awareness among the respondents
The aim of this section is to explore the role of the students in the political participation
process in Libya, through the institutions and agents of the participation such as the Basic
Popular Congress meetings. This part will also explore the awareness of the respondents' role
in the political process within the system and their knowledge of politics. This section is based
on question numbers 27a, 27b, 34, 35a, 35b, 36, 37a, 37b, 38, and 39 (see Appendix A).
The respondents were asked first whether they remembered when they first became aware of
politics. 59 percent were aware of the first experience with politics; 11 percent did not
remember; and 30 percent did not know. Those who remembered their first experience were
then asked when they became aware of politics. 16 percent replied between the ages 6 and 12
years; 36 percent when they were between 12 and 15 years; 25 percent between 15 and 18
years; and 23 percent between 18 and 22 years.
When the respondents remembered their first involvement with politics, they mentioned
political events which formed their memories of politics. The events which the respondents
mentioned were attending the ideological preparation camps, the Libyan—Egyptian war of
1977, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Sabra and Shatiyla massacre in Beirut in
1982, the Libyan—American dispute over the Sirte Gulf in the early 1980s, the American
attack on Libya in 1986 and the Gulf War of 1990/91.
The most common way in which citizens (and therefore students) can participate in the
political system is through the Basic Popular Congresses which are the main institutions of
the peoples' authority system in Libya. Consequently, this will be the institutional focus of
this section. When the respondents were asked whether they attended meetings in their Basic
Popular Congress, only 6 percent of them said that they attended regularly; 43 percent of the
respondents attended the meetings from time to time; and half of them never attended the
meetings. It is clear that overall the students had limited interest in participating in the BPC,
which is perhaps a surprising finding. As they are educated the expectation is that they will be
more interested in politics and therefore more likely to participate than other strata of society.
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This is especially so in Libya as the regime paid special attention to them. The regime
expected the youth to be politically very active, and this expectation is clearly not fulfilled.
Figure 7.1, presents the result of an investigation as to whether participation in the general
political process is related to the extent to which students participated in political activities at
school. The figure shows that among those who participated in the activities at school, 9
percent regularly attended their Popular Congresses, 53 percent attended from time to time
and 38 percent of the respondents never participated.
Figure 7.1: Attendance at meetings of Basic Popular Congress by participation in
political activities at school
Yes	 No
School activities
Among those who did not participate in the activities at school, 3 percent attended the
meetings regularly, about 32 percent attended from time to time, and 65 percent of them never
attended meetings. It is clear from the figure that activity at school is associated with
attendance at the BPC, but even of those active at school only a small minority attend
regularly.
Table 7.9 looks at the link between participation in political activities at university and
attendance at meetings of the Basic Popular Congresses. Of those who participated in the
political activities at university, 11 percent regularly attended BPC meetings; about 64
percent attended the meetings from time to time; and about 25 percent never attended the
meetings.
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Among those who did not participate in the political activities at university, 6 percent attended
regularly the meetings of the BPC; about 41 percent attended the meetings from time to time;
and more than half never attended the meetings. It seems that the more students are active at
university, the more they participate in the Basic Popular Congresses , but again only a small
minority attends regularly.
Table 7.9: Attendance at meetings of Basic Popular Congresses by participation in
political activities at university
University	 Number of
activities
	 respondents
Regularly
N
From time to time
[°/0]
Never
N
Yes	 53
No	 440
11
6
64
41
25
53
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 7.10 shows the respondents attending the meetings in the Basic Popular Congress by
place of family residence. The table shows that there are some differences between urban
respondents and rural respondents.
Table 7.10: Attendance at meetings of Basic Popular Congress by place of family
residence
Family residence	 Number of respondents Regularly From time to time Never
IN IN N
Urban 428 6 40 54
Rural 72 10 61 28
Source: Field survey 1994
Rural respondents were more active politically and were more likely to attend BPC meetings
than urban respondents. Only 6 percent of urban respondents regularly attended meetings of
their BPCs, while 40 percent of them attended from time to time; and more than half (54
percent) never attended. In contrast, 10 percent of the rural respondents attended meetings
regularly, 61 percent attended meetings from time to time, and 28 percent never attended the
meetings. Nonetheless even for the rural respondents only a small minority attended regularly.
Now we turn to the proportions of male and female respondents who attended meetings of the
Basic Popular Congresses. As can be seen from Figure 7.2, there is a gap between male and
female participation which indicates less involvement in the BPC by women.
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Figure 7.2: Attendance at meetings of Basic Popular Congresses by gender
70_/
60 -/
1
0 Regularly
0 From time to time	 	
0 Never
/62 /_
49Y
L10-Z
%
30-7
20-/
10	
10
—// •
0 	
Male	 Female
Gender
The respondents' democratic or non-democratic experience within their families, especially
the responsibility for taking decisions, might have been significant for their involvement in the
political process through the BPC. The relationship between the respondents attending the
Basic Popular Congress meetings and the responsibility of making decisions within their
families can be seen in Figure 7.3. The figure indicates that among those whose fathers were
solely responsible for taking decisions within the family, only 7 percent regularly attended the
meetings of the Basic Congress, 41 percent of them did attend from time to time, and more
than half of them (52 percent) never attended the meetings of the BPC. Among those whose
mothers were responsible for making decisions within the family, none of them attended
regularly, 39 percent of them did attend from time to time and 61 percent of them never
attended any meeting. Among those for whom both of the parents were responsible for the
decision making within the family, only 2 percent attended regularly, 42 percent attended the
meeting from time to time and 55 percent never attended. Among those for whom all the
family were responsible in decision-making within the family, 8 percent regularly attended the
Basic Popular Congress meetings. 46 percent attended from time to time and 46 percent never
attended. It is clear that those who experienced a democratic atmosphere within their families
were more willing to attend the meetings of the Basic Popular Congress. This difference was
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170
A5z	
CI Regularly
El From time to time
ID Never
Ate(7.
60 -
70-r
50 -
A2/
statistically significant, mainly due to the low attendance by those from mother-headed
families.
Figure 7.3: Attendance at meetings of Basic Popular Congresses by responsibility for
making decisions within the family
Father	 Mother	 Both	 All the family
Responsibility for making decisions within the family
Another dimension of political participation is political efficacy. The concept political
efficacy might be defined as "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can
have, an impact upon the political process, it is the feeling that political and social change is
possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change".' 4 It is
important to elaborate this definition in relation to the Libyan experiment. Accordingly, this
study used two items to measure the sense of political efficacy among the Libyan students.
The first deals with the students' influence on any decision taken in the Popular Congress.
The second deals with the ability of the students to change any decision taken in the Basic
Popular Congress.
When the respondents were asked whether they could influence any decision taken in the
popular congress, 32 percent said 'yes', with 66 percent saying 'no'. It may be that some of
those who were confident that they could influence any decisions taken in the popular
congress were members of the Revolutionary Committees. Part of the duties of the latter is to
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teach the people how to practice their 'authority' through the Basic Popular Congress and to
guide the people to make the right decisions.
Among those who participated in activities at university, 53 percent felt able to influence
decision-taking in the Congress, while about 45 percent of them felt unable to do that.
Table 7.11: Influence any decisions taken in the Basic Popular Congress by students'
activities at the university
Activities at University Number of respondents Yes No
EN EN
Yes 53 53 45
No 440 30 69
Source: Field survey 1994
As shown in Table 7.11, among those who did not participate in the activities at university, 30
percent felt able to influence decision-taking in the Popular Congress and 69 percent felt not
able to influence any decision.
A similar pattern can be seen in Figure 7.4, which shows the view of the respondents about
decision-taking in the Basic Popular Congress by place of family residence. Among the urban
respondents only 30 percent felt they were able to influence any decision taken in the Basic
Popular Congress and 69 percent were not able.
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Among the rural respondents, 47 percent felt able to influence a decision taken in the Basic
Popular Congress, while 50 percent felt unable to do so. Rural respondents were more
confident in their role to influence any decision taken in the Popular Congress. Even so, the
majority of the rural respondents still did not believe they could influence decisions. There
were neither significant differences between male and female respondents in their answer, nor
by parental educational level or by family income.
When the influence of the source of identification was examined, the only significant
relationship was in regard to the identification as 'Arab', where there was a higher incidence
(40 percent) of those who felt they had some influence.
By far the most important finding here is the simple one that most students regardless of
individual characteristics and regardless of their actual attendance in the meetings, felt no
capacity to influence the congresses' decisions.
The second item for measuring political efficacy involved asking the respondents whether they
felt they could change any decision taken in the Basic Popular Congress. 23 percent replied
'yes' and about 74 percent answered 'no'. Moreover, there was no significant difference
between male and female respondents.
173
Urban	 Rural
go
70
60
50
% 40
30
20
10
El Yes
0 No
63 
33
/7'
Figure 7.5 indicates the respondents' belief in their ability to change any decision taken in the
Basic Popular Congress by the place of family residence. The result shows that there was a
statistical difference. 22 percent of urban respondents thought they were able to change a
decision, while 76 percent answered 'no'. Among the rural respondents, 33 percent answered
'yes'. It is clear that more rural respondents felt able to change any decision taken in the Basic
Popular Congress, but even for them a large majority did not feel able.
Figure 7.5: The ability to change decisions taken in the Basic Popular Congresses by
place of family residence
Place of family residence
Figure 7.6 shows the respondents' belief in their ability to change any decision taken in the
Basic Popular Congress by the responsibility of taking decisions within their families. Among
respondents whose fathers were responsible for making decisions within the family, 16
percent were confident to change any decision taken in the Popular Congress. Among those
whose mothers were responsible for decision-making within the family, 17 percent were able
to change any decision taken in the Popular Congress.
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Figure 7.6: The ability to change decisions taken by responsibility for making decisions
within the family
Father	 Mother	 Both	 All the
family
Responsible for making decisions within the family
It is clear that those who experienced participation in decision making within the family were
more confident about changing decisions taken in the Popular Congress.
Table 7.12: Attendance at meetings of Basic Popular Congresses by belief in capacity to
influence decision making
Regularity of attendance meeting Number of respondents Yes
[°/0]
Regularly 31 68
From Time to Time 215 47
Never 252 15
Source: Field survey 1994
175
Table 7.13: Attendance at meetings of Basic Popular Congresses by belief in capacity to
change decisions
Regularity of attendance meeting Number of respondents Yes
Regularly 31 45
From Time to Time 215 31
Never 252 15
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 7.12 and Table 7.13 show that there is a highly significant relationship between degree
of attendance at the Basic Popular Congresses and the belief in capacity to both influence and
change decisions in these congresses. Of the small minority who did attend regularly, the
majority believed they could influence decisions and a large minority believed they could
change decisions. A large majority of non-attenders believed that they could neither influence
nor change decisions. Irregular =enders (a large group) were intermediate, but even here a
small majority did believe that they could even influence decisions.
The next section deals with the degree to which the respondents are informed about the
political system. The respondents were asked whether they follow changes which occur in the
Libyan system. The response showed that 44 percent of them regularly followed the changes,
46 percent followed the changes from time to time, and 9 percent never followed the changes.
It is clear that a small majority of respondents were not very interested in following the
regular changes which occur in the system.
There was no relationship between interest in changes and political participation at school.
There was a slight tendency for those who participated politically at university to be more
interested (53 percent versus 43 percent for non participants), but even here nearly half did
not display regular interest.
Discussing political affairs with others reflects the political interests of the individuals. The
respondents were asked whether they discussed political affairs, local or international, in
general. The findings show a relatively high frequency of the respondents (67 percent)
discussing political affairs. 33 percent did not discuss political affairs, indicating they did not
have any interest in politics.
When the respondents were asked how often they discussed political affairs, it was found that
22 percent of them discussed politics everyday. 6 percent of them discussed politics once a
week. Finally, 71 percent of the respondents discussed politics from time to time.
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The respondents were asked with whom they discussed political affairs. The response shows
that 88 percent of the respondents discussed political affairs with their immediate family; 88
percent with friends; 82 percent with relatives; 79 percent with colleagues at university; 51
percent with members of the Popular Congress; 3 percent with departmental staff, members of
the Revolutionary Committee, etc. The willingness of more than half of the respondents to
discuss politics with members of the Popular Congress is interesting.
It is also interesting to note that the degree of trust of the respondents in talking and
discussing politics with other people is very high in the first circles of their relatives. In other
words, the proportion goes up with the closeness of people to the respondents.
The respondents were asked about the mass media which they used. The response to this
question shows that 16 percent of the respondents were primarily using the radio, 25 percent
television, 11 percent magazines and newspapers, and 66 percent indicated that they used all
the above mass media agents.
7.4 Conclusion and Summary
Since the revolution in 1969, Libya's political structure has undergone a number of changes.
In the early years of the revolutionary regime, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)
and especially al-Qadhafi played a crucial role in both legislative and executive functions of
the government. The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) was a brief experiment in the political
system's structure intended to mobilise the masses and create institutions for mass
participation. Then a new political experiment was set up by al-Qadhafi based on the idea of
direct democracy or the people's authority. To ensure the success of this concept, Basic
Popular Congresses and Popular Committees formed the core for the people's authority and
new instruments of mass participation were formed at local, regional and national levels.
The exploration of the political participation experiences among the Libyan university
students in terms of their attitudes and their role within the political system generated a
number of interesting findings. Almost half of the students participated in the political
activities at school, while only a small minority participated at university. The explanation for
such differences is that most activities at school were (in theory) compulsory. However,
despite the compulsory character of school activities (for example Ideological Preparation
Camps) many students had never participated in them. This suggests a major gap between
principle and practice.
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The findings relating to the students' attitudes show that some of the respondents experienced
a participatory process within their families' decision-making. However, the majority did not.
The rural respondents were more involved in politics than urban respondents. The female
respondents were clearly less interested in participating in politics than male students,
although the findings did not show big differences between the two categories. Furthermore,
most respondents do not believe in their role in the Popular Congresses. Even for those who
would be interested in participation, there was a high degree of disbelief in the mechanisms of
political participation of the regime.
Despite the formal requirement that all students go through the political socialisation process,
the Libyan regime seems to have had very limited success in creating participant individuals
who are aware of their role within the political system and are actively participating in it. One
explanation could be that the machinery of the state is not very efficient in preparing people
for a role in political participation. As is shown here, it is clear that even for the small
minority who participated many did not believe in the efficacy of the political participation
process. Indeed, a general disbelief in the effectiveness of the mechanisms was evident.
Political participation is a minority activity in all societies, but a disbelief in the effectiveness
of participation may indicate deep-seated structural problems.
I carried out fifteen extended qualitative interviews with respondents in order to develop and
clarify the quantitative findings. In general these interviews did not add much to the
quantitative findings, but I included an additional question by asking respondents for the
origins of their beliefs and values (see Appendix B). The overwhelming emphasis was on the
role of the family, with schools given an important subordinate role. It seems as if the family
system remains most important, with activities during school years also being formative.
However, post-school experience is not significant. This is clearly related to the very low level
of participation both at University level and in the BPCs.
The overwhelmingly most important finding here can be summarised in terms of the relative
ineffectiveness of the participatory mechanisms. Even when these were formally compulsory
many did not attend. When they were voluntary at university, few attended and there were few
regular attenders at the BPCs. There were some differences by background, of which the most
important were by gender and between rural and urban, but non-attendance at University,
non-regular attendance at the BPCs and disbelief in the efficacy of the institutions was only
relatively smaller among males and rural students. It seems from these findings that the actual
structures of the political participation system in Libya are not taken seriously by many
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respondents. Indeed participation seems to be an activity undertaken only by a small minority
much on the lines of participation in party activity in single party and multi-party regimes,
although the Libyan system is explicitly not party-based.
This low level of participation might not matter, although it is very much out of line with the
objectives of the regime. Clearly a significant number of respondents did believe that they
could influence or change BPC decisions, but the majority were not of this opinion. The small
number of regular attenders at the BPCs mostly believed that they could influence decisions;
irregular attenders were divided; and most non-attenders (just over half of the total) felt they
had no influence.
The above is a complex finding. It is of course reasonable that in a participatory system those
who don't bother to turn up don't have a say. It is also reasonable that the degree of influence
depends on the regularity of attendance. However, it is worth noting that almost a third of the
small minority of regular attenders did not feel that they could influence decisions.
The unanswered question is whether people do not attend because they cannot be bothered,
and, as a result, abdicate their responsibilities willingly to others, or, whether they do not
attend because they think it is pointless. The answers given when I asked why people didn't
participate in university and at school suggest that the reality is a mixture of both factors.
\
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8. Changing Attitudes to the Role of
Women in Society
8.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the attitudes to the role of women in society among
Libyan students, in three main sections. The first section deals with the changing values
towards women in Libyan society. This part seeks to describe traditional values and views
relating to women, on the one hand, and the ideology and policies of the Libyan regime
towards this stratum on the -other hand. Also, the section includes a content analysis study of
school curricula, looking at the image of women in these curricula—based on reading books
of the ninth school grade. The aim of this part is to reveal how school curricula reflect the
image of women. Finally, the section covers statistical information describing the place of
women in Libyan society. The information is based on United Nations publications and
official Libyan material.
The second section deals with the data analyses and the findings in response to the relevant
questions of the questionnaire put to the sample. Nine questions are covered: question
numbers 54, 55a, 55b, 56, 57a, 57b, 58, 59, 60, 61a, 61b, 62a and 62b in the questionnaire
(see Appendix A). The questions seek to explore the attitudes of respondents towards several
issues related to the role of women and their position within society. The final section is the
summary and conclusion.
Through these questions the researcher examines whether there is an acceptance that men and
women should have equality in human rights; whether fathers should have more authority than
mothers within the family; whether differences in the role of men and women in the family
stem from religion, or from customs and social values; whether women should be employed in
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positions which give them authority over men; whether women should participate in
governmental and political affairs; whether any differences which do exist in the desired
participation of women come from religion or from customs and social values; whether there
should be any differentiation between men and women in rights to education, work, freedom
of thought etc.; whether women should fight alongside men in the army; whether women in
Libya currently possess the same level of rights as men do; whether Libyan women should
have the same rights as Libyan men to many non-Libyan Muslim Arabs; and whether the
current costs of dowry and marriage should be eliminated. There will also be an examination
of the extent to which men and women in Libya hold different attitudes with regard to identity
(comparing tribal, Arab, Islamic, state, family and city identities), and to the other "face
sheet" variables.
8.2 Changing Values Towards Women in Libyan Society
During the past three decades, the position of women and their role in society has been one of
the dominant social issues in the revolutionary regime's ideology. This part of the study
covers: traditional values and views relating to women and their position in general; the
revolutionary regime's ideology and policies towards women's issues through different eras
since the revolution in 1969; and the image of women through a content analysis of school
curricula.
8.2.1 Traditional values and views relating to women
Cultural stereotypes and traditional views of women exist not just in Arab society or Libyan
society, but everywhere. Historically, it seems that women's positions in different societies
were the same, whether in oriental or Western societies. Dhaher and Al-Salem state that
The idea that women bring shame to the family, an idea reinforced in countless
aphorisms, has resulted in savage customs. In the jahihya @re-Islamic times), female
infants were buried alive, a custom that persisted also in China. Female children were
sold as a slaves in the Far East when the family was in need, and among African tribes
girls were the last to be fed, for they were transients in the family, waiting to be married
off. These habits were not limited to the oriental world. As late as the 19th century, an
Englishman might sell his wife and children, and this in an age which prided itself on
sensibility and righteousness. Whether women were viewed as weak, fragile creatures,
or shameless beings requiring strict control, the effect was the same: oppression
parading under the name of benevolence or necessity.'
In order to understand present attitudes to the role of women in Libyan society, it is important
to focus on the traditional views and attitudes which are still part of the culture. These
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traditional views represent a great challenge to the process of change within any society. Some
of the traditional views which still shape the attitudes of individuals in Arab society and
Libyan society are: "women are weak mentally and physically; women are soft, beautiful and
temperamental; women are sex symbols and a source of shame;" 2 the women's place is at
home, and house work is a woman's job; and it is shameful for women to remain unmarried.
8.2.1.1 Women are mentally and physically weak
In comparison to men, the image of women traditionally was that they were mentally and
physically weak. Through this idea women were seen as not being capable of taking part in
heavy responsibilities in the same way as men. The main responsibilities of women were
within a household, as wives and mothers. Moreover, it was very common as part of these
traditional values to use religion as a tool to legitimise the women's position. For instance, it
was not unusual to hear some people state the position of women according to one of the
Hadith, "Women are lacking in mind and religion".
8.2.1.2 Women are beautiful, soft, and temperamental
According to this view women should be inculcated from childhood with an interest in beauty:
to be beautiful and have beautiful clothes and jewellery. In his account of these views in
traditional societies Attir mentioned that
a woman aspires to possess beautiful clothes and jewellery. The quantity and quality of
both are related to her family status. Al the time of marriage, traditionally it is the
husband's responsibility to present his bride with jewellery and expensive clothes, the
exact amount of which is specified by the bride's parents or guardians. Women must
wear their jewellery and expensive clothes on numerous occasions, and on some of
these a woman from a well-to-do family may wear as much as two or three pounds of
gold.3
Traditionally, women were considered temperamental and sensitive. Consequently, women
were not deemed to be able to carry the responsibility of leadership or be involved in any
decision-making, and were therefore excluded from leadership positions. Even in the tribal
structure women never were leaders of tribes. The tribal structure was and still is dominated
by males.
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8.2.1.3 Women are sex symbols and a source of shame
Women traditionally were seen as a source of shame. The concept of honour was and still is
linked with women. The honour of the men of the family, easily damaged and nearly
irreparable when damaged, depended on the conduct of their women (wives, sisters and
daughters).4 Therefore, women were to be carefully protected. As children, girls played only
with other females and attended all-female schools. Culturally, women married much younger
than men. Females married in their early teens: the girl's parents were eager for her to many
at the earliest possible age in order to forestall any mishap to her virginity. 5 These protection
procedures traditionally affected the right to travel, as females could only travel with a male
member of the family. Attir states that to leave the country,
a female citizen had to apply for an exit visa and include a letter from her father or her
husband stating his approval of the trip. This letter was necessary even if the female
was travelling with her father or husband.6
8.2.1.4 A Woman's place is at home, and housework is a woman's job
Traditionally, the division between women's and men's roles was very clear and fixed. The
best place for women according to this view was at home, to practice their duties as wives and
mothers away from any significant role outside the home. Housework was a women's job, it
was a part of their duties. The place of men was outside the home and that of women was
inside. It was shameful for men to work at home and to do domestic work like cooking,
cleaning, and taking care of the children. As Lorfmg and J. Abu Nasr state:
The traditional role of women was confined to their being mothers and wives in a
patriarchal family system. Their sphere of action is limited to their home; they are
expected to be modest, obedient, and self-effacing. The persistence of these traditional
values and attitudes among people of both sexes keeps women within the walls of their
domestic world, a situation that is incompatible with the demands of economic
partidipation.7
Until recent years, the traditional views about the role of women at home were emphasised
through school curricula in Libya. Reading textbooks indicated the division of roles between
men and women. These books introduced the women's role mainly as that of mother through
her duty at home, which involved cooking, cleaning and taking care of children. Even as late
as 1986, the ninth-grade books still were repeating the traditional views, as can be seen from
this example:
this is my father, my father goes to work, this is my mother, my mother is working at
home... cAi'sha at home, `Ai'sha is an active mother, she works at home, `Ai'sha
cleaning the house, cooking the food and washing the clothes.'
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The school curricula were permeated with the traditional image of women as housewives, but
the men were displayed as having different responsibilities usually outside the home.
8.2.1.5 It is shameful for women to remain unmarried
Culturally, women were under greater pressure than men to get married. Within society it was
acceptable to be an unmarried man, while it was almost shameful for a woman to remain
unmarried.9 This was one of the main factors behind the increasing number of unmarried men
compared to unmarried women.
The common view within society was that the right place for women was in their homes with
their husbands and children. Marriage was seen as providing security and a guarantee for a
woman's future.
8.2.2 Ideology and policies of the Libyan regime towards women
The ideology and policies of the Libyan regime need to be examined within the context of
policies pursued by the monarchical regime before 1969. The latter are covered in 8.2.2.1
below, before proceeding to the post-1969 policies in 8.2.2.2.
8.2.2.1 Policies of the monarchical regime before 1969
The increasing numbers of schools during this period for bath sexes followed the introduction
of a law making education compulsory at elementary level for all children, either male or
female. This encouraged parents to send their children to schools, with females gaining much
from such policies, although their numbers in the education system lagged behind those of
males, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. This was partially due to the early marriage of
females.
In this period, the involvement of women in the labour force was quite limited, except for
farming. Although government regulations did not discriminate against women in salaried
employment, women were neither qualified nor skilled for such positions. As a result, as Attir
states,
Women were only eligible for those jobs requiring little or no training and that could be
performed in segregated quarters. Thus, women tended to occupy positions such as
housemaids or office janitors.'°
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During the 1950s and 1960s, women were affected by a number of regulations and laws
which had been introduced to organise family life. For instance, women were given the right
to choose their husbands from the age of sixteen and the right to seek divorce in the same way
as men. Women also received the right to participate in politics through their right to vote; the
right to buy and sell property, and the right to establish their own associations, which were
beginning to be formed in the main urban centres.11
Although all these rights were given to women in principle, in practice they existed only on
paper. Only a few women gained from these rights. Women were still not participating in
daily activities in the same way as men.
8.2.2.2 The ideology and policies of the revolutionary regime since 1969
During the 1970s, the revolutionary regime carried through a number of policies which aimed
at changing the character of Libyan society. The regime's policies sought to enable women to
play a crucial role in society, and to participate in building the country in the same way as
men. However, the ideology of the regime at the same time emphasised the physical and
biological differences between male and female. 12 There was a role for each to play, matching
their different natures. Through The Green Book the ideology also paid attention to the
family as a social unit; 13 the role of women as mothers was highly respected. The woman was
supposed to be fully responsible for raising her children. This notion was emphasised by al-
Qadhafi when he stated that
Nothing else would be appropriate for mankind's [sicl nature, and would suit his
dignity, except natural motherhood, (that is, the child is raised by his mother) in a
family where the true principles of motherhood, fatherhood and brotherhood prevail.14
In principle, the ideology of the regime did not reject women working, but limited them to
fields which "suited" them and their nature. In The Green Book al-Qadhafi argues that
The question is not whether the woman works or does not work. For it is a ridiculous
materialistic presentation. Work should be provided by the society to all able
members—men and women—who need work, but on condition that each individual
should work in the field that suits him, and not be forced to carry out unsuitable work."
One of the main successes of the revolutionary regime was with women's educational policy.
By law education is compulsory, and women must attend schools until the intermediate level.
As a consequence, the number of schools for women increased all over the country after 1969.
The increasing level of education among women during the 1970s affected many other aspects
of their traditional life. This was visible in the widespread 'unveiling' among women,
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especially in urban areas; and in the increasing number of females participating in shopping
and driving, and travelling without a male companion.
Women have been encouraged to participate actively in political life within the framework of
the political system of the regime (that is, People's Committees and the Basic People's
Congresses). They have also been encouraged to form their own Revolutionary Committees
which work within the framework of the Revolutionary Committees in general, with the
special aim of strengthening female political and administrative roles.16
From the beginning of the 1980s, a number of new ideas and policies were introduced by the
regime to encourage women to take a more prominent place within the society. First, all
Libyan males and females were to undertake and have continuous military training if
medically able. 17 Article 3 of Law No. 3 stated that military science was one of the main
topics which students should study at all levels above primary level. Both male and female
students above primary level were required to wear a standard military uniform and attend
daily military exercise, though in the past few years this was reduced to one day a week. At
university level, students had to attend training camps, but they were not required to wear
military uniforms when attending classes. Since 1990, university students have not received
any military training during their studies but they have to do military service after their
graduation for at least a year, except for those who were successful in their military training
under Law No. 3 regarding the People's Army.
Second, women were encouraged to attend the Women's Military Academy (WMA), which
was established in 1979. Graduates of this academy have been promoted to the rank of
lieutenant.18
Third, Law No. 176 of 1972 regarding women's rights in marriage and divorce was annulled
and replaced by Law No. 10 in 1984, issued by the General People's Congress after the Basic
People's Congresses agreed upon it. But because many women were absent from the BPC,
despite encouragement by the regime, the law showed the effect of having been shaped by
male members of the BPCs who were opposed to any major change in women's position.
Finally, some articles of the law were reformed by Law No. 22 of 1991. The purpose of these
changes in the law of marriage and divorce was to give women a better position and stronger
rights within marriage. According to Article 13 of Law No. 22, a man is no longer allowed to
take a second wife without the permission of his first wife or through the issue of a permit
from a court.19
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Fourth, women were encouraged from the beginning of the 1990s to participate in the judicial
system. Women had not previously been accepted as judges for cultural reasons. Law No. 8
of 1989 gave women the right to hold judicial jobs, under the same conditions as men. The
jobs included those of judges, public prosecutors, and case administrators." Thereafter the
first women were appointed to these positions.
Fifth, women were encouraged in this period to hold positions in the political system. A
number of women were elected to participate in the Secretariat of the General People's
Congress and the General People's Committee Secretariat. But still women and their
participation in politics and political affairs was limited compared to their roles in other
activities.
Finally, the regime introduced a number of organisations and concepts which were intended to
promote the role of the "new woman". The main ones were those of the Women's
Revolutionary Committees; the Female Guards; and the Revolutionary Nuns.
a) Women's Revolutionary Coimnittees (al-lijan al-thawiya al-nisa 'iya). Women were
encouraged to form these committees at schools, places of work, and in the
communities at large. The duties of women's Revolutionary Committees were the same
as those of the Revolutionary Committees in general (mentioned in Chapter 7): to
develop a core of believers in al-Qadhafi's Third World Theory (The Green Book). The
Women's Revolutionary Committees in the late 1980s were encouraged by al-Qadhafi
to organise the Festival of Women's Freedom. In order to prepare for this festival,
Women's Revolutionary Committees studied the position of women and their problems
in courts, at work, at home and in every place where women were humiliated or
subjugated. The twentieth anniversary of the revolution was the day of the Festival of
Women's Freedom (1 September 1989). The reason behind this festival was to
encourage women to fight and obtain full rights and to create better positions for
women within society.
b) The Female Guards: These form part of the Green Revolutionary Guards (al-haras
al-thawri al-akhdar), which include both males and females. Members of the
Revolutionary Guards tend to be members of the Revolutionary Committees. The
Female Guards come from all strata of society and have different professional
backgrounds and ages and come from all areas of Libya. All are volunteers and unpaid.
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They uphold the principles of the revolution and the Third Universal Theory and The
Green Book. Their aim is to protect the revolution and its leader, al-Qacraafi.21
c) The Revolutionary Nuns: The idea of revolutionary nuns (al-rahibat al-thawriyat)
was introduced by al-Qadhafi in February 1981 when he addressed a group of women's
Revolutionary Committees. He explained his objectives as follows: "this idea did exist
before Islam and Christianity, before the Roman Empire ...A certain number of people
have felt a strong need to stop their life to serve what is sacred for the nation, what is
necessary for their civilisation, their beliefs, their lives themselves. These people stop
everything to serve an ideal; God, Christ, the sacred fire, or any other target." 22 Al-
Qadhafi stated that Revolutionary Nuns must be totally devoted to the revolution, they
must be ready to sacrifice their lives, they must give up any personal private life and
marriage, to put an end to reaction, Zionism, the Crusades, divisions, and to push
forward socialism, progress and Arab unity. The movement should be capable of
stopping the regression of the Arab nation.23 Al-Qadhafi asked for only 5 percent of
females to be part of this movement. He justified the reason for being single as:
"marriage places responsibilities on other people, it leads to successive problems. What
value does (traditional) marriage have today? in the end you study for a diploma to,
give yourself to a nobody, who only sees in you a maid, a cook, and a breeding-
machine, and who disclaims you for a 'yes' or 'no' without regard for your university
diploma".24
These organisations and concepts have brought some Libyan women into the elite. But the
notions have not been popular among women at the grassroots nor among the vast majority of
Libyans in general. Especially the idea of Revolutionary Nuns has been regarded by the
people as an anti-Islamic idea and therefore neither acceptable nor natural.
In the mid-1980s, the activities of the Islamists in Libya became more visible. Although the
regime adopted different policies to control them, Islamists increased—especially among the
younger generation, including women. This has affected the attitudes of the new generation of
women who were brought up in the revolutionary ideology and inculcated with its values. The
use of the veil (al-hijab) is widespread nowadays, especially among female university
students. This has increased in the 1990s. Al-Qadhafi in many of his speeches has attacked
the veil and emphasised that women should protect themselves by education, and that they
should have a strong self-identity and confidence in their ability to perform many tasks that
were traditionally reserved for men.
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Even when the regime introduced its ideology and policies towards women, still women did
not accept full responsibility within society. Their role was still a limited one compared to the
regime's policies. The traditional culture factor still plays a crucial role in stopping women
from being active members of Libyan society.
8.2.3 The image of women through a content analysis of school curricula
In this part the researcher will examine the changes which have occurred through the
textbooks prescribed by the school curricula. The analysis of the values towards women in
these books will be taken as evidence of the views and attitudes which the regime tries to
inculcate in the new generation of Libyan citizens. The aim is to understand the nature of the
values which are conveyed.
The researcher assumes that the content of the school textbooks—reading books of marhalat
al-'asasi [the primary and preparatory schools]—reflects the image of Arab women
and their roles in political, economic and social fields which the regime has wanted to
inculcate in school children.
Readers of the first grade up to and including, the ninth grade will be examined and analysed.
Readers are used in all grades in the Libyan school system, from first grade until the final
year (before university), both in humanities and sciences. These books are part of the Arabic
language textbooks and they have different subjects including general knowledge, history,
literature, stories. These topics vary from year to year, and with the grade.
Content analysis, as described by El-Mogherbi, is a systematic way of collecting and sorting
information acquired from written or spoken communications. Systematic content analysis
attempts to analyse material so as to demonstrate objectively the nature and strength of the
stimuli applied to the reader or listener.25
The three main analysis units for any communication are words, themes, and space/time. This
study will adopt themes as the unit of analysis. Themes refer to any proposition contained in
the communication and can be found in clauses, sentences, paragraphs, or entire stories. It is
important to specify whether the mentioning of a theme is substantial (that is, found in a
paragraph or an entire story) or minor (that is, found in a phrase or sentence). The former will
be identified as a major theme, and the latter as a sub-theme. Major themes, then, occur when
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women constitute the central element in the topic treated, while sub-themes occur when the
central topic is on a different matter.
The study is based on a sample of one book from each year [first grade to ninth grade],
chosen from kutub al-qira'a al-madrasiya. The analysis here is based on the latest copies of
these books which witnessed a clear change in the form and the content, in which there is
more emphasis on the ideology of the regime. The teaching of these books started in the
academic year 1987-1988 in Libya.
Through content analysis a number of themes and categories of values with respect to women
have been identified. These themes are the following:
1) Women and education
2) Women at work and production
3) Women and armed training
4) Women and fighting (traditional)
5) Women and authority
6) Islam and women
7) Female virtues
8) Women as mothers and wives
9) Characteristics of Arab women
A statistical frequency analysis of these themes, by major and sub-themes, can be seen in
Table 8.1. This is further broken down into each grade in Table 8.2.
8.2.3.1 Women and education
This was one of the main themes in the reading books, describing education as an important
natural right for women, equal to that of men. Moreover, the books emphasised the
significance of education for women from childhood. One of the topics of the first grade
reading-book reflects this. "Widad goes to school, Widad sits on the chair. In Widad's hand is
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a pencil. Widad reads, writes and draws." 	 a ninth grade reading-book, under the title "To
my daughter", one reads:
To my daughter: today you go to school. I do not how much time you will spend on this
through the years of your life, but I know that you will gain from science and
knowledge as much as you can, because you carry in yourself an ambition, and a strong
desire to have more knowledge and to be armed with science.27
Table 8.1: General distribution of frequencies of themes about women by major themes
and sub-themes
Themes Major
themes
[°/0] Sub-themes [Vo] Total [Vol
Women and 4 10.5 8 17.4 12 14.3
Education
Women at 6 15.7 11 23.9 17 20.2
Work and
Production
Women and 5 13.2 5 10.9 10 11.9
Armed
Training
Women and
fighting
(traditional)
6 15.7 4 8.7 10 11.9
Women and 0 0.0 2 4.3 2 2.5
Authority
Islam and 5 13.2 4 8.7 9 10.7
Women
Female Virtues 1 2.6 0 0.0 1 1.1
Women as 9 23.6 12 26.1 21 25.0
Mothers and
Wives
Characteristics
of Arab Women
2 5.2 0 0.0 2 2.4
Total 38 100 46 100 84 100
Source: Amal Suleiman. M. Obeidi, "The Political Socialisation of Arab Women: Influence of
the School Curriculum", unpublished paper, Conference on Women in the Arab Society,
October 1988, Benghazi, Libya.
As shown in Table 8.1, the total frequencies of the category "women and education and its
significance" in all grades was 12 themes, 4 of which were major themes and 8 were sub-
themes. The total percentage of this theme was 14.3 percent, (10.5 percent major themes and
17.4 percent of sub-themes). As can be seen in Table 8.2, this theme was not systematically
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distributed between all the grades, but appeared only in the first, third, eighth and ninth
grades.
Table 8.2: Distribution of themes about women in reading books by grade level (Gr.)
Themes Gr. Gr. Gr. Gr. Gr. Gr. Gr. Gr. Gr. T
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Women and Education 4 0 6 0 0 0 0 1 1 12
•	Major themes 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
•	 Sub-themes 2 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 8
Women at Work 1 9 3 1 1 0 1 0 1 17
*Major themes 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
•	 Sub-themes 0 5 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 11
Women and Armed 0 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 10
Training (Traditional) 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 10
•Major themes 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 5
•	 Sub themes
Women and Fighting 0 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 10
•Major themes 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 6
•	 Sub themes 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 4
Women and authority 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
*Major themes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
•	 Sub themes 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Islam and Women 3 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 9
•	Major themes 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 5
•	 Sub themes 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Female Virtues 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
'Major themes 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
•	 Sub themes, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Women Mothers and 4 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 2 21
Wives 0 3 1 0 2 2 0 0 1 9
'Major themes 4 0 2 3 1 1 0 0 1 12
•	 Sub themes
Characteristics of Arab
women
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
2
•	Major themes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
•	 Sub themes
Gr.: Grade level (grades 1 up to 9)	 T: total
Source: Amal Suleiman M Obeidi, "The Political Socialisation of Arab Women: Influence of
the School Curriculum", unpublished paper, Conference on Women in the Arab Society,
October 1988, Benghazi, Libya.
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8.2.3.2 Women at work and production
This theme stresses the importance of women as part of the labour force. In the reading book
of the second grade, under the title "My Productive Family", one reads:
My father is working at the shoes factory, he makes the shoes. My mother is a teacher,
my mother is teaching at school. My mother is teaching reading and writing. My sister
is working at the clothes factory. My sister makes the clothes.28
As shown in Table 8.1, the total frequency of this idea was 20.2 percent, 15.7 percent of
major themes and 23.9 percent of sub-themes. The idea of women at work and production was
distributed among most of the grades, except the sixth and eighth grades, as shown in Table
8.2. The highest frequency of this idea was in the second grade: 4 major themes and 5 sub-
themes.
8.2.3.3 Women and armed training
In this category the reading books reflect one of the main policies which the regime seeks to
achieve: encouraging women to have the same role as men in the army and to be trained. This
theme is based on a common idea in the regime's ideology, namely that the defence of the
homeland is the responsibility of every citizen, male and female. In the reading book of the
second grade, for instance, one *reads:
The Jamahiriyan society, "the society of the masses", believes that Arab women have
the right to defend their homeland, also one of its aims is to establish the army of the
people, in which authority, wealth and arms are in their hands.29
In the same book, women's military training is related to the needs of the country:
The Jamahiriyan society believes that the defence of the country is the responsibility of
all the citizens, men and women. Therefore, the society has established a women's
military academy which provides military training for Arab women...3°
Throughout the reading books, the regime has clearly tried to emphasise the need for women
to be in the army, seeking to inculcate this idea in the younger generation.
As shown in Table 8.1, 11.9 percent was the total percentage related to this idea (13.2 percent
of major themes and 10.9 percent of sub themes). Moreover, this idea has been introduced in
all of the grades except the first.
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8.2.3.4 Women and fighting (traditional)
This idea has strong links with the previous idea, which was women at arms. Women and
fighting is an idea reflected through number of stories. The participation of Arab women in
jihad battles [Holy war] was the main form of this idea, both historically and in recent times.
The books tell stories of Arab women who participated in battle and were as fit to do this as
men. As an example, in the fifth and sixth grades one finds the stories of Umm Myisara and
Khaula bint al-Azwar, famous historical figures who served in the Muslim army in the early
stages of the Islamic state. The reading books also reflect the courage of Arab women in
recent times. The fourth grade reader presented the story of Sana 'a Muhaydli, a Lebanese
lady who attacked Israeli soldiers in the South of Lebanon during the Israeli invasion in 1982.
The incidence of this idea as shown in Table 8.1 was 11.9 percent (15.7 percent of major
themes and 8.7 percent of sub-themes). Looking at Table 8.2, this idea was presented in most
of the grade levels, except for the first and second grades.
8.2.3.5 Women and authority
This theme covers the role of women in authority and their right to take part in political
decision-making through the political structure based on the Basic Popular Congresses and
Popular Committees. Surprisingly, although the regime's ideology encourages women's
involvement in political decisions, the reading books include very few examples of this theme.
(2.5 percent). It is only found in the fourth grade and then merely as a sub-theme.
8.2.3.6 Islam and women
The theme reflects the attitude of Islam towards women, with a comparison between the
situation of women before and after Islam. The reading books present this as Islam having
given women the same rights as men. These rights include the practise of their religion, the
right to education, the right to work and the right to defend their countries. They also focus on
the role of Muslim women in recent times, through their participation in society. This theme
was found among most of the grades except the third, sixth and ninth grade. As shown in
Table 8.1, the total percentage of this theme in the reading books was 10.7 (13.2 percent of
major themes and 8.7 percent of sub-themes).
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8.2.3.7 Female virtues
The reading books pointed out that many of the most important elements in the universe are
signified by female terms in Arabic, such as those for the sun and the earth. Through these
examples it is suggested that school children should appreciate the role of females in general.
This was mentioned in the context of the role of mothers and their duties towards children. As
Table 8.2 indicates, this idea was mentioned only in the sixth grade as a major theme.
8.2.3.8 Women as mothers and wives
One of the major ideas in the reading books was the role of women as mothers and wives,
through painting a positive picture of bringing up children and caring for them. Many stories
showed that women as wives and mothers, were still able to participate in many duties within
society. They showed women who are working, and also socialising their children. Mothers
were portrayed as brave, not crying for their children lost in battles in defence of their
country. In the sixth-grade reader one can read about a mother addressing her daughter, "oh
daughter, the Arab mother has no son but has a homeland". In the same book on another topic
one can read: "As every Arab woman, you should believe in the slogan 'you do not have a
son, but you have a homeland."31
The books portray women as productive mothers and wives, according to the ideal
"Jamahiryan society family, the productive family". This term, according to the ideology of
the regime, indicates a family where members are working and receiving military training.
Some of the historical stories about women's role as wives were also presented. One of these
stories was the story of the first wife of prophet Mohammed, Khadija Bint Khowaild. As a
historical figure married to Mohammed, she helped and supported him, providing assistance
and encouragement at the time when he was trying to spread Islam.
As Table 8.1 indicates, this theme amounted to 25 percent (total), with 23.6 percent of major
themes and 26.1 percent of sub-themes. It had the highest theme frequency for the majority of
grades, the exception being the seventh and eighth grades. The total frequencies of this theme
was 21, 9 were major themes and 12 were sub-themes, as shown in Table 8.2.
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8.2.3.9 Characteristics of Arab women
This theme links up directly with the previous ones, dealing with the main characteristics of
Arab women. The readers portrayed women in a positive light, as being brave, hard working,
clever, sacrificing, etc.
As shown in Table 8.1, this theme covered about 2.4 percent of the total themes (5.2 percent
of major themes, with no sub-themes). The idea was emphasised in the reading books of the
sixth and seventh grades.
To conclude, the most common single idea among these themes was the traditional role of
women as mothers and wives. This idea reflects part of the state ideology, especially that
found in The Green Book, about the natural role of women as mothers. However, while this
theme only accounted for 25 percent of the theme frequencies, it must be pointed out that the
other official policies of the regime towards women, were given substantially less stress.
This lack of focus might be explained in that there were other important themes which the
Li/an tathwir al-manahij [Committees to Revolutionise the Curricula] emphasised more like
the political and economic achievements of the revolution. Another possible explanation is
that the regime prioritised "practical" programmes to involve women more in politics etc. (for
example Basic Popular Congresses and judicial system) rather than setting about to indirectly
change the population's views on women's roles.
Also, the regime and the Lijan tathwir al-manahij [Committees to Revolutionise the
Curricula] never investigated the success of inculcation of ideas into the younger generations.
They may in fact have been unaware that instead of their views on women, the traditional
views (women as housewives) have remained quantitatively dominant in the school books.
8.2.4 Statistical information on the role of women in Libyan society
Before proceeding to a discussion of the findings of the survey, it is useful to include some
contextual material describing the place of women in Libyan society. This information is
based on United Nations publications and official Libyan material, including the census of
1984.
The United Nations World Population Prospects in 1992 estimated that the Libyan population
in 1995 would be 5,475,000. Of this it was estimated that females would number 2,624,000
and males would number 2,852,000. 32
 The percentage of women aged between 15 and 49 in
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1995 was estimated 44.3 percent. Generally, the sex ratio for the whole country was 104
males to 100 females. In 1984, according to the official census held in the Municipality of
Benghazi, the sex ratio varies from one place to another, increasing in urban areas such as
Tripoli and Benghazi, to 106 males to 100 females. This surplus of males is characteristic of
societies with good health care and a young population.
The revolutionary regime since 1969 tried to encourage women to take a more active role in
society. In the early days of the revolution, al-Qadhafi announced in one of his speeches
(delivered at El-Fatih university in Tripoli) that "women are half of the society. They play a
very important role in the life of a society and in the process of revolutionary development."33
As a result, the opportunities for Libyan women have increased considerably over the last two
decades. In the field of education, for example, one of the revolution's most impressive
achievements is the rate at which access to education for females has advanced at all levels as
can be seen from Table 8.3 which presents the development of female education during the
period 1969/70 and 1987/88.
Table 8.3: Development of female education in Libya, 1969/70 and 1987/88
Levels of Education 1969/1970 1987/1988
Females Females
Elementary Schools 107047 39,2700
Preparatory Schools 5707 132,500
Secondary Schools 1071 54,000
Vocational Schools — 5,600
Religious Education — 200
Teacher training 1676 20,000
University and higher education 410 10,800
Total 115911 615800
Source: General People's Secretariat of Planning, Social and Economical Achievements during
19 years of al-Fatih Revolution, January 1989, p. 37.
• United Nations sources show that, in 1990, the number of females in education came to about
445,000 students at the first level (elementary), 232,000 at the second level (preparatory and
secondary), 196,000 students in the general and 11,000 at the third level (higher education).
However, the UN figures underestimate the rate of women's participation in the Libyan
education system. This is partly due to the Libyan side not providing the UN with up-to-date
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information and to the rapid increase in students numbers, especially the number of female
students.
Women have played a minimal role in the economically active population, more as a result of
cultural conditioning than of a natural aversion on their part. In the 1973 census, females
were not numerous in the work force and constituted just 7 percent of the economically active
population. However, increasing opportunities for women to be educated encouraged greater,
though still limited participation in the labour force. In 1994 females constituted 10 percent of
the total labour force in Libya.34
It is worth noting that the absence of reliable updated statistical information about Libyan
women in the labour force, either in the urban or the rural sectors, hinders a proper
understanding of the role of women in Libyan society, and of the changes over the last decade.
UN sources35 show that, between 1982 and 1991, the number of women in the Libyan labour
force increased from 64,000 to 109,000 (from 7.6 percent to 9.3 percent). The largest
absolute shift was in service occupations, where the numbers increased from 32,000 to 60,000
(7.0 percent to 8.9 percent). Whereas female employment has increased in agriculture, male
employment has declined. Women now form more than 24 percent of the agricultural labour
force. However, this is not a relevant sector for the university students. It is clear from
observation and press coverage that educated women have entered into a variety of
professional occupations from which they were previously excluded. The most notable
example is the judiciary, which is a radical development in an Islamic society.
Available UN and World Bank data 36 indicate that Libya continues to have a very high 'Total
Fertility Rate' (the number of children a woman will bear during her lifetime, given prevailing
age-specific fertility rates), amounting to 6.7 for the years 1990-95. Conventional wisdom
asserts that once women complete secondary education, this level drops dramatically. Again
observation of contemporaries suggests that this is true for educated women in Libya.
8.3 Exploration of Attitudes Towards Role of Women: Data
Analyses and Findings
The aim of this section is to explore attitudes of the samples' respondents towards the role of
women in society, based on the following questions:
a) Men and women have equal human rights. Do you agree?
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b) Do you think that, within a family, the father should have more authority than the
mother? If yes, are your reasons for this based on: religion, social values and customs
and traditions, etc.?
c) Do you consider it acceptable for a woman to hold a job which involves authority over
men?
d) Do you think it is important for women to participate in governmental and political
affairs? This was followed by a second part. If not, why not? Are your reasons for this
based on: religion, social values and customs and traditions, or family responsibilities?
e) There should be no discrimination between male and female in the right to education,
work, freedom of thought, etc. Do you agree?
f) Do you think women should fight along side men in the army?
g) Do women currently possess adequate rights in Libya?
h) Women should have the same right as men to marry other Arabs or non-Libyan
Muslims. Do you agree? If you disagree, why?
i) Do you think it is important for women and men to avoid exaggeration in the cost of
marriage? If not, why not?
The aim of these questions was to find out what the attitudes are among the new generation
(university students) towards the gender question. The methods of analysis included frequency
counts and cross tabulations for categorical variables. The first examination of the attitudes of
respondents towards gender or the role of women in society covered equality in human rights
between men and women.
8.3.1 Attitudes towards equality in human rights between men and women
The exploration of the attitudes towards the gender question among the respondents of this
study was based on two main questions. The first question involved asking the respondents
whether they accept that women have equal human rights to men. The second question is a
control question which deals with the same idea as that in the first question, but in a more
specific context. The respondents were asked whether there should be discrimination between
males and females in the right to education, work, freedom of thought, etc.
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The response to the first question shows that the majority of respondents either strongly agree
or agree with equality in human rights between males and females. Only a minority disagree
or strongly disagree. Figure 8.1 indicates that 36 percent of respondents strongly agree with
equality in human rights and 43 percent agree, while 10 percent disagree and 10 percent
strongly disagree.
Figure 8.1: Attitudes towards equality in human rights between men and women: total
sample
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When respondents were asked whether there should be no discrimination between male and
female in the right to education, work and freedom of thought, etc., the vast majority of
respondents agreed there should be no discrimination. As Table 8.4 indicates, those who
strongly agree cover 50 percent of respondents, 35 percent agree that there should be no
discrimination, while only 7 percent disagree and 8 percent strongly disagree.
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Table 8.4: Attitudes toward discrimination between male and female: total sample
Categories Number of respondents N
Strongly agree 250 50
Agree 174 35
Disagree 36 7
Strongly Disagree 39 8
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 8.5 shows the attitudes of respondents towards equality in human rights between male
and female by gender. There is a difference between men and women in their attitudes towards
this question. The result is statistically significant, with women as more positive (87 percent)
on the human rights question than men (74 percent), but men were generally positive on the
issue.
Table 8.5: Attitudes of respondents towards the equality of human rights between male
and female
Categories	 Male	 Female
[°/0] 
Percent positive	 74	 87
Number of Respondents
	 260	 238
Source: Field survey 1994
Figure 8.2 indicates the attitudes of respondents towards discrimination between men and
women in education, work, etc. There is a tendency to positive attitudes among the males
towards this issue, although women have stronger positive attitudes than men.
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Figure 8.2: Attitudes of respondents towards the proposition that there should be no
discrimination between male and female
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Figure 8.3 indicates attitudes- towards gender equality in human rights by place of family
residence (urban/rural), divided between male and female. It seems that there are no great
differences between urban and rural males in their attitudes on this question. The same applies
to urban and rural females, although the number of rural female respondents is low therefore
weakening the basis for generalisation.
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Figure 8.3: Men and women have equal human rights, by place of family residence, male
and female
Urban
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Place of family residence and gender
The educational background of the respondents' fathers did not make any significant
difference in respondents' attitudes towards gender equality in human rights. Neither was
there any significant difference among male students according to the level of education of
their mothers. However, for female students mother's the educational level was associated
with some difference in their attitudes towards this question. Moreover, this did not correlate
simply with level of education (that is, the higher education the mother has, the more in favour
of women's rights), but rather a complex pattern emerged instead. See Table 8.6.
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Table 8.6: Equality in human rights by mother's education (female respondents only)
Mother's
education
Number of
respondents
Strongly agree
N
Agree
N
Disagree
N
Strongly
disagree
N
Illiterate 100 42 46 7 5
Read Only 13 46 46 0 8
Read & Write 17 59 29 0 12
Primary 29 38 52 7 3
Preparatory 33 27 49 15 9
Secondary 18 39 33 17 11
Intermediate 15 47 53 0 0
University and
over
13 77 15 0 8
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 8.6 shows that among those respondents whose mothers' educational level is a
university one, 77 percent strongly agree about equality in human rights although the number
of respondents is only 13. Among those whose mothers are not or are hardly educated, for
instance those whose mothers are illiterate, there is strong agreement about the equality on
human rights between male and female. One can explain this situation by the fact that these
respondents represent the first generation to gain university education and differ from their
mothers who did not have any opportunity for education for various reasons such as early
marriage.
Examining the attitude to equality in human rights between men and women by fathers'
occupations of both sexes of the respondents does not show any statistical significance. Also
there was no significant difference by family income.
Table 8.7 and Table 8.8 show the attitudes of respondents towards equality in human rights
between the two sexes by sources of identification. There were some differences among male
respondents which are interesting. Those males with Arab, city, state and family identification
were clearly more favourable to female equality than those with tribal or Islamic
identification.
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Table 8.7: Equality in human rights by sources of identification (male only)
Sources of Number of Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly
identification respondents N N N disagree
[Vo]
Family 50 32 48 12 8
Tribe 21 24 43 10 24
City 24 46 38 4 13
State 17 29 53 12 6
Islam 97 24 41 17 18
Arab 49 37 37 14 10
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 8.8 indicates the attitudes of female respondents towards equality in human rights by
sources of identification. The interesting thing about this table is that it does show a slight
difference from male attitudes.
Table 8.8: Equality in human rights by sources of identification (females only)
Sources of Number of Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly
identification respondents . disagreeN N [ Vol
[Vo]
Family 33 33 49 12 6
Tribe 8 62 38 0 0
City 25 44 44 8 4
State 18 17 61 17 5
Islam 85 46 47 2 5
Arab 67 46 36 8 10
Source: Field survey 1994
Those female respondents who identify themselves by Islam have much stronger positive
attitudes towards gender equality in human rights than do men with the same identification
(Islam). The explanation for such a difference might relate to the understanding of female
Islamists about the principles of Islam as a religion, which is seen as based on giving rights
for women as well as men, while male respondents were dominated by cultural myths about
women and their role within the society. Likewise, women for whom tribe was the first source
of identification were strongly in favour of women's rights, whereas men with this first source
of identification were less favourable. Not much can be made of this, given the small number
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of women with a 'tribal' identification, but the finding reflects the paramount status of gender
for women overall. The researcher wonders what rank women would have given to gender as
a source of identity if this had been asked of them.
In general, the female respondents seem very much oriented towards equality between the two
sexes. However, male respondents do not seem to have strong traditional attitudes towards
this question, with the vast majority having no problem accepting the principle of equality in
human rights. The most interesting difference was that noted between the Islamist
respondents, with female Islamists having stronger positive attitudes towards this question
than male Islamists.
8.3.2 Attitudes towards the role of men and women within the family
The purpose of this part is to deal with the attitudes of respondents towards the role of men
and women within the family. The main question in this part involved asking the respondents
whether the father should have more authority than the mother within the family. This
question was followed by a second, asking about the reasons behind their views.
As can be seen from Table 8.9, more than half of respondents (63 percent) answered 'yes',
with 36 percent saying 'no'.
Table 8.9: Attitude of respondents towards father's authority
Categories	 Number of respondents 	 Percentage
[%)
Yes	 316	 63
No	 181	 36
Source: Field survey 1994
The respondents who replied 'yes' gave various reasons for favouring the authority of the
father rather than the mother within the family. For 55 percent it was religion, 46 percent said
traditions, custom and social values, 9 percent said that the father was better equipped to deal
with family matters, 3 percent said that there should only be one head of the family which was
the father, 2 percent said that men have more capability than women, and 1 percent justified
the fathers' authority as being due to the mind of man and his knowledge. Note that as
respondents could give more than one reason these percentages sum to more than 100.
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Figure 8.4 shows the attitudes of respondents towards the father's authority by gender. About
three-quarters of male respondents (74 percent) favoured the authority of father rather than
the mother. However, the female respondents were almost equally divided on this question, 51
percent answering 'yes' and 48 percent no. The differences were statistically significant.
Figure 8.4: Attitudes of respondents towards the father's authority by gender
The respondents' reasons for their positive answer towards the father's authority within the
family can be seen in table Table 8.10.
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Table 8.10: The reasons for favouring the father's authority
Categories of reasons	 Male	 Female
[%] 
Religion	 62	 44
Traditions and customs 	 45	 48
Father better equipped to deal	 7	 12
with family
There should only one head of 	 2	 4
the family
The mind of man and his 	 2	 0
knowledge
Women are lacking in religion	 0	 0
and mind
Biological and psychological 	 0	 0
reasons
Men have capability	 0	 6
Source: Field survey-1994-(zeros indicate that the rounded percentage came to this
Table 8.10 shows the respondents' reasons for their positive answers towards the father's
authority within the family. As shown in the table the main two reasons given were religion
and traditions and customs.
Figure 8.5 indicates the attitudes of the respondents towards father's authority by place of
family residence (urban—male/female and rural—male/female). There were some differences
between urban and rural respondents. The urban respondents either male or female, seem less
supportive of the father's authority than rural respondents.
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Figure 8.5: Attitudes towards father's authority within the family by place of family
residence
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It is clear from the figure that female respondents, either urban or rural, gave less support to
the father's authority within the family in comparison to male respondents. Educational
background of the parents (mothers and fathers), father's occupation and family income did
not show any differences among the respondents for this question.
Table 8.11 shows the attitudes of respondents towards the father's authority question by
sources of identification (family, tribe, city, state, Islam and Arab). There were some
significant differences between male and female respondents in their attitudes towards this
question.
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Table 8.11: Attitudes towards father's authority within family by sources of
identification
Sources of	 Number of male Yes male Number of female Yes female
identification	 respondents respondents[%] [N
Family	 50 80 33 52
Tribe	 21 90 8 38
City	 24 67 25 36
State	 17 82 18 67
Muslim	 97 76 85 53
Arab	 49 61 67 55
Source: Field survey 1994
Among male respondents with all identities except Arab, and to a lesser extent city, were
strongly supportive of the father's authority within the family. Among female respondents,
those who identified themselves by state, family, Islam and Arabism were more supportive of
the father's authority within the family.
8.3.3 Attitudes towards women holding jobs which involve authority over men
The main aim of this part is to explore the attitudes of respondents towards women at work,
where women hold jobs which involve authority over men. Respondents were asked whether
women should be employed in positions which give them authority over men.
The overall analysis of the respondents' attitudes shows that 45 percent of them accepted and
55 percent rejected the idea that women could hold a job involving authority over men. Figure
8.6 shows the attitudes of male and female respondents. Only 29 percent of male respondents
answered 'yes', while 63 percent of female respondents said 'yes' to this idea. The result
shows that female respondents have a much more positive attitude towards this question than
male respondents.
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Figure 8.6: Attitudes towards women holding job involving authority over men
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Table 8.12 shows the attitudes of respondents (male and female) towards women holding jobs
involving authority, by place of family residence (urban/rural). There are some differences
between male and female on the one hand and between urban and rural on the other hand. 31
percent of urban males said 'yes', while 23 percent of rural males answered 'yes'. Among
urban females 64 percent said 'yes' and 47 percent of rural females said 'yes'.
Table 8.12: Attitudes towards women holding job involving authority by place of family
residence
Categories Number of male
respondents
Yes male
[%]
Number of female
respondents
Yes female
Urban 209 31 219 64
Rural 53 23 19 47
Source: Field survey 1994
There is a significant difference among female respondents by place of family residence. It
seems that urban females are willing to accept the idea of women holding jobs involving
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authority over men more than rural females, although even for rural females 47 percent were
in favour, that is, much more than the men.
The variables father's and mother's educational level, father's occupation and family income
did not make any statistical significant differences in the respondents' attitudes towards this
question. However, the variable by source of identification (family, tribe, city, state, Muslim
and Arab) did. The strongest positive attitude among male respondents towards this question
was among those who identified themselves with Islam or Arabism. As can be seen in Table
8.13, 31 percent of Islamists and 35 percent of Arabists supported the idea of women holding
authority over men. Tribal identifiers were lowest.
Table 8.13: Attitudes towards women holding job involving authority by source of
identification
Source of
identification
Number of male
respondents
Yes
[°/01
Number of female
respondents
Yes
rol
Family 50 28 33 76
Tribe 21 19 8 50
City 24 21 25 76
State 17 25 18 56
Muslim .	 97 31 85 66
Arab 49 35 67 51
Source: Field survey 1994
The female respondents had a stronger positive attitude than the males, as can be seen among
the Islamists at 66 percent and Arabism identities identifiers 51 percent. The percentage of
positive attitudes towards this question among those who were family-oriented and state
oriented were high, at 76 percent each. Even the women with a tribal identification (a small
number) were 50 percent in favour.
8.3.4 Attitudes towards women participating in governmental and political affairs
The aim of this part is to explore the attitudes of the respondents towards the political
participation of women in government and political affairs. The main question was asked to
the respondents whether women should participate in governmental and political affairs. The
general response reflected a positive attitude, with more than half answering 'yes' (54
percent).
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Figure 8.7 shows the most important reasons why those respondents who gave negative
answers did so. These reasons include religion, family responsibility, traditions and social
values, and the views that women have no capability for dealing with politics, that politics is
not women's business - and that women have other duties such as bringing up the children. 49
percent gave religion as a reason for their negative attitude, 43 percent mentioned family
responsibility, 28 percent highlighted social values and traditions, and only 1 percent indicated
that women had no capability to deal with the relevant problems. Not more than 1 percent
believed that politics is not women's business, and 1 percent mentioned that women had other
duties such as bringing up the children. It is worth mentioning that as more than one answer
was possible, the figures do not add to 100 percent.
Figure 8.7: Reasons for a negative attitude among the respondents towards participating
in politics and governmental affairs
Reasons for negative attitudes
Figure 8.8 shows the difference between male and female respondents towards women's
participation in governmental and political affairs.
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Figure 8.8: Attitudes of respondents towards women participating in governmental
affairs
Male	 Female
Sources of identity
A general pattern was that female respondents have stronger positive attitudes towards this
issue than male respondents.
The respondents, male and female, who rejected the idea that women should participate in
governmental and political affairs gave a number of reasons for their negative attitudes. These
different reasons can be seen in Table 8.14. Effectively, male students gave more emphasis to
the religious factor (57 percent) and female students to family responsibilities (55 percent).
However, it is surprising that 12 percent of the female respondent 'negatives' said 'women
lack the capability', while only 4 percent male respondents said so.
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Table 8.14: Reasons for rejecting women's participation in governmental and political
affairs
Categories Male Female
rol Ml
Religion 57 29
Social values and traditions 28 28
Family responsibilities 38 55
Women lack of capability 4 12
Politics is not women's business 1 3
Women have many other duties 1 1
Country does not need women as politicians 1 1
Source: Field survey 1994
Table 8.15 shows the attitudes of respondents to the same question by place of family
residence (urban and rural). The results indicated that urban female respondents and rural
male respondents were more favourable to women participating in governmental and political
affairs. 36 percent of urban male respondents said 'yes' to the idea, while 45 percent of rural
male respondents said 'yes'.
Almost three quarters of urban females (74 percent) said 'yes' to the idea that women should
participate in governmental and political affairs. Among rural female respondents, 47 percent
of them supported the idea although the number of female rural among the respondents is very
small in general.
Table 8.15: Attitudes of respondents towards women participating in governmental and
political affairs by place of family residence
Categories Number of male
respondents
Yes Number of female
respondents
Yes female
IN [°/0]
Urban 208 36 215 74
Rural 53 45 19 47
Source: Field survey 1994
Examining the attitudes of respondents towards the idea that women should participate in
government and political affairs by the respondents' parents' education did not show big
differences. However, one interesting point was that female respondents whose mothers were
illiterate had very strong positive attitudes towards participation compared to the other
categories of mothers' education. Yet again we can see the effect of being "first generation"
educated women.
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A similar analysis of cross-tabulation by father's occupation did not reflect any significant
differences.
Another cross-tabulation related the attitudes of the respondents towards the idea that women
should participate in governmental and political affairs by family income. For male
respondents the family income did not make any difference. However, among female
respondents there were some differences. The strong positive attitudes among females were
concentrated among those whose family income was between 200-300 Libyan dinars (73
percent) and 301-500 Libyan dinars (63 percent).
This issue was also examined by source of identification of the respondents (family, tribe,
city, state, Muslim and Arab). The results show that the main differences between the two
sexes towards this question was among the Islamists. Females who were Islam-oriented had a
much stronger positive attitude (73 percent) towards women participating in governmental
and political affairs than male Islamists (37 percent).
8.3.5 Attitudes towards women in the army
The establishment of the Women's Military Academy (WMA), on 2 February 1979, has
increased the number of Libyan women involved in the army over the last decade. The idea
that women should be involved in the army was based on the ideological vision of al-Qadhafi
when he introduced the notion of 'people in arms', which is distinctive from that of a
professional army.
In May 1978 a new law announced compulsory military training. This was justified by al-
Qadhafi, who stated that as soon as the state of the 'people in arms' is achieved, the law
establishing compulsory military service would be abolished." Since then a militarisation of
Libyan society has been implemented, affecting all sections of the population. Under the law,
the following measures were taken:38
a) In the second cycle of school studies (15 to 18 years), the pupils — girls and boys —
received training twice a week, relating in particular to fist fighting.
b) The pupils of the military secondary schools learned, under the aegis of professional
officers, how to use heavy weapons. Moreover, each school had a speciality connected
to a particular area (land defence, air defence etc.). Its pupils were prepared to serve as
assistants to specialists in these weapons.
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c) All the men, depending on their ages, were compelled to have repetitive periods of
training:
• between 18 and 45, they had to take part in general training each year, for quite a
long period (some weeks);
• from 45 to 55, they were trained for the specific tasks of popular resistance;
• some of those over 55 were to take part in kata'ib al-mujahidin [warrior corps],
operating, for example, as coast guards (some of whom remained permanently
armed).
d) As for women, married or single, volunteers for military training were called to
exercises several times a week in a school in their area.
In theory, the capacity of the Women's Military Academy is 1,000 students, but this number
has never been reached to date. Recent figures about the numbers of the students in the WMA
are not available, but Maria Graeff-Wassink mentions that between 1980 and 1988 the
numbers varied for students between 170 and 410 per session, and for officers between 80
and 210 per year." It can be estimated that since the foundation of the WMA fifteen years
ago it has trained roughly 3,060 officers, and approximately eight times as many soldiers.
The idea of women at arms reflects the Libyan regime's policies towards women and their
role in society, and the changing attitudes of Libyan society towards women. This section
seeks to explore the attitudes of respondents towards the role of women in the army alongside
men.
a
When respondents were asked whether women should fight alongside men, 56 percent said
'yes'. Examining the attitudes by gender, the result shows that there were some differences.
Among male respondents 43 percent supported the idea, whilst among female respondents 70
percent did.
Figure 8.9 shows the attitudes of respondents towards women fighting alongside men by place
of family residence (urban and rural) for males and females. Rural respondents, whether male
or female, were more willing than urban dwellers of both sexes to accept the idea.
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Table 8.16: Attitudes of respondents towards women fighting alongside men by source of
identifications
Source of	 Number of male
identification	 respondents
Yes Number of female
respondents
Yes
EN [%]
Family	 50 28 33 79
Tribe	 21 52 8 63
City	 23 57 25 76
State
	 17 41 18 78
Muslim	 97 38 85 67
Arab	 49 55 67 66
Source: Field survey 1994
8.3.6 Attitudes as to whether women currently possess adequate rights
The purpose of this section is to explain how respondents describe the current position of
women in Libyan society. Respondents were asked whether women currently possess
adequate rights. The general pattern among respondents shows that about 69 percent of them
agreed.
Table 8.17 shows the attitudes of respondents towards the current position of women by place
of family residence. There were some differences between rural males and females, although
in general gender made no difference to views here.
Table 8.17: Do women currently possess adequate rights by place of family residence
Categories	 Number of male
	 Yes male	 Number of female	 Yes female
respondents	 respondentsN	 N 
Urban	 209 70 219 67
Rural	 53 65 19 84
Source: Field survey 1994
Examining the same question by parental education (father's and mother's educational level)
showed that there was no impact of this variable on the respondents' attitudes. However, the
family income was significant: The higher the family income the more respondents thought
that women did currently possess adequate rights.
There were no differences between respondents (male and female) in their attitudes towards
this question by source of identification.
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It is interesting to explore the overall pattern of answers to the foregoing set of questions as a
whole by source of identification for both male and female respondents. This has been done
by creating a new variable, covering the five variables dealing with women's equality in
human rights. Where the answers strongly agree and agree were available these have been
designated as positive and given the value 1; assigning the value 1 to 'yes' answers to the
questions dealing with women's general participation in political activity and in the armed
forces, and having jobs involving authority over men; and assigning the value 1 to 'no'
answers to the question dealing with father's authority in the family. The new variable is the
sum of these scores and ranges in value from 0 to 5, with a score of 5 indicating strong
feminist views.
When this variable was related to main source of identity there was an interesting pattern of
scores as shown in Table 8.18, which shows the mean score by identity and gender.
Table 8.18: Strength of feminist attitudes by identity and gender
Source of Identity 	 Number of
Males
Mean Score Number of
Females
Mean Score
Family	 50 1.5 32 3.1
Tribe	 20 1.4 8 2.9
City	 24 . 2.0 25 3.5
State	 16 1.4 17 2.6
Muslim	 97 1.5 85 3.0
Arab	 49 2.1 67 2.7
Source: Field survey 1994
The main difference is plainly by gender, but there are interesting gender differences by
identity which confirm the analyses for the individual variables. Women whose main identity
source is Islam have a high score on this gender equality variable, whilst men with Islam
identification have a generally low score. There is of course some inconsistency in answers to
the individual questions, but summing scores tends to overcome this problem and is the best
way to summarise overall attitudes.
8.3.7 Exploring attitudes of respondents towards social issues
This section deals with some other social issues related to the right of choice in personal
decisions. One of these was the right of women to marry other Arabs or Muslims who were
non-Libyan. The other issue was the exaggeration of dowry and costs of marriage.
222
/13 	
Strongly agree
0 Agree
El Disagree
0 Strongly disagree
50
45
40
35
30
% 25
20
15
10
5
	/2.J.
The respondents were first asked whether women should have the same right as men to marry
other non-Libyan Arabs or Muslims.
Figure 8.10 shows the attitudes of respondents towards this question, with 70 percent of men
either strongly agreeing or agreeing, compared with 60 percent of women. Therefore women
were less willing.
Figure 8.10: Attitudes towards the right of women to marry other Arabs
Male	 Female
Gender
The previous question was followed by another which involved asking the respondents who
disagreed what the main reasons were for their negative attitudes. The responses to this
question showed that among male and female respondents, traditions and customs was the
main reason given. Among male respondents 39 percent said traditions and customs; 7 percent
said that 'it goes against the social system'; and 5 percent mentioned that 'they are not
Libyan'. Among female respondents 46 percent said traditions and customs; and 17 said that
these Arabs or Muslims are not Libyan. This reason is quite popular among female
respondents in particular. There were some other reasons which female respondents
mentioned, as can be seen in Table 8.19.
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Table 8.19: The reasons of the disagreement about the right of women to marry Arabs
and Muslims non Libyan
Categories Male Female
[°/0] [°/0]
Traditions and customs 39 46
Society will not accept 1 4
Discrimination against other countries 5 6
Caring about tribal unity 4 7
The gap between Libyan and other societies 4 4
No successful experience with such marriages 4 1
Social and economic problems 1 4
They are not Libyan 5 17
To protect the woman's rights 0 1
Changing undeveloped customs 0 1
It goes against the social system 7 5
Source: Field survey 1994
The other question deals with one of the major social customs in Arab and Libyan society.
This custom is mahr [dowry], and the concern is with its prohibitive size. This is also coupled
with the exaggeration in the costs of marriage. The mahr sometimes goes up to 3,000 and
4,000 Libyan dinars41 , excluding gifts (al-biyan) that the husband-to-be must offer his bride
during the marriage week, such as clothes, jewels, perfumes, and so forth.42 However,
nowadays many families do not ask for the mahr, but accept 25 Libyan Dirhams. While many
accept this arrangement in theory, in practice the actual costs to the bridegroom's family may
be much higher. This has led to an exaggeration of the marriage costs. It is now quite common
for the bridegroom to provide his bride with an independent house from that of his family, as
well as the furniture.
There are some advantages and disadvantages of the mahr and all the financial clauses of the
marriage contract. The advantage is that the dowry is the woman's alone, and she can obtain
all her needs of her wedding without burdening her family with the expenses. Moreover, the
gifts, particularly gold and jewels, are an insurance for whenever she may need money in the
future:* Similarly with the house and the furniture, as by law the house belongs to the wife
and her children after divorce. Nowadays however, with the increasing numbers of educated
women holding jobs, many are taking part in the preparation of their houses by providing
some of the furniture. The brides' families now also spend a fortune on providing their
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daughters with the gifts which the brides' family must provide, usually jewellery, gold, clothes
and some furniture.
However, there are a number of disadvantages with the mahr. First, all these expenses may
close the door for young men who want to marry, but can not afford to. This, gives the
opportunity to older men who can better afford the marriage contract. As a result this could
lead to a big age gap between the spouses and it also enables older men to marry more than
one wife (i.e polygamy). Second, the husband may have borrowed money in order to cover all
expenses; as a result the couple starts their life with a huge debt. Third, some young men who
do not wish to remain bachelors but are unable to afford marrying a Libyan, frequently resort
to marrying non-Libyans, while Libyan women rarely have a reciprocal option.44
This section is based on a question which involved asking the respondents whether Libya
should lower the costs of marriage. The response to this question among respondents male and
female can be seen in Figure 8.11.
Figure 8.11: Attitudes of respondents towards abandoning exaggeration and lowering
the costs of marriage
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As the figure shows, male respondents had more positive answers for this question than
females. This difference reflects the fact that men usually suffer from the custom more than
females do. 94 percent of male respondents favoured Libya should ban the exaggeration of
costs of marriage. Among female respondents, 88 percent said 'yes', which is a less positive
answer than male respondents, but still very supportive of the idea.
Those respondents who did not support the lowering of the costs were asked for their reasons.
44 percent of male respondents, compared with only 15 percent of female respondents, cited
traditions and customs. Only 13 percent of males, but 31 percent of female respondents used
the explanation 'to protect the women's rights'. The other main reasons given were that low
costs of marriage would give men the opportunity to leave their children and get married to a
second wife, leading to polygamy, and that men do not like a women with a low dowry. One
reason mentioned by only female respondents was that women cannot trust men, therefore,
they prefer a high dowry as a way to feel secure. The final reason was linked with the fact that
life was getting more difficult, therefore asking for a high dowry would help women to secure
their future.
8.4 Conclusion and Summary
The main aim of this chapter was to explore the attitudes of respondents, the university
students, towards the role of women in Libyan society. This chapter began with a general
review of the traditional views about women in Libyan society which regarded women as a
source of shame, and considered the nature of women in general, that they are beautiful and
fragile.
The chapter continued with a review of the present Libyan regime's ideological position
regarding women, and of its policies towards women. The results of a content analysis of
schools curricula "reading books" up to the ninth grade showed that the dominant idea among
these themes was the traditional role of women as mothers and wives (25 percent of the
themes). Hence, the curricula themes did not adequately reflect the practical and widely
publicised official policies of the regime towards women.
A review of statistical information about the place of women in Libyan society showed
increasing numbers of women in the education system at all levels. However, despite the
increasing number of females in the education system, women still play a minimal role in the
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economically active population. According to the United Nations source, in 1994 females
constituted only 10 percent of the total labour force in Libya.
The respondents' attitudes towards women were explored through questions which dealt with
the role of women and their rights in the society. The findings showed that the ideology of the
regime has been transmitted with considerable success in this arena. Libyan male students
displayed progressive attitudes on the question of gender as expressed through their responses
except on authority issues.
The female respondents seemed to have strong feminist views and were very much oriented
towards equality between the two sexes. Male respondents did not have strong traditional
attitudes towards these issues. The vast majority did not have a problem in accepting the
principle of equality in human rights between the two sexes. The only difference was between
the Islamist female respondents and Islamist male respondents. This difference reflected the
female Islamists' strong positive attitudes towards gender equality and female rights as a
whole.
In general, it seems that the regime was more successful in inculcating its values on gender
issues with these students than was the case for any other value set, apart from its position on
Arab issues as will be shown in Chapter 9.
As has generally been the case, background variables made little difference to views. There
were some differences by 'source of identity', but these became most interesting when
explored further in relation to gender. Overall the women were substantially more feminist in
their views than the men, and this difference related particularly to public roles in politics and
employment. It is worth noting that whilst a majority of the male students asserted the
principles of equal rights for women, when it came to family matters, authority in
employment, participation in the armed forces, and political roles for women, a majority of
the male respondents asserted traditional values. Women were much more assertive as to
equality on these matters of practice. It was particularly interesting that women with an
Islamic source of identity were generally among the most feminist in their view.
These gender differences show that the regime's ideology of gender equality has been taken up
in different ways by men and women. Although a minority of men do agree with practical
implementation, the majority subscribe to equality in principle only. For women there is a
stronger commitment to genuine implementation. It has to be said that the reality in Libyan
society corresponds to the male position. Women lack authority and participate less (see
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Chapter 7), so have less capacity for forcing these issues. However, these gender differences,
which do not change for those with a religious identity, could have profound significance in
the future, especially given the strong formal commitment of the regime to gender equality.
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9. Attitudes Towards Arab Issues
9.1	 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to focus on some of the Arab issues which the Libyan regime deems
directly relevant to Libya, namely Arab unity and the Palestinian problem. Both issues have
constituted significant elements of the state ideology, since the revolution in 1969. The chapter
therefore seeks to examine and explore the attitudes of the respondents of this study towards
Arab unity and the Palestinian problem.
Some of the questions asked, especially those on Arab nationalism and Arab unity, are
modelled on a previous study by Sand Eddin Ibrahim et al Itijahat al-Ra'i al- cAam al-Arabiy
Nahwa Mos 'alat al-Wanda [Trends of Arab opinion toward the issue of unity]. This study
was undertaken in ten Arab countries to explore public opinion towards Arab unity in the late
1970s. Using some of these questions in the current study does not mean that comparison
between the results will be useful. There are many differences in the aims and the nature of
each study and in the size of the samples. Moreover, the circumstances facing Arab countries
and the Middle East region as a whole are now very different from two decades ago.
The current study is an attempt to explore attitudes of a certain stratum within Libyan society
towards Arab unity, seeking to ascertain whether the regime has succeeded in instilling its
values and ideology in this stratum of its citizens.
There is a link between the concerns of this Chapter and those of Chapter 5. It will be recalled
that Arabism identity was one of the possible elements of identification, the others being
family, tribe, city, state, and Islam. This chapter will focus on the respondents' attitudes
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towards actual policy issues, rather than their beliefs. In other words, the practical side of
their attitudes towards Arabism will be explored.
The Chapter has four main sections. The first focuses on Arab unity and the Palestinian
problem in the state ideology of the regime in Libya. The second seeks to explore the attitudes
of the respondents towards Arab nationalism and Arab unity. This section is based on 12
questions which deal with these issues, namely questions 40, 41, 42, 43a, 43b, 44, 45, 46, 47,
48, 49, and 50 (see Appendix A). The third section examines the attitudes of respondents
towards the Palestinian problem through three main questions, numbers 51, 52 and 53 (see
Appendix A). The final section is the conclusion.
9.2	 Arab Unity and the Palestinian Issue as Components of State
Ideology in Libya: A Review
The main ideological elements which have shaped the Libyan regime's foreign policies since
the revolution in 1969 have been Pan-Arabism, anti-Zionism, and anti-colonialism. All these
elements stem from Nasir's ideology which has greatly influenced the state ideology in Libya
and created a framework for its polices.
Pan-Arabism, Arab unity and Arab nationalism are not new political ideas in Libyan society.
They formed part of the political culture of the generation of the 1950s and 1960s. The
monarchical regime did not have any programme for inculcating its citizens, especially young
people, with such values but yet they were transmitted through the Egyptian radio station,
Sawt al-Arab [the voice of the Arabs], and through Egyptian school textbooks, which school
children studied after independence. This unplanned socialisation process created a political
culture which was different from that of the monarchical regime, which had strong ties with
the West but weak ties with the Arab region, by creating citizens who were in favour of Arab
nationalism and Arab unity. The youth admired Nasir, who became their hero as evidenced by
his picture being everywhere in Libya. Arab unity was one of the major concerns of the
generations of the 1950s and 1960s, of which al-Qadhafi and the free officers were a part.
Libyan identities were based on tribe and regional identification with specific parts of Libya
(Cyrenica, Tripolitania, and Fazzan), as well as a wider identification with Arabism and
Islam. Historical evidence can be found to support the wider Arab-Islamic identity. For
example, during the popular liberation war against Italy, from 1911 there were a number of
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Arab fighters from different Arab countries such as Yemen and Syria fighting with the
Libyans. Moreover, during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, numbers of Libyan volunteers
participated in the Arab armies. Yet, identification with Libya as a whole seems to have been
relatively weak.
Arab unity, became one of the major concerns of the new regime since 1969. As Deeb and
Deeb argue,
Arab unity is major concern to foreign-policy makers in Libya to which al-Qadhafi was
always sympathetic since his youth, when he listened to that powerful source of
political socialisation of late 1950s and the 1960s, the voice of the Arabs broadcast
from Cairo. Libya's historical divisions into Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fazzan, and
consequently the lack of a clearly defined Libyan identity, pushed al-Qadhafi to go
beyond his own borders, to seek a wider identity in Arab unity.'
Arab unity has been one of the main elements of the foreign policy in Libya since the
revolution. Practically, the regime has attempted to bring about Arab unity through
unification agreements with a number of other Arab countries. Al-Qadhafi persuaded several
Arab leaders to unite their countries with Libya. His quest took him to Egypt, Sudan and
Tunisia during the seventies, and Syria and Morocco in the early eighties. These attempts
have earned the country a reputation as "Arab Prussia." 2 However, none of these schemes
succeeded.
Some of the countries with which unity was agreed were different from Libya ideologically
and politically, for example Morocco. Such differences did not discourage the Libyan regime
in their campaign. El-Khawas states:
In August 1984, Al-Qadhafi and King Hassan of Morocco agreed to merge their
countries despite their ideological and political differences: Qadhafi's Libya is
revolutionary with close ties to the Soviet Union; this stance contrasts with Morocco's
conservative monarchy, which has been a traditional ally for the U.S.3
The Palestinian issue has also been an integral part of Libya's Arab nationalism. The Libyan
regime regarded the Palestinian issue as an Arab issue, for which all Arabs must accept
responsibility, working together to destroy the racist and Zionist state.4 Thus al-Qadhafi
adopted the concept of Oawmiyat al-Macraka [the pan-Arabisation of the struggle], asking the
Arab countries to stand and fight against Israel.
The only solution to the Palestinian problem, according to al-Qadhafi, was the liberation of all
Palestine. This is because he doesn't accept the existence of the state of Israel. For him the
Palestinian problem started already in 1948 when part of Palestine was transformed into
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Israel. This is different from many other Arab governments who seem to have accepted U.N.
resolution 242. Al-Qadhafi, has persistently criticised the Arab governments which
concentrated their efforts on the return of the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967.5
The Libyan regime was consistently against any peaceful settlement of the conflict. From the
beginning, as Deeb and Deeb indicate,
[he] opposed U.N. Resolution 242 of November 1967, supported the idea of an Arab
Palestine where only those indigenous Jews who had lived there during the British
Mandate would be incorporated in this state, and did not approve of the idea of a
Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as the solution to the Palestinian
problem.6
These attitudes remain distinctive of the Libyan regime's policies towards the region. Despite
all the changes in the region since Saclat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the peace treaty between
Israel and Egypt, the Madrid conference, the direct negotiations between the PLO and Israel
and the other Arab countries, and the establishment of the "limited Palestinian authority" in
Gaza Strip and West Bank, Al-Qadhafi maintained his stand.
These positions on Arab issues in general and on the Palestinian issue in particular are
strongly expressed in the official socialisation mechanisms described earlier. They are
presented within the schools through the content of history and geography books, are asserted
in specific sessions devoted to Arab Unity in the Ideological Preparation Camps, and through
the mass media. Al-Qadhafi's political speeches focus on precisely these matters and the
students will have been exposed to all of these from childhood. It should also be noted that the
parents of the students, who come from that generation of the 1950s and 1960s which adopted
Nasirism as explained above, are likely to have expressed these views in the home as part of
family socialisation. In a sense the impact of the radio station Scrwt al-Arab [the voice of the
Arabs] persists through the generations. For the generations of the 50s and 60s Nasir's Egypt
became the centre and symbol of Arab unity and assertiveness, following the defiant seizure
of the Suez Canal from British control in 1956. Al-Qandafi was part of that era. To al-
Qandafi, listening to Radio Cairo's Voice of the Arabs and plotting to depose the Libyan
monarchy, Nasir was a hero and role model.'
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9.3	 Exploring Attitudes Towards Arab Nationalism and Arab
Unity
The purpose of this section is to explore attitudes towards Arab nationalism and Arab unity in
the sample of Garyunis University students, taking first the awareness of Arab unity as a
notion, second, the attitudes of respondents towards the types and forms of Arab unity, and
finally attitudes towards the practical side of Arab unity.
93.1	 The awareness of Arab unity as a notion among the respondents
The examination of awareness of Arab unity started by asking the respondents whether Arab
nationalism was a coherent idea. 73 percent answered "yes" and 27 percent "no". The
majority of respondents clearly believed that Arab nationalism was an important element and
a coherent idea, reflecting the ideas of the revolutionary regime about Arab unity. However,
there was a substantial minority who did not share this view. The latter phenomena indicates
the likely strength of other forms of identification. It is generally held that such identifications
have become more significant in other Arab countries.'
When respondents were asked about the meaning of al-watan [fatherland] for them, more than
half of the respondents (69 percent) replied that they see al-watan as the wider Arab
fatherland, 23 percent said that al-watan was the existing state in which they were living, and
4 percent referred to the wider Islamic fatherland. The 23 percent that identified al-watan with
the existing state supports the reasoning for the negative answers about Arab nationalism
discussed above.
A small minority mentioned other definitions of the 'fatherland'. Among these were: a place
where people believe in God; any place where people can live in peace and express themselves
without fear and where they can find the satisfaction of all their needs; the whole world
irrespective of the religious beliefs, ethnic identification or political beliefs; and an Islamic
state which has an Islamic democratic system. A small number said that the term al-watan
does not mean anything nowadays.
When respondents were asked to describe how they regarded Arab nationhood, 57 percent
said Arabs belonged to one Arab nation which was artificially divided; 29 percent thought of
the people in Arab countries as belonging to one nation but each with different and special
features; 9 percent viewed the people in the Arab countries as belonging to different nations
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with few strong ties between them, and 4 percent described Arabs as belonging to different
nations, but with strong ties between them. Again these figures support those given earlier
regarding the rationale of the minority who reject Arab nationalism.
As the Islamic religion is a significant element for many respondents, as was shown in the
identity question, the respondents were asked whether Islamic religion was a vital factor for
Arab unity. 62 percent said "yes" and 38 percent "no".
The findings show that most respondents were oriented towards Arab unity and believed in
Arab nationalism as a means towards Arab unity. This was illustrated by their definition of
the concept of al-watan and their description of nationhood. Emphasising Islam as one of the
vital factors of Arab unity reflected the ideology of the regime, previously discussed (Chapter
5). Overall, the majority of responses here corresponds to the regime's position. The
significant minority who do not accept this position generally gave answers which indicated
their identification with Libya as a specific state.
The next question involved asking the respondents about the factors which they thought
caused disunity between Arab countries. 40 percent identified the main factor as being the role
of ruling elites within Arab countries. 37 percent attributed it to the role of non-Arab powers
such as Israel and the United States, 24 percent to the role of ethnic minorities, 7 percent to
attempts by particular groupings to protect their economic interests, 6 percent to the disunity
between Arab countries and to the strong loyalties which populations had to existing Arab
states, and finally, a small minority mentioned such factors as the failure to uphold correct
Islamic practices. These percentages come to more than 100 because some mentioned more
than one factor.
Though not directly comparable, Ibrahim's study 9 found that the majority of respondents in
his survey attributed disunity mainly to the role of ruling Arab elites, with the role of non-
Arab powers coming second. This is similar to the pattern in the present study.
The role of non-Arab powers, especially the United States, is popularly given as a reason to
explain the failure of attempts at Arab unity. El-Khawas states that
Qadhafi has blamed the U.S. for his failure to bring about Arab unity. The U.S. has
played up the Soviet threat as a means to divide the Arab world and to further its own
strategic and economic interests in the region. Washington has never looked favourably
on any drive to achieve Arab unity for fear that it might hinder Western interests in the
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area and, further, might place the U.S. in an awkward position because of its
commitment to the survival of Israel.'°
9.3.2	 Attitudes of respondents towards the types and forms of Arab unity
The purpose of this section is to explore the attitudes of respondents towards different
approaches to Arab unity. This enquiry began by asking the respondents whether the Arab
League had proved a successful expression of Pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism. 34 percent
of respondents gave a positive answer for this question, whilst almost two thirds (66 percent)
were negative.
When the respondents were asked about the type of Arab unity which was most desirable, 37
percent said that this should take place through a merger, with one central government
overseeing the affairs of all peoples. 31 percent favoured federation, with a unitary security
and military policy, but with individual domestic policy remaining the responsibility of
existing governments. Finally, 30 percent thought co-operation among existing Arab states
was the best way forward.
When respondents were asked 'whether Arab unity should be based on a smaller regional
grouping such as the Gulf states, the Nile valley states, and the Maghrib states, only 20
percent accepted this idea, with 78 percent rejecting it. A comparison of this finding with
Ibrahim's study, shows a similar trend among his respondents, less than half of whom
favoured smaller regional groupings (42 percent). The reason for rejecting the idea, as
Ibrahim noted, was that unity based on regional grouping was a relatively new idea in the
Arab national stage. Also, the idea was linked sometimes with Western projects in the area."
The Libyan regime's position towards the idea of Arab unity based on regional groupings was
to accept it as an alternative route to Arab unity after the failure of a number of attempts to
bring about general Arab unity.
9.3.3	 Attitudes towards the practical sides of the Arab unity
It was deemed important to explore the practical side of attitudes to Arab unity and Arab
nationalism among the respondents, in order to see if there are any differences between theory
and practice. It should be noted, however, that asking people questions about their practical
237
attitudes towards Arab unity does not necessarily reveal how they actually behave — as people
do not necessarily practice what they preach.
Respondents were first asked whether they supported moves towards Arab unity. 91 percent
gave a positive answer, with only 9 percent rejecting the idea. The second part of the question
involved asking those who gave a positive answer whether they continued their support for
Arab unity despite the following statements: first, "even if this means sharing Libya's oil
wealth with other Arabs"; second, "even if this means letting other Arabs work and live in
Libya"; third, "even though Arab governments are not supporting Libya over the sanctions
issue."
67 percent were willing to share Libya's oil wealth with other Arabs; 79 percent were willing
to let other Arabs work and live in Libya; and 67 percent supported moves toward Arab unity
even though Arab governments did not support Libya over the sanctions issues.
These findings show the positive attitudes of the students towards Arab unity, reflecting the
revolutionary regime's ideology. One of the main slogans which al-Qandafi announced on
many occasions since the end of 1970s was that "Libya is the land of all Arabs." According to
this approach all Arabs have the right to live and work in Libya, with the same rights as
Libyans. Libya in its development programme has depended on foreign manpower, owing to
the small number of the Libyan population. The census of 1973 12 indicated that 9 percent of
the total population were foreigners, of whom 85-90 percent were Arabs, 5 percent Europeans
and the rest from Asia, Africa, and South and North America. The majority of the non-
Libyans were Egyptians.13
When respondents were asked whether Libya should seek unity with Arab states which had a
different political system (monarchical, for instance), 63 percent of the respondents said "yes"
and 36 percent opposed it. The result here is not surprising, given Libyan ideological and
practical moves to bring about Arab unity. In September 1987 al-Qadhafi announced a
'project for Arab unity' to unite the Arab states and to build an economical and defence power
despite the differences in political systems. 14 Practically al-Qandafi moved to achieve unity
with Morocco in 1984 despite the political and ideological differences between the two
countries.
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In another question, the respondents were asked whether they supported the removal of border
and passport controls as a step on the road to Arab unity. 69 percent of respondents accepted
this practical step.
In the late 1980s the borders between Libya and Tunisia, and Libya and Egypt were reopened,
and the movement of their citizens became easier. However, United Nations sanctions against
Libya over the Lockerbie planecrash affair took effect in April 1992. The immediate effect of
the sanctions was on the travel side. An air embargo shut down all international flight
connections. Thus the main gates of Libya became Tunisia, Egypt and Malta, as new land and
sea routes were established to circumvent the air embargo." Moreover, opening the borders
with other Arab neighbours helped Libyans to continue to connect with the outside world.
To examine "national expression", a new variable (SNP) was created. National expression in
this chapter refers to Arab nationalism, that is, the degree of expression of Arab unity and
Arab nationalism. This variable ranked respondents by the number of positive answers to all
the questions which addressed the practical expression of Arab unity. These were the
statements dealing with sharing Libya's oil wealth with other Arabs, letting other Arabs work
and live in Libya, and supporting moves towards Arab unity despite the lack of support from
Arab governments. It was created by giving a score of one to all positive answers and totalling
these scores. The scores on this new variable, were ranked as strong (all positives);
intermediate (some positives) and weak (no positives). These were related to the background
variables, such as place of family residence, family income, parental educational levels and so
forth. Some of the results show interesting and significant developments.
The first of the background factors to be examined relates this national expression to that of
place of family residence (urban or rural). There was no statistical significance by place of
family residence.
Figure 9.1 examines the degree of national expression by gender. Although the results were
not highly significant, there were some interesting differences, in that male respondents had a
lesser degree of national expression than female respondents.
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Table 9.1: Degree of importance of tribalism in the respondents' identification by degree
of national expression
Source of	 Strong	 Intermediate	 None	 Number of
Identification	 respondents
Tribe Id
	 21	 43	 36	 28
Others Id	 50	 39	 11	 447
Sig = 0.0002
Tribe Id = Tribe as most important source of identification
Others Id = Other sources of identification such as family, city, state, Arab, Muslim.
Source: field Survey, 1994
Table 9.2 shows the relationship between those who identified with Arabism and the degree of
national expression. The results as can be seen from the table were statistically significant,
but this is only as would be expected. The more people identify themselves as Arabs the more
positive and stronger their degree of national expression is likely to be. Among those who
identified themselves with Arabism, 64 percent of them had a strong degree of national
expression, 33 percent had an intermediate degree and only 3 percent had none.
Table 9.2: Degree of importance of Arabism in the respondents' identification by degree
of national expression
Source of
	 Strong	 Intermediate	 None	 Number of
Identification
	
[%]respondents[ °/0] 
Arabs Id
	
64	 33	 3	 111
Others Id	 43	 41	 15	 364
Sig = 0.00005
Arabs Id = Arabism as most important source of the identification
Others Id = Other sources of identification such as tribe, family, city, state, Muslim.
Source: Field Survey, 1994
Overall, it is interesting that the females again seem somewhat more strongly attached to
views which conform with the regime's. Again we find that the majority of students are
expressing views which reflect those of the regime.
9.4	 Exploring Attitudes Towards the Palestinian Issue
As Palestine has been given considerable attention by the regime in Libya, within the context
of the regime's concern for Arab issues, we will now explore the attitudes of respondents
towards this issue. First, we examine attitudes towards the relationship between Libya and the
• Palestinian problem. Then we look at attitudes towards possible solutions to the Palestinian
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9.4.2	 Attitudes towards possible solutions to the Palestinian problem
When the respondents were asked about the best solution to the Palestinian problem, the vast
majority were not willing to accept any peaceful solution to the issue, with 86 percent
preferring the forceful liberation of all Palestine.
Numbers in favour of other options were small, with 8 percent preferring the creation of a
secular state for both Arabs and Jews, 3 percent accepting the idea of a peace treaty with
Israel, and 1 percent wanting a peace process with no pre-conditions, linked with UN
resolution 242.
Table 9.3 shows the preferred solutions to the Palestinian problem, by the degree of the
respondents' national expression. More than half of those who accepted the liberation of all
Palestine as a solution (52 percent) had a strong degree of national expression, while 37
percent had an intermediate degree and only 11 percent had none.
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Table 9.3: Solution to the Palestinian problem by degree of national expression
Categories
Peace process
with no pre-
conditions linked
with UN
resolution 242
The liberation of
all Palestine
The creation of a
secular state for
both Arabs and
Jews
Peace treaty with
Israel
Use of military
means against
Israel
Arab revolution
to destroy all the
obstacles
The unification of
all Islamic states
against Israel
Arab unity will
lead to a return of
Palestine
Strong Intermediate None Number of
respondents[Vo] [%] N
33 67 0 6
52 37 11 409
37 45 18 38
8 75 17 12
0 33 67 3
0 100 0 1
o o o 0
0 0 100 3
Sig = 0.0001
Source: Field Survey, 1994
Among those who suggested the creation of a secular state for both Arabs and Jews, 37
percent had a strong degree of national expression, 45 percent had an intermediate degree and
only 18 percent had none. Among the small number of respondents who suggested a peace
treaty with Israel, 8 percent had a strong degree of national expression, 75 percent had an
intermediate degree, and 17 percent had none.
A small minority of the respondents suggested some other solutions to the Palestinian which
were not statistically significant due to the small number of respondents (see Table 9.3).
These suggestions were the use of the military means against Israel; Arab revolution to
destroy all the obstacles between Arab countries in order to unite against Israel; unification of
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only 12 percent of them had none. It seems that the more respondents opposed the Declaration
of Principles, the stronger the degree of national expression. This shows that respondents with
a strong degree of national expression were not willing to accept any agreement with Israel. In
addition, they were not ready to accept any peaceful solution to the Palestinian issue, unless it
achieved a full Palestinian state. Again this is expected but is useful as a demonstration of
consistency.
It seems that most respondents agreed with the regime's ideology towards the Palestinian
issue, based on rejecting any peace agreement with Israel. This position was pursued by the
Libyan government through rejecting the Declaration of Principles between PLO and Israel
and later the Oslo Accord in September 1993. Moreover, Libya began expelling Palestinian
workers and their families from Libya in an effort to undermine the Israel-PLO peace
Accords. Al-Qandafi announced that all Arab countries should send Palestinians to Gaza and
the West Bank to overwhelm the Israelis attempting to absorb them." PLO-Libyan relations
were not good before the Oslo Accord, especially when Libya sent its pilgrims to Jerusalem
instead of Mecca to protest against the embargo imposed by the United States and applied by
all Arab states without exception!'
9.5 Conclusion and Summary
Arab unity and the Palestinian problem are the two main issues which have shaped the Libyan
revolutionary regime's policies both domestically and in the Arab region since 1969. To these
two issues the regime paid great attention ideologically and in practice. Moreover, they were a
significant part of the values which the regime tried to inculcate in its citizens, especially in
the younger generation. Therefore, this chapter dealt with the attitudes of the university
students towards these two issues.
It appears that the regime has had considerable success in creating certain values related to
these issues among its citizens. For instance, as far as Arab unity is concerned, a substantial
majority of respondents agreed that Arab nationalism is a coherent idea. The type of Arab
unity which was desirable among them was a merger, with one central government overseeing
the affairs of Arab nations. However, the vast majority rejected Arab unity based on smaller
regional groupings.
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On the practical side the majority of the respondents gave positive answers indicating that
they supported moving towards Arab unity. These included statements like letting other Arabs
work and live in Libya, willingness to share Libya's oil wealth with other Arabs and support
for Arab unity even though Arab governments did not support Libya over the sanctions.
More than half of the respondents supported the idea that Libya should seek unity with Arab
states which have different political systems (monarchical systems for instance). They also
supported the removal of border and passport controls as a practical step on the road of Arab
unity. In general, the respondents show a strong and positive degree of national expression
towards Arab unity.
As far as the Palestinian problem is concerned, the vast majority of respondents thought it to
be directly relevant to Libya. Those who accepted this link showed a strong degree of national
expression. The most popular solution to the Palestinian problem was the liberation of all
Palestine. The respondents show that they were not willing to accept any peaceful means.
The attitudes of the respondents towards the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and
Israel was very negative. The vast majority were not willing to accept it, instead supporting
military means as a tool for the liberation of all Palestine.
It does seem that the popular ideology of the regime about Arab unity and Palestinian issues
has been successfully inculcated into these students, although there were always some who did
not agree with the regime's positions. It is worth noting that this minority was very small on
the Palestinian issues, but became much larger when dealing with forms of Arab unity and
still larger when dealing with practical ways in which Libya and Libyans could assist other
Arabs. In this last case a third of the respondents were not in favour of sharing oil wealth,
opening borders and so forth. This sort of position may well have become more general as UN
sanctions have an effect on living standards in Libya and Libya becomes more isolated. At the
time of the survey, living standards were beginning to be affected and it would be logical for
this to have an effect on attitudes, first in relation to practical matters.
The regime has not had a consistent record of upholding its own ideological positions. In the
late 1970s and early 1980s Egyptian and Tunisian workers were expelled from Libya. The
Egyptian expulsions were a response to Sadat's peace treaty with Israel, and the Tunisian
expulsions also originated in political differences between the Libyan and Tunisian regimes.
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Recently, after the execution of the survey, the Libyan regime has expelled thousands of Arab
workers including hundreds of Palestinians.° This was identified as a repeat of early uses of
deportation for reasons of political pressure, in this case against the Palestinian authorities
who signed the Oslo Accord.
It was not possible in the survey to explore these contradictions between the regime's ideology
and practice. It is worth repeating that the substantial minority of respondents who did not
accept the rights of non-Libyans in Libya and so forth may represent a view which became
more general under conditions of economic difficulty.
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•10. Summary and Conclusion
10.1 Summary of the Thesis
The return of political culture as a central concept in many recent studies indicates that "there
was an earlier time when political culture studies were here at hand and prospering, that this
was followed by a time in which this approach declined, and that these studies are once again
prospering." 1
 The main focus of the literature on political culture has related to the experience
of societies in three regions only: Western industrial societies, Communist societies, and East
Asian societies. The key works on the political culture of Western societies have generally
focused on the United States, Britain and Germany. Among these studies are those by Almond
and Verba (1963), Inglehart (1975), Kavanagh (1980), and Barnes and Kaase (1979). On
Communist societies, key works include those by Brown and Gray (1977 and 1984), and
White (1979), while the key works on the political culture in East Asian societies include
those by Hothcinz and Calder (1982), Davis (1987) and Pye (1985).2
Little attention has been paid to the political culture of the Middle East and that of the Arab
countries in particular. Although there are a few studies based on empirical approaches, such
as those by El-Menoufi (1980), Entelis (1981), Daher (1987) and Farah (1987), the main
approach in studying Arab political culture has been historical and has concentrated on the
political traditions of Islam.3
The purpose of this study has been to investigate political culture in Libya through exploring
the attitudes of Libyan university students towards some of the major elements of the
revolutionary regime's ideology. This was based on a survey carried out by the researcher in
the spring and summer of 1994 among 500 Libyan students, both male and female at
Garyunis University in Benghazi.
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Historically, the religion of Islam, social institutions (especially those related to tribe) and
education have played key roles in shaping political culture in Libya. The significance of the
ideological factor in nation-building in Libya became crucial after the revolution in 1969,
since the revolutionary regime has depended on it as one of the main sources of its legitimacy.
Demographic challenge has affected Libya in the same way as other developing countries.4
This is shown in increasing population size and the large proportion of the population made
up by young people. Libya must be considered as a youthful country, as those under the age
of 25 represent almost 60 percent of the population.
The young generation has been targeted by the revolutionary regime through a political
socialisation process which was intended to create activist, participant, nationally conscious
and motivated citizens with a commitment to Arab nationalism and Arab unity, and to
equality for women. The vast majority of young people receive a state education, and are
therefore exposed to the socialisation process through education, i.e. school routines, curricula
and text books. Of course, the Libyan regime hoped to inculcate their values into students.
However what has remained unknown is whether the young people actually accepted these
values, which is where this study comes in. I hope to have uncovered where and to what
extent the socialisation process was "successful", and in which areas people resisted it.
10.2 The Objectives Revisited
The objectives of this study were identified in Chapter 1 as follows:
a) To explore the attitudes of the students towards some elements of the state ideology of
the revolutionary regime.
b) To investigate the extent to which political culture is still influenced by traditional
values and ideas which reflect the social life of Libyans before the combination of
ideological, economic and social changes which have occurred since the 1960s.
c) To examine the role of the regime's ideology, structures, and particularly the school
system in inculcating national identity, and belief in Arab unity and Arab nationalism.
d) To examine the values of a generation which has gone through the school system and
the ideological preparation camps to see whether their values are congruent with the
252
values taught to them in those institutions. Particular attention was paid here to views
on women's rights and gender roles.
To achieve these objectives, the study has tried to compare the actual values, identities and the
level of political participation of students, with what these ought to have been if the regime's
processes of political socialisation had been fully successful.
This study combines both quantitative and qualitative methods to explore the attitudes of
Libyan university students. I explored the influence of background variables (i.e. social status,
gender, place of family residence) on attitudes towards critical elements of the political culture
which the revolutionary regime has sought to purvey. These latter elements were those of
identity, tribalism, political participation, the role of women, and Arab issues such as the
Palestinian problem, Arab unity and Arab nationalism. The results of the survey showed that
whilst there were differences, background was generally not a significant source of them—
other than in terms of the influence of gender on attitudes to the role of women. The social
background from which students came was not generally important to aspects of their political
culture. This is because the students have gone through a common educational system and
have been exposed to the same values in that process. Furthermore, the majority of
respondents were the first generation in their families to gain a higher education. Only gender
was a major discriminator among them, although there were occasional interesting differences
between the rural minority and the urban (mainly Greater Benghazi) majority. The weakness
of face-sheet or background variables in producing different attitudes among the respondents
of this study indicates the extent to which political culture variables act differently in a
country like Libya from Western countries. In general, background factors such as social
status have a much greater impact on attitudes in the latter societies.
First, the study explored the question of identity among the university students (Chapter 5). In
general, the students were not prepared to distinguish between Islam and Arabism as a source
of identity. The majority stated that these two elements were both equally important for them.
This is consistent with the regime's ideology in which Islam and Arabism as identities are
"inextricably linked."' This finding was further supported by the fact that religion (Islam) was
the highest ranked reason for being an Arab. The existing state, on the other hand, was ranked
low as a source of identification among the respondents. This latter finding is to some extent
the counterpart to the respondents' strong identification with Islam and Arabism. This may be
compared with al-Salem's study on the Arab Gulf States. Al-Salem's findings showed that the
only identity which had developed among the students was the sense of citizenship of the
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state.6 In this case the awareness of the state among the students may be attributed to the
generous benefits available to them as citizens through the educational, medical, and social
welfare systems of the Gulf States. The benefits are similar to what Libyans have, and the
difference may come from the ideological factor: the Libyan revolutionary regime emphasises
wider Arab citizenship through the socialisation process. Some other factors can be added to
explain the low level of identification linked with the state among the Libyan respondents,
such as the low level of national consciousness and national identity which had existed in
Libya ever since independence. As St John (1987) states:
The advent of independence unified Libya's three provinces but failed to forge a deep-
rooted sense of national identity as did the bitter war of independence in Algeria. For
most part, Libyans continued to think of themselves as Tripolitanian, Cyrenaican or
Fezzanes, not as a Libyan.'
This lack of national consciousness continued after independence. It was significant that the
rising tide of Arab nationalism in the Middle East and anti-colonial agitation in neighbouring
North African states coincided with the rise of statehood in Libya. The monarchical regime
was not able to overcome the negative impact of tribal, provincial and religious loyalties and
the positive appeal of a vibrant pan-Arabism.8
Moreover, Libyans have not had much historical experience with the state. This is illustrated
by the following statement from Davis (1987):
the theoretical and speculative interest of the Libyan phenomenon is its non-state,
'stateless' characteristics: those acts of will and determination which deny the utility
and desirability of the structures imposed by the General Assembly. The will comes
from a deeply entrenched image of statelessness which Libyans locate in the recent
past, and from the failure of the Italian colonial authority to make the state in the least
bit attractive and respectable. And it is made possible by the freedom conferred by oil
wealth, by a version of Islam which denies hierarchy, and by the failure of progressive
and revolutionary forces to guide the Libyan coupists along a more conventional path.
The result is extremely uncomfortable for statesmen; but it is an expression of that
strand of human activity which, imperfectly, with many hesitations and inconsistencies,
denies The Leviathan almost root and branch.9
The absence of sufficient institutions that distinguish the state from other systems and that
reflect the idea of 'modem civil society' may be another reason for the low identification with
the state. At the same time we must consider the role of other institutions which individuals
ranked higher than the state, especially tribe and family. Tribal/family units clearly function
as important social networks. In Libya these social organisations represent an alternative to
the institutions which might exist in a modem civil society.
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The detailed examination of 'identity factors' and the exploratory construction of identity
types showed that the majority of respondents expressed identities which corresponded quite
closely to that which the regime would regard as desirable, like identification with Islam and
Arabism for instance. There was a minority who expressed family/tribe orientations,
reflecting a localist position, and there was an interesting difference in the degree of emphasis
given to Islam, but the majority were much as the regime would want them to be. Of course,
this to some extent reflects the Libyan character of the regime itself and the extent to which its
values corresponded to those of the respondents' parents' generation.
The second issue was that of tribe and tribalism. The findings of the study indicated that more
than half of the respondents were not ready to drop their tribal identification, and that tribe
was still a major source of personal identification in Libyan society. The vast majority of the
respondents were not willing to change their tribe. There were some small differences between
respondents according to background factors. One of these differences was that those who
came from a poorly educated background were less in favour of the tribal identification,
apparently regarding tribalism as a network of privilege. They seemed to believe that they did
not derive any benefit from the tribe, unlike those who came from a higher educational and
social background.
Another interesting finding from the survey came from exploring the relationship between
strength of attachment to tribe and willingness to drop tribal identity. Surprisingly, 31 percent
of those who were strongly attached to their tribe were willing to drop tribes. It appears that a
substantial minority of students would prefer not to have a tribal system, but live with it
because it is there and is important, in the Libyan context.
The views expressed by the students can be considered to belong to three sets. The first was
represented by those who were (strongly) attached to their tribe and who did not wish to drop
tribal identities. They seemed likely to have both an instrumental and a non-instrumental view
of the role of tribes. For those who wanted to drop tribal identities and were not attached to
their tribes, both the instrumental and non-instrumental bases were rejected. Those who were
willing to drop tribe identity but remained attached were probably somewhat instrumental in
their view of the tribe — it had a role so they remained part of it. The regime's position has
tended to either extreme of this continuum. At first it tried to reject tribes, but subsequently it
has in ideological terms asserted their non-instrumental role. At the same time it has accepted
their instrumental role outside the formal political sphere.
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It is worth noting that the regime has been inconsistent towards the role of tribes since the
beginning of the revolution, having wavered between hostility and respect for the role of the
tribe (as a social organisation, a source of security and socialisation for individuals). 10 Since
the beginning of the 1990s, the tribe has become a source of political legitimacy for the
regime. The regime has needed to rely on tribal organisation for the reasons which follow:
• The tribe has succeeded in the socialisation of individuals, socially and politically, in
some elements where the formal socialisation mechanism of the regime has failed."
• Communication within the tribe, especially between the leader of the tribe (al-shayikh)
and the individual members of the tribe, has proved a useful means of conveying
information.
• The nature of the tribe is such that the political culture of tribal members has inevitably
been based on their respect for and loyalty to their leader.
• Customary practices and tribal councils are efficient for solving many tribal disputes
and problems, compared to the weakness and inefficiency of the official courts within
Libyan society.
The third issue concerning the political culture of the revolutionary regime which was
explored was political participation. Almost half of the respondents participated in political
activities at school, while only a small minority participated at university. The explanation for
this difference is that most activities at school were (in theory) compulsory. However, despite
the compulsory character of school activities (e.g. ideological preparation camps), many
students never participated in them. Those who came from a rural background were more
involved in politics than urban respondents. The female respondents were less interested in
participating in politics than male students, but the difference between the two sexes was not
great. Most respondents did not believe that they could play a genuine role in participating in
decision-making in the popular congresses. The degree of disbelief in the mechanisms of
political participation of the regime was quite high among respondents.
Despite the fact that all students go through the political socialisation process, the Libyan
regime seems to have had limited success in creating participant individuals who are aware of
their role within the political system and the political participation process. One explanation
could be that the machinery of the state is not very efficient in preparing people for a role in
political participation. As the findings show, it is clear that even for the small minority who
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participated, many did not believe in the efficacy of the political participation process. It may
be suggested that some of those who participated in political activities did so as a means
towards gaining a particular kind of employment or to gain some other self-interest. It seems
from these findings that the actual structures of the political participation system in Libya are
not taken seriously by many of the respondents. As in many other societies, participation
seems to be an activity restricted to a small minority. In the Libyan case, the main participants
are the members of revolutionary committees, much on the lines of participation in party
activity in single party regimes, although the Libyan system is explicitly not party-based, as it
is against political parties.12
One general explanation for the lack of participation among the Libyan students can be found
in El-Mogherbi's arguments about Arab political culture and the issue of democracy (see
Chapter 2). El-Mogherbi argues that Arab political culture represents a subject political
culture, in which individuals are aware of the output of the political system, but unaware of
their role and their influence on the system. He adds that the submission, fear and the pattern
of non-democratic behaviour characterised by the lack of free discussion and unwillingness to
accept different opinions are a consequence of the process of social and political socialisation
through the formal educational institutions and informal socialisation agents such as the
family.
The fourth issue which this study has explored is the role of women in society. A general
review of the traditional views about women in Libyan society showed that women were
regarded as constituting a source of shame; that women were regarded as being beautiful and
fragile, and mentally and physically weak; that their place was at home; and that it was
shameful for women to remain unmarried.
A review was given of official attitudes regarding women through a content analysis of school
curricula "reading books" up to the ninth grade. The most common single idea among these
themes was the traditional role of women as mothers and wives (25 percent of the themes).
The themes about the role of women which were covered in the school curricula did not
adequately reflect the practical and widely-publicised official policies of the regime towards
women. The latter policies were aimed at encouraging women to play a significant role in the
social, political and economic changes within Libyan society!'
Nevertheless, the findings of the study showed that the ideology of the regime has been
transmitted with considerable success in this arena, especially through the regime's practical
policies towards women's role in society. Libyan male students displayed progressive rather
257
than traditional attitudes on the question of gender in their responses. The females generally
had strong feminist views and were very much oriented towards equality between the two
sexes. The vast majority of males and females did not have a problem in accepting the
principle of equality in human rights between the two sexes. The only difference was between
the female Islamist respondents and the male Islamist respondents. The female Islamists have
much stronger positive attitudes towards gender equality and female rights as a whole, than
male Islamists do. The explanation for such a difference might be that female Islamists
understand the principles of Islam as a based on giving rights to women as well as men, while
male respondents were dominated by some cultural myth about women and their subjugated
role within society. Overall, the women were substantially more feminist and progressive in
views than the men and this difference related particularly to public roles in politics and
employment.
The fifth issue which this study explored related to Arab unity and the Palestinian problem.
These two concerns have shaped the Libyan revolutionary regime's policies both domestically
and regionally since 1969. The regime has paid much attention to them, ideologically and in
practice. They have also formed a significant part of the value-system which the regime tried
to inculcate in its citizens, especially in the younger generation.
The findings of the study have shown that the revolutionary regime has had considerable
success in creating positive attitudes over Arab unity and the Palestinian problem among the
new generation. The vast majority of the respondents' answers indicates that they supported
moving towards Arab unity. This included allowing other Arabs to work and live in Libya,
willingness to share Libya's oil wealth with other Arabs, and support for Arab unity even
though Arab governments did not support Libya over the sanctions question. However, on the
question of social integration, especially over women's marriage to non-Libyan Arabs or
Muslims, only male respondents were in favour, but the idea was not popular among female
respondents. Some of the reasons given for disagreeing with the right of women to many non-
Libyan Arabs and Muslims that it is anti-traditional and that other nationalities were not
acceptable, simply because they were not Libyan.
Some other ideas which the regime presented through its ideology towards Arab unity were
popular among the respondents. More than half of the respondents supported the idea that
Libya should seek unity with Arab states which have a different political system (the
monarchical system for instance). They also supported the removal of border and passport
controls as a practical step towards Arab unity. In general, the respondents showed a strong
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and positive degree of national expression towards Arab unity. Their attitudes reflected the
regime's ideology and policies towards this issue.
On the Palestinian problem, the vast majority of respondents indicated that the Palestinian
issue was directly relevant to Libya. Moreover, the most popular possible solution to the
Palestinian problem among the respondents was the liberation of all Palestine. The majority of
respondents showed that they were not willing to accept any peaceful means. The attitudes of
the respondents towards the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel were very
negative. The vast majority were not willing to accept it, instead supporting military means as
a tool for the liberation of all Palestine.
We can conclude that the revolutionary regime in Libya has had considerable success in
creating certain values among the younger generation. The regime was most successful in
inculcating its values on gender issues and Arab nationalism, Arab unity and the Palestinian
problem (Chapters 8 and 9). However, the regime has failed to create participant individuals
and to develop alternatives to kinship ties. Tribes remain a source of identity, economic
welfare and to some extent political identity.
The regime's 'failures' would seem to be accounted for by different factors: in the case of
political participation, the government's efforts have been thwarted by a basic lack of political
trust; in the case of kinship ties, the regime's own message has been two-sided (supporting
them in some ways, yet rejecting any political dimension to them). In those factors where the
regime succeeded (Arab issues and the role of women), the message put across was clear and
untainted by domestic political interests.
It may be useful to compare the case of Libya with the experience which some other
mobilizational regimes have had in seeking to shape the attitudes of citizens, generate
legitimacy and create new citizens. The comparison with Cuba seems particularly relevant.
Both regimes have sought to create the "new man". Creating a new "Cuban socialist man"
was connected with major campaigns of mobilisation for purposes of defence, literacy,
sugarcane-harvesting, and revolutionary-military activities abroad. 14 For the first two decades
these campaigns had moderate success in creating regime legitimacy, the acceptance of the
norm of activism in the implementation of goals, and the acceptance of socialism in the diffuse
sense of that term." This success, however, may not be of lasting significance. In recent years
Cuban experience has witnessed a growth of bureaucratisation, less stress on utopian ideals
and mass mobilisation, and more on efficiency and regimentation."
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The Libyan regime has also sought to inculcate citizens with the values and ideology of the
revolution. The objective has been to create the "Jamahirian man": the activist, participant,
nationally-conscious and motivated citizen with a commitment to Arab nationalism and Arab
unity, and to equality for women. The transformation and mobilisation process targeted the
youth in Libya through the education system, the ideological preparation camps, media and
the militarisation process of the society in general. When this experience is compared with
that of Cuba, the overall conclusion must be that success in the Libyan case was more limited
: the transformation and mobilisation of the society was successful in some aspects and a
failure in some others. Success and failure for the regime in shaping political culture in Libya
is laid out in Table 10.1.
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Table 10.1: Elements of Libyan political culture: measurement of the regime's success
and failure
Elements of political	 Regime's values 	 Respondents' values Measurement of success
culture
Identity	 Arabism and Islam	 • Arabism and Islam positive
UP)	
• Localist source of	 negative
identity (family and
tribe)
Tribalism	 inconsistent	 • strong tribal loyalty negative
and attachment
• hostility to tribes (P)	 positive in some aspects
• respect for the social
role (I)
• source of political
legitimacy since
1990s (P)
• tribe source of
personal and
political identity
• an efficient
organisation in the
absence of a stable
state
• tribalism as a
network of
privilege 
Political participation	 encouraging mass
	 • degree of disbelief negative
participation through
	 in the mechanisms
Basic Popular
	 of political
Congresses (I-P)	 participation
• machinery of the
state is not very
efficient in
preparing people
for a role in
political
_participation 
Women's rights	 • consistent support
for the women's
rights (I-P)
• strong support for	 positive
women's rights
from both sexes in
general
• females showed
more assertiveness
on the equality
question
Arab nationalism, 	 • consistent support 	 • strong support on 	 positive
Arab unity and	 for Arab unity, Arab	 Arab issues (Arab
Palestinian problem	 nationalism and the	 unity and
Palestinian issue (I-	 Palestinian issue)
P)*
I- Ideology	 P- Practice	 (I-P)* It is worth noting that the regime has not
had a consistent record of upholding its own ideological positions. The Libyan regime has expelled
thousands of Arab workers, including Palestinians, using deportation as a tool for reasons of political
pressure against their authorities (see Chapter 9).
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The thesis has shown that the study of political culture enables an effective examination of
certain fundamental variables which affect the political system, such as legitimacy, identity
and attitudes towards political participation. The purpose of this thesis has not been to test a
theory in which political culture plays the role of independent variable. Rather it has
attempted to provide data which could be used in future work to test such a theory against
alternatives such as political economic or political institutional analysis.
10.3 Further Work
From the findings of this study, some questions arise and which necessitate further research.
These questions relate to two different issues, as follows:
a) Islamic fundamentalists: Islamic fundamentalists have been rapidly gaining ground in
many Arab countries, especially in North Africa and Algeria in particular. In Libya this
phenomenon has become evident as well, especially in the 1990s. The question which
can be raised is: Does the value system found among the Libyan students, in particular
those strongly identifying with Islam and Arabism, lie at the backbone of an increase in
Islamic fundamentalism? The existence of a significant number of students who
identified strongly with Islam is interesting. In the light of developments of Islamic
fundamentalism in Libya subsequent to this survey, especially in the Benghazi area, it
may be that it is this sort of identity which has become translated into support for
'fundamentalist' groups. In conditions of tension such an identity might well turn
towards fundamentalist solutions. The increasing numbers of veiled women within
society has become a visible phenomenon, and the increased use of violence by the
Islamists in Libya is further evidence of the trend.
b) Pariah state and changing values: Libya has became a pariah state among nations,
especially after the United Nations sanctions over the Lockerbie plane crash affair took
effect in April 1992. The immediate effect of the sanctions was on the travel side. An
air embargo shut down all international flight connections. The reader may wonder
whether the sanctions against Libya as an external pressure have had any effect on the
main elements of the political culture. Do the people now hold different attitudes
towards Arab unity and Arab nationalism and the Palestinian issue, as a result of the
economic difficulties which the sanctions against Libya have caused? A contemporary
survey of this would be useful.
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The researcher suggests that both of the above mentioned questions are of crucial importance
and should be investigated in further research.
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Appendix A: The Questionnaire
	1.	 Place of family residence
	
2.	 Place of birth
	
3.	 Age
	
4.	 Sex
a) Male
b) Female
	
5.	 Marital status
a) Married
b) Single
	
6.	 Year of university study or number of semesters
	
7.	 Faculty and subject of study
	
8.	 Father's occupation
	
9.	 Level of father's education
a) Illiterate
b) Can read only
c) Can read and write
d) Primary
e) Preparatory
f) Secondary
g) Intermediate
h) University and over
	
10.	 Level of mother's education?
a) Illiterate
b) Can read only
c) Can read and write
d) Primary
e) Preparatory
f) Secondary
g) Intermediate
h) University and over
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11.
a)	 Does your mother work?
i) Yes
ii) No
b)	 If yes, what is your mother's occupation?
12.	 How many people live in your household?
a) Less than 2
b) 2-4
c) 5-7
d) 8-10
e) 11-13
f) 14-16
g) 17-19
h) 20 and over
13.
a)	 What is your family income (per month in Libyan Dinar)?
i) Less than 120
ii) 121-199
iii) 200-300
iv) 301-500
v) 501 and over
b)	 How would you classify - categorise the social status of you family?
i) Labour category
ii) Lower Middle
iii) Middle
iv) Upper Middle
v) Upper
14.
a)	 What kinds of home do you live in?
i) Villa
ii) Apartment/Flat
iii) An old Arabic house
iv) Hut
v) Other (Specify)
b)	 How many rooms are there in your house?
15.	 Which of the following items does your family have? (please tick)
a) A car
b) More than one car
c) Refrigerator
d) Washing-machine
e) Colour television
f) Air conditioning
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g) Telephone
h) Radio recorder
i) Video recorder
j) Satellite dish
	
16.	 Which of these is most important to your identity? (Please tick the relevant box)
a) Being an Arab (Arabism)
b) Being a Muslim (Islam)
c) Both equally
	
17.	 How do you identify yourself? (Please rank in descending order a-g)
a) I am a son / daughter of a specific family
b) I belong to a specific tribe
c) I come from a particular city within Libya
d) I am citizen of the Libyan state
e) I am a Muslim
f) I am an Arab
g) Other (please specify)
	
18.	 I am an Arab because of: (Please rank in descending order a-d)
a) My religion
b) My language
c) I belong to an Arab state
d) Other reasons (specify)
19.
a) Do you belong to a tribe?
i)	 Yes
No
b) If yes, to what extent do you feel loyal and attached to your tribe?
i)	 Very attached
Attached
Not attached
	
20.	 If it were possible, would you like Libyans to drop their tribal identifications and
think of themselves only as Libyan?
a) Yes
b) No
	
21.	 If you had the chance would you like to change to another tribe?
a) Yes
b) No
22.
a) Generally speaking, do you think that one should be careful when dealing
with other people?
i)	 Yes
No
b) Which of the following statements do you agree with?
i)	 I trust most people
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26.
27.
ii) I trust some people
iii) I don't trust any one outside my family
	
23.	 How would you describe your parents' treatment of their children?
a) Strict
b) Relaxed
	
24.	 Who is usually responsible for making decisions in your family?
a) Father
b) Mother
c) Bath
d) All the family
25.
a)	 Did you have a voice in family decisions as a child?
i) Yes
ii) No
b)	 If yes, at what age?
a)	 In general, do you think it is a good idea that children take part in family
discussions?
i) Yes
ii) No
b)	 If yes, at what age should they start taking part?
a)	 Do you remember when you became aware of politics?
i) Yes
ii) No
in)	 Don't know
b)	 If yes, how old were you?
28.
a)	 Did you feel free to talk to your parents about your or your family's affairs
matters?
i) Yes
ii) No
b)	 If yes, who did you talk to?
i) Father
ii) Mother
in)
	 Both
29.	 When you were a pupil at primary, preparatory, and secondary school, how would
you describe your teachers?
a) Strict
b) Relaxed
30.
a) Did you participate in any political activities when you were a pupil at
primary, preparatory, and secondary school, such as the ideological
preparation camps and popular demonstrations?
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i)	 Yes
No
b) If yes, what kind of activities did you participate?
c) If not, why not?
31.
a)	 Have you ever participated in any students' political activities at the
university?
i) Yes
ii) No
b)	 If yes, what kind of activities have you participated in?
c)	 If not, why not?
32.
a) Are you a member of the Students' Congress in your faculty?
i)	 Yes
No
b) If not, why not?
	
33.	 Do you attend discussions in the Students' Congress in your faculty or university?
a) Regularly
b) From time to time
c) Never
	
34.	 Do you attend meetings of the Basic Popular Congresses?
a) Regularly
b) From time to time
c) Never
35.
a) Do you think that you can influence decision making in your Basic Popular
Congress or students' union?
i)	 Yes
No
b) Do you think that you can change any decision making in your Basic Popular
Congress or student's union?
i)	 Yes
No
36.	 Do you follow the changes which occur in the Libyan political system?
a) Regularly
b) From time to time
c) Never
37.
a)	 Do you discuss political affairs, local or international?
i) Yes
ii) No
b)	 If yes, how often do you discuss political affairs, local or international?
i)	 Every day
Once a week
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iii)	 From time to time
	
38.	 Do you discuss political affairs, local or international, with: (Tick each category with
which you discuss politics.)
a) Your family
b) Your relatives
c) Your friends
d) Colleagues and comrades at university
e) Members of the Popular Congress
Others than of the above-mentioned, namely
	
39.	 What kind of mass media do you make use of? (Tick each category which you usually
use)
a) Radio
b) Television
c) Newspapers
d) Magazines
e) All of the above
	
40.
	 Is the idea of Arab nationalism a coherent idea?
a) Yes
b) No
	
41.	 Do you think of the word fatherland (al-watan) as:
a) The existing state in which you are living
b) The wider Arab fatherland
c) I have different view which is:( )
	
42.	 How would you describe the people in the Arab countries? (Please tick one of the
following)
a) They belong to different nations and there are no strong ties between them.
b) They belong to different nations but they have strong ties between them.
c) They belong to one nation but they have different and special features.
d) They belong to one nation which is artificially divided.
43.
a) Do you support moves towards Arab unity?
i)	 Yes
No
b) If yes, would you continue your support despite the following statements?
i)	 Even if this means sharing Libya's oil wealth with other Arabs.
a) Yes
b) No
Even if this means letting other Arabs work and live in Libya.
a) Yes
b) No
Even though Arab governments are not supporting Libya over the
sanctions.
a) Yes
b) No
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	44.	 According to some scholars, the Islamic religion is a vital factor for Arab unity. Do
you agree?
a) Strongly agree
b) Agree
c) Disagree
d) Strongly disagree
	
45.	 Which are the most important factors causing disunity between Arab countries?
a) Ruling elites within Arab countries protecting their interests
b) The role of non-Arab powers
c) Attachment and loyalty of the population to existing states
d) Attempts by groupings to protect their economic interests
e) The role of ethnic minorities
f) Other factors (specify)
	
46.	 Do you think that the Arab League is successfully expressing Pan- Arabism and Arab
nationalism?
a) Yes
b) No
	
47.	 Which type of Arab unity is most desirable in the present time?
a) A merger with one central government overseeing the affairs of the Arab
nation.
b) A federation with a unitary security and military policy, but with individual
domestic policies remaining the responsibility of the existing governments.
c) Co-operation among existing Arab states.
	
48.	 Should Arab unity be built on the basis of smaller regional groupings, e.g. the Gulf
states, the Nile Valley states, the Maghrib states?
a) Yes
b) No
	
49.	 Do you think Libya should seek unity with Arab states which have a different
political system (e.g. Monarchy)?
a) Yes
b) No
	
50.	 As a practical step on the road to Arab unity, do you support the removal of all
border and passport controls?
a) Yes
b) No
	
51.	 Do you think that the Palestinian issue is directly relevant to Libya?
a) Yes
b) No
	
52.	 Which of these statements do you prefer as a solution to the Palestinian problem?
a) A peace process with no pre-conditions linked with UN resolution 242.
b) The liberation of all Palestine.
c) The creation of a secular state for both Arabs and Jews.
d) A peace treaty with Israel.
e) A different strategy (Please specify)
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	53.	 Do you accept the "Declaration of Principles" which has been signed between the
PLO and Israel ?
a) Yes
b) No
	
54.	 "Men and women have equal human rights". Do you agree?
a) Strongly agree
b) Agree
c) Disagree
d) Strongly disagree
55.
a)	 Do you think that, within the family, the father should have more authority
than the mother?
i) Yes
ii) No
b)	 If yes, what are your reasons for this based on? (Please tick whichever word
is most relevant)
i) Religion (Islam says so)
ii) Social values
iii) Traditions and customs (It has always been so)
iv) Other factors (Please mention)
56.	 Do you consider it acceptable for a woman to hold a job which involves authority
over men?
a) Yes
b) No
57.
a)	 Do you think it is important for women to participate in governmental and
political affairs?
i) Yes
ii) No
b)	 If not, why not? Are your reasons for this based on: (Please tick whichever is
most relevant)
i) Religion
ii) Social values
iii) Traditions and customs
iv) Family responsibilities
v) Others (please mention)
	
58.	 There should be no discrimination between male and female in the right to education,
work, freedom of thought, etc. Do you agree?
a) Strongly agree
b) Agree
c) Disagree
d) Strongly disagree
	
59.	 Do you think women should fight alongside men in the army?
a)	 Yes
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b)	 No
60.	 Do women currently possess adequate rights in Libya?
a) Yes
b) No
61.
a)	 Women should have the same right as men to marry other Arabs or non-
Libyan Muslims. Do you agree?
i) Strongly agree
ii) Agree
iii) Disagree
iv) Strongly disagree
b)	 If you disagree, why?
62.
a)	 Do you think it is important for women and men to avoid exaggeration in the
dowry and cost of marriage?
i) Yes
ii) No
b)	 If not, why not?
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Appendix B: The Interview
1.	 Case Number
2.	 Date of the interview
3.	 Place
4.	 Place of family residence
5.	 Place of birth
6.	 Age
7.	 Sex
a) Male
b) Female
8.	 Marital status
a) Married
b) Single
9.	 Year of university study or number of semesters
10.	 Faculty and subject of study
11.	 Father's occupation
12.	 Level of father's education
a) Illiterate
b) Can read only
c) Can read and write
d) Primary
e) Preparatory
f) Secondary
g) Intermediate
h) University and over
13.	 Level of mother's education?
a) Illiterate
b) Can read only
c) Can read and write
d) Primary
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e) Preparatory
f) Secondary
g) Intermediate college
h) University and over
14.
a)	 Does your mother work?
i) Yes
ii) No
b)	 If yes, what is your mother's occupation?
15.	 How many people live in your household?
a) Less than 2
b) 2-4
c) 5-7
d) 8-10
e) 11-13
f) 14-16
g) 17-19
h) 20 and over
16.
a)	 What is your family income (per month in Libyan Dinar)?
i) Less than 120
ii) 121-199
iii) 200-300
iv) 301-500
v) 501 and over
b)	 How would you classify - categorise the social status of you family?
i) Labour category
ii) Lower Middle
in)	 Middle
iv) Upper Middle
v) Upper
	
17.	 How do you identify yourself? (Please rank in descending order a-g)
a) I am a son / daughter of a specific family
b) I belong to a specific tribe
c) I come from a particular city within Libya
d) I am citizen of the Libyan state
e) I am a Muslim
f) I am an Arab
g) Others (please specify)
	
18.	 I am an Arab because of: (Please rank in descending order a-d)
a) My religion
b) My language
c) I belong to an Arab state
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d)	 Other reasons (specify)
19.
a)	 Do you belong to a tribe?
i) Yes
ii) No
b)	 If yes, to what extent do you feel loyal and attached to your tribe?
i) Very attached
ii) Attached
iii) Not attached
20.	 Who is usually responsible for making decisions in your family?
a) Father
b) Mother
c) Both
d) All the family
21.
a)	 In general, do you think it is a good idea that children take part in family
discussions?
i) Yes
ii) No
b)	 If yes, at what age should they start taking part?
22.
a)	 Did you participate in any political activities when you were a pupil at
primary, preparatory, and secondary school, such as the ideological
preparation camps and popular demonstrations?
i) Yes
ii) No
b)	 If yes, what kind of activities did you participate?
c)	 If not, why not?
	
23.	 Do you attend meetings of the Basic Popular Congresses?
a) Regularly
b) From time to time
c) Never
	
24.	 Do you follow the changes which occur in the Libyan political system?
a) Regularly
b) From time to time
c) Never
	
25.	 Is the idea of Arab nationalism a coherent idea?
a) Yes
b) No
	
26.	 Do you think of the word fatherland (al-watan) as:
a) The existing state in which you are living
b) The wider Arab fatherland
c) I have different view which is:( )
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27.
a) Do you support moves towards Arab unity?
i)	 Yes
No
b) If yes, would you continue your support despite the following statements?
i)	 Even if this means sharing Libya's oil wealth with other Arabs.
a) Yes
b) No
ii)	 Even if this means letting other Arabs work and live in Libya.
a) Yes
b) No
iii)	 Even though Arab governments are not supporting Libya over the
sanctions.
a) Yes
b) No
	
28.	 As a practical step on the road to Arab unity, do you support the removal of all
border and passport controls?
a) Yes
b) No
	
29.	 Do you think that the Palestinian issue is directly relevant to Libya?
a) Yes
b) No
	
30.	 Do you accept the "Declaration of Principles" which has been signed between the
PLO and Israel ?
a) Yes
b) No
	
31.	 Do you consider it acceptable for a woman to hold a job which involves authority
over men?
a) Yes
b) No
32.
a) Do you think it is important for women to participate in governmental and
political afFairs?
i)	 Yes
No
b) If not, why not? Are your reasons for this based on: (Please tick whichever is
most relevant)
i)	 Religion
Social values
iii) Traditions and customs
iv) Family responsibilities
v) Others (please mention)
33.	 Do women currently possess adequate rights in Libya?
a)	 Yes
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b)	 No
34.
a)	 Women should have the same right as men to marry other Arabs or non-
Libyan Muslims. Do you agree?
i) Strongly agree
ii) Agree
iii) Disagree
iv) Strongly disagree
b)	 If you disagree, why?
35.
a)	 Do you think it is important for women and men to avoid exaggeration in the
dowry and cost of marriage?
i) Yes
ii) No
b)	 If not, why not?
36.	 Many religious, social and political values and beliefs have different sources. Rank
the following sources according to their influence on you.
a) Family
b) Tribe
c) Peer groups and colleagues
d) School and school curricula
e) Mass media
f) Mosque -
0	 Personal experience
h)	 Others (Please specify)
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Appendix C: Structure of People's
Authority System
Source: Muammar Al-Qadhafi, The Green Book, vol. 1, (Tripoli: Global Centre for Study
and Research on the Green Book, 1979).
